The Six Commitments and Their Classical Analogues
The Six Commitments and Their Classical Analogues
Below is a clean, non-rhetorical mapping of your six commitments to their classical philosophical analogues, historically and conceptually — not modern reconstructions, not theological versions, and not post-Kantian reinterpretations.
This is the philosophical lineage of each commitment.
1. Substance Dualism
Your commitment:
The agent (prohairesis / mind) is ontologically distinct from the body and not reducible to it.
Classical analogues:
- Plato — Phaedo, Republic: the soul is not identical with the body; the body is an impediment to the soul’s proper function.
- Aristotle — De Anima (non-reductive hylomorphism): intellect (nous) is separable, impassible, and not bodily.
- Epictetus — Discourses 1.1: “You are not flesh and hair, but prohairesis.”
- Plotinus — Enneads: the soul belongs to a higher order than the body.
- Augustine — the mind is not extended in space and is not identical with matter.
Shared core:
Mind is not identical with body; rational agency is not a physical process.
2. Metaphysical Libertarianism
Your commitment:
The agent can genuinely choose otherwise; assent is not causally necessitated.
Classical analogues:
- Aristotle — voluntary action (to hekousion) requires alternative possibilities.
- Epictetus — prohairesis is unconstrained by externals; responsibility presupposes freedom.
- Cicero — De Fato: rejects strict determinism for moral responsibility.
- Alexander of Aphrodisias — defends indeterminism against Stoic fate.
- Origen — moral responsibility requires freedom not determined by prior causes.
Shared core:
Moral responsibility requires genuine alternative possibilities.
3. Ethical Intuitionism
Your commitment:
Moral truths are directly recognizable by rational insight, not derived by inference.
Classical analogues:
- Plato — knowledge of the Good is direct intellectual apprehension.
- Aristotle — phronesis directly sees the morally salient features of a situation.
- Stoics — katalēptic impressions grasp value directly.
- Cicero — natural law is known by reason immediately.
- Aquinas — synderesis apprehends first moral principles directly.
Shared core:
Reason directly apprehends moral truth; it is not constructed or inferred.
4. Moral Realism
Your commitment:
Good and evil are objective features of reality, not projections or preferences.
Classical analogues:
- Plato — Forms, especially the Form of the Good, are objective realities.
- Aristotle — human good is grounded in objective function (ergon).
- Stoics — virtue is objectively good, vice objectively bad.
- Cicero — justice is not conventional but natural.
- Augustine — good is participation in being; evil is privation.
Shared core:
Moral value is not subjective or conventional; it is mind-independent.
5. Foundationalism
Your commitment:
Moral knowledge rests on bedrock principles that are not derived from other beliefs.
Classical analogues:
- Aristotle — first principles (archai) are not demonstrated but known.
- Stoics — axioms of value (virtue is good) are not proven but presupposed.
- Aquinas — “do good and avoid evil” is self-evident.
- Plato — the Good is the ultimate explanatory terminus.
Shared core:
Justification terminates; not everything is proven.
6. Correspondence Theory of Truth
Your commitment:
A judgment is true if and only if it matches reality.
Classical analogues:
- Aristotle — “to say of what is that it is” is truth.
- Plato — knowledge is of what is, opinion is of what appears.
- Stoics — true impressions correspond to what is the case.
- Aquinas — adaequatio intellectus et rei.
Shared core:
Truth is conformity of thought to being.
Summary Table
| Your Commitment | Classical Analogue | Core Thesis |
|---|---|---|
| Substance Dualism | Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Augustine | Mind ≠ body |
| Libertarian Freedom | Aristotle, Epictetus, Cicero | Agency requires alternatives |
| Ethical Intuitionism | Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Aquinas | Reason directly sees value |
| Moral Realism | Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Cicero | Value is objective |
| Foundationalism | Aristotle, Stoics, Aquinas | Justification terminates |
| Correspondence Truth | Aristotle, Stoics, Aquinas | Truth = conformity to being |
Final Point
Your six commitments are not idiosyncratic, modern, or hybrid.
They are the classical moral-metaphysical spine of Western philosophy before the modern turn.
That is why they feel familiar, stable, strict, and heavy.
They are not fashionable.
They are structural.