I must eradicate the belief that externals have value before I can become pious

On 7/21/2017 I posted the following message to the International Stoic Forum to which Chris Fisher and Grant Sterling responded.

"My sense of community is stimulated by a sense of shared or similar ethical beliefs. The main point of Handbook 31 is actually that we will not be able to hold the right opinions about the gods: that they exist and govern the cosmos well and justly and that we should follow them willingly, unless we regulate our desires and aversions."

"Epictetus Enchiridion Chapter 31, trans. George Long"

"Be assured that the essence of piety towards the gods lies in this, to form right opinions concerning them, as existing, and as governing the universe justly and well. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them amidst all events, as being ruled by the most perfect wisdom. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected in any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things which are not within our own power, and by making good or evil to consist only in those which are. For if you suppose any other things to be either good or evil, it is inevitable that, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you should reproach and blame their authors. For every creature is naturally formed to flee and abhor things that appear hurtful, and that which causes them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and that which causes them. It is impracticable, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should rejoice in the person who, as he thinks, hurts him; just as it is impossible to rejoice in the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by his son, when he does not impart the things which seem to be good; and this made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies, that empire seemed good to both. On this account the husbandman reviles the gods; the sailor, the merchant, or those who have lost wife or child. For where our interest is, there too is piety directed. So that whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought is thus made careful of piety likewise. But it also becomes incumbent on every one to offer libations and sacrifices and first-fruits, according to the customs of his country, purely, and not heedlessly nor negligently; not avariciously, nor yet extravagantly."


To which Chris Fisher responded:

"Dave,

"That's interesting. If I understand you correctly, you're suggesting that our ability to "regulate our desires and aversions" either affects our ability to hold right opinions about the gods or includes those right opinions about them. Is that correct?

"Chris"


To which I answered:

"I wasn't considering a general "ability to regulate our desires and aversions," just the possible effect of our desires for, and aversions to, things not in our control.

"For if you  judge things not in your control to be either good or evil, it is inevitable that when you don't get what you desire or get what you desire to avoid, you will reproach and blame those who you think are the authors of those events or circumstances.

"If you believe that you have been harmed by the gods, it is 'impracticable' that you will rejoice in those who you believe caused the harm, as it is 'impossible' to rejoice in the harm itself.

"So, piety and right opinions about the gods are threatened by any false valuation of externals.


Grant Sterling also responded to my original post:

"I completely agree with Dave. To put it another way, the belief 'the Gods control the universe well and justly' contradicts the belief 'it was bad for that thing {whatever it is} to have happened'. So if I assent to the impression 'some external things are good or evil', then I am doomed to be impious--it's just a matter of time before they don't turn out the way I want them to, and when that happens I will perceive the outcome as bad, and then I cannot also truly believe that the gods rule everything well and justly. If it's bad for my crops to die, or for the Steelers to win the Super Bowl, or for (so-and-so) to be elected to public office, and those things happen, then obviously the gods don't rule the universe well--they're either too weak to prevent the bad thing from happening, or they're not fully good, or they don't exist at all.

"Notice that Epictetus is not arguing here that I should start with the idea that the gods rule the universe well and justly and this will help me to rid myself of the idea that externals are good or evil--he thinks that I must eradicate the belief that externals have value before I can become pious.

"On the topic of reverence--notice that Epictetus' view is that all ceremonies are irrelevant if we are impious--that is, if I am unhappy about something that occurs, then I have insulted the gods by suggesting that they are stupid, weak, or evil. If I insult the gods with my unhappiness, then no ceremony that I perform makes a difference to my (im)piety. If I have first eradicated my belief that externals have value, and so I no longer insult the gods with my unhappiness, _then_ I can perform ceremonies in the proper way. The ceremonies have value as a public sign of respect for the gods, but it is the inner respect (or disrespect) that really matters most.

Regards,
Grant

What are the things to which I ought to pay attention?

What are the things to which I ought to pay attention?

Epictetus' Discourses 4.12 argues for the necessity of always paying attention. But while paying attention generally is advantageous, Epictetus insists that we pay attention, first, to three specific philosophical principles.

"What are the things, then, to which I ought to pay attention?—First, these general principles, and you ought to have them at your command, and without them neither go to sleep, nor rise up, nor drink, nor eat, nor mingle with men; I mean the following: [1] No man is master of another's moral purpose; and: [2] In its sphere alone are to be found one's good and evil. It follows, therefore, [3] that no one has power either to procure me good, or to involve me in evil, but I myself alone have authority over myself in these matters" (Epictetus, Discourses 4.12.7--8; Oldfather).

The text of Discourses 4.12.1--18 follows this link to John Sellars' commentary on Epictetus' teaching on prosoche ('attention').


"When you relax your attention for a little while, do not imagine that whenever you choose you will recover it, but bear this in mind, that because of the mistake which you have made to-day, your condition must necessarily be worse as regards everything else. For, to begin with—and this is the worst of all—a habit of not paying attention is developed; and after that a habit of deferring attention; and always you grow accustomed to putting off from one time to another tranquil and appropriate living, the life in accordance with nature, and persistence in that life. Now if the postponement of such matters is profitable, it is still more profitable to abandon them altogether; but if it is not profitable, why do you not maintain your attention continuously? "To-day I want to play." What is to prevent your playing, then,—but with attention? "I want to sing." What is to prevent your singing, then,—but with attention? There is no part of the activities of your life excepted, to which attention does not extend, is there? What, will you do it worse by attention, and better by inattention? And yet what other thing, of all that go to make up our life, is done better by those who are inattentive? Does the inattentive carpenter do his work more ​accurately? The inattentive helmsman steer more safely? And is there any other of the lesser functions of life which is done better by inattention? Do you not realize that when once you let your mind go wandering, it is no longer within your power to recall it, to bring it to bear upon either seemliness, or self-respect, or moderation? But you do anything that comes into your head, you follow your inclinations.

What are the things, then, to which I ought to pay attention?—First, these general principles, and you ought to have them at your command, and without them neither go to sleep, nor rise up, nor drink, nor eat, nor mingle with men; I mean the following: [1] No man is master of another's moral purpose; and: [2] In its sphere alone are to be found one's good and evil. It follows, therefore, [3] that no one has power either to procure me good, or to involve me in evil, but I myself alone have authority over myself in these matters. Accordingly, when these things are secure for me, what excuse have I for being disturbed about things external? What kind of tyrant inspires fear, what kind of disease, or poverty, or obstacle?—But I have not pleased So-and-so.10—He is not my function, is he? He is not my judgement, is he?—No.—Why, then, do I care any longer?—But he has the reputation of being somebody.—He and those who think so highly of him will have to see to that, but I have one whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey, that is, God, and after Him, myself. God has commended me to myself, and He has subjected to me alone my moral purpose, giving me standards for the correct use of it; and when I follow ​these standards, I pay heed to none of those who say anything else, I give not a thought to anyone in arguments with equivocal premisses.  Why, then, in the more important matters am I annoyed by those who censure me? What is the reason for this perturbation of spirit? Nothing but the fact that in this field I lack training. For, look you, every science is entitled to despise ignorance and ignorant people, and not merely the sciences, but also the arts. Take any cobbler you please, and he laughs the multitude to scorn when it comes to his own work; take any carpenter you please.

First, therefore, we ought to have these principles at command, and to do nothing apart from them, but keep the soul intent upon this mark; we must pursue [desire] none of the things external, none of the things which are not our own, but as He that is mighty has ordained; pursuing without any hesitation the things that lie within the sphere of the moral purpose, and all other things as they have been given us. And next we must remember [4] who we are, and [5] what is our designation, and [6] must endeavour to direct our actions, in the performance of our duties, to meet the possibilities of our social relations. We must remember what is the proper time for song, the proper time for play, and in whose presence; also what will be out of place; lest our companions despise us, and we despise ourselves; when to jest, and whom to laugh at, and to what end to engage in social intercourse, and with whom; and, finally, how to maintain one's proper character in such social intercourse. But whenever you deviate from any one of these principles, immediately you suffer loss, and that not from anywhere outside, but from the very nature of the activity" (Epictetus, Discourses 4.12.1--18; Oldfather).

Stoicism says that the common-sense view of emotions is completely and totally wrong

 

Stoicism says that the common-sense view of emotions is completely and totally wrong.

Grant Sterling's message to the International Stoic Forum in answer to Anna Kinesman

On 9/18/15 8:42 AM, Anna Kinesman [ ... ] [stoics] wrote:
>
>
> Dear Grant,
>
> Before I went away we were discussing my view that Stoicism is common
> sense and simple.
>
> Looking at Nigel’s response to your posts, he seems to have dealt with

> most of your objections.However when it comes to you saying that <<< The


> Stoics explicitly reject the common sense view of the emotions >>> -
> perhaps if you were to read a piece by John Sellars (Research Fellow at
> King's College London) which you can find at
>
> http://misc-stoica.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/stoicism-and-emotion.html
> you will see what I was trying to explain.
>
> He offers what I find to be a very good common sense approach to the
> various types of emotions and the Stoic attitude to them.
>
> Yours sincerely,
>
> Anna

I have been extremely busy with matters of university
governance, so I haven't had a chance to respond to the contributions
on this thread (and related threads, such as the one on Epictetus'
ethics). I have a little time now, but only for one post, so
I'll try to tackle some broad issues that will apply to many
different discussions.

I have read the linked article. I find, in general, that
he has accurately stated Stoic doctrine but drawn the wrong
conclusions. I won't follow step-by-step through the article, but
I will highlight a few points.

1) On the word "emotion". I quite agree with the author that the
Stoic technical term "pathos" doesn't perfectly match up with the
ordinary-language English word "emotion", because like most ordinary-
language words "emotion" is not used with anything like a consistent and
rigorous definition, and so sometime it is used for things the Stoics
wouldn't have called "pathe".
However, I think we can easily go on talking about "emotions"
(as I have done), for two reasons:
a) If you try to converse with people about Stoicism outside
a fairly technical setting, then insisting on using ancient Greek
terms will end the conversation with no information being passed.
As a professional philosopher, I am quite comfortable with having
conversations that rely on technical terms from other languages, but
on this list I usually use English except when narrowly technical points
are being discussed (or occasionally when I think no English word is
even close to the meaning I want). Since this thread was about, in
part, discussing Stoicism with non-philosophers, I don't think we should
"go Greek".
b) "Emotion" is much closer to "pathos" than any other English
word, including "passion". ("Passion" is now used almost exclusively
for intense desires, especially sexual ones. Just as "emotion" is
sometimes used too broadly in comparison to "pathos", "passion is
typically used far too narrowly.)

Whatever the version of the OED that Sellars has may say
(my OED defines it much differently), ordinary English speakers
_almost never, in fact, use the word "emotion" for just any mental
feeling whatsoever_. Try this test: find 10 people at random, and
ask them to write down the first three types of emotion that enter their
heads. I am willing to bet that almost all 30 of the words they
write down would qualify as Stoic "pathe": fear, grief, anger, love,
hate, etc. While someone might in theory use the word "emotion" to
describe "the joy experienced by a virtuous person when they perceive
that an act of virtue has been performed", no-one in fact thinks of
this sort of thing when they think of "emotions". The physical pleasure
of eating a good meal could conceivably be called an "emotion", but
few people think of that when the word "emotion" is used. Instantaneous
shock might be called an emotion, but it's not one that anyone thinks
of.
So, in fact, when you tell someone "the Stoics called for the
elimination of all emotions" most English speakers will think that
you mean that the Stoics called for the elimination of love (as a
passionate feeling), hate, anger, fear, grief, etc. And since that
is exactly what the Stoics called for, your statement will convey
accurate information. If the conversation continues and you need to
make explicit that things like virtuous joy and physical or aesthetic
pleasures don't count as "emotions" you can easily do so. But you
will have brought the other person far closer to the truth than if
you try to say something like "the Stoics want to eliminate excessive
emotions" (which they will interpret as "go ahead and fear anger,
fear, grief, etc., just not too strongly" which is totally and
completely off the mark) or "the Stoics want to eliminate negative
emotions" (which they will understand as allowing passionate love
and desires) or any similar formulation.

2) On "care" (or "love"). It's true that the Stoics think that
a kind of concern for the well-being of oneself and others is
appropriate, and that indeed it should be extended and not
eliminated. But to call it "care" is even more misleading than to
call pathe "emotions". According to the Stoics, I should have concern
for my wife, but if she dies tomorrow I should feel NO grief. (I
might be stunned for an instant if she were to die unexpectedly or
suddenly, but no more than that.) This completely rational and logical
attempt to make someone's life better is nothing at all like what
English-speakers usually call "care" or "love". If I am diagnosed with
possible cancer I should feel NO fear. If my child is murdered I
should feel NO anger. Etc. This sort of Stoic care or love is not, in
fact, any reason to say that the Stoics don't call for the elimination
of all emotion.

3) The vital heart of Stoic doctrine...
The Stoics believe that only things directly related to virtue
(beliefs, desires, will) are in our control.
They believe that only virtue is good and only vice is evil.
They believe that all things not in our control ("externals")
are neither good nor evil.
They believe that desires are caused by beliefs about good
and evil.
Hence, the good Stoic will have no desires whatsoever regarding
external things.
They believe that our feelings of love, hate, fear, grief, anger,
frustration, disappointment, etc., are all caused by beliefs
that external things are good or evil.
Hence, the good Stoic will never experience any of those
feelings, even in the slightest degree.
Of course, we haven't been brought up as Stoics. So they
believe that we have a lifetime of habits built around believing that
externals are good or evil. This means that we are liable to make
_false_ judgments, and hence feel those feelings to some degree.
Some Stoic teachings are designed to helping us deal with those
mistakes when they occur--but this doesn't mean that these mistakes
are somehow acceptable or appropriate.
{Ordinary people believe that every single one of those
basic principles is false.}

The ordinary, common-sense view of emotions is that emotions
are a natural response to situations of a certain sort. (Natural
both in the sense of 'arising from our nature and hence not in
our control' and in the sense of 'appropriate and acceptable'.)
Emotions shouldn't get "out of hand", in the sense of leading us
to do obviously self-destructive things or preventing us from
leading normal lives, but less violent emotions are just fine.
If my wife dies I _should_ be overcome for a while by grief (if
not, then I didn't really love her and I am therefore to be
condemned). Although I should gradually recover from this grief
over a period of days, painful memories of loss may be expected to
persist for the rest of my life. If my cat dies I should feel
grief of a lesser degree, and should recover more quickly and
completely.
If my child is murdered or raped I should feel intense
and lasting anger. Not anger so violent as to lead me to run
across the courtroom and try to strangle the accused attacker,
although I probably wouldn't be condemned if I did so. As with
the grief, the anger should dissipate somewhat as time goes by,
although if I ever completely forgive the attacker that will be
an act of saintliness, which would not be normal or expected.
If someone insults me at work I should feel anger of a lesser
degree.
If I am diagnosed with cancer, I should feel fear.
That fear may well be severe enough to interfere with my normal
life for some time, although not so severe as to completely
debilitate me. If I might lose my job, I should feel fear to a
lesser degree.

That's the common-sense view of emotions. That's
the view of emotions that every single person that I know
of who hasn't studied Stoicism holds. Stoicism says that this
view is completely and totally wrong. Emotions (as here
understood) are not "natural", they result from our beliefs, and
our beliefs are in our control. (They may be _habitual_, but
that's completely different.) And the appropriate level of grief,
anger, and fear to feel is...zero.

So I stand by my claims. Stoicism calls for the elimination
of all the things that people ordinarily think of when they think of
"emotions". Stoicism completely rejects the ordinary view of emotions.
Stoicism is utterly radical.

Regards,
Grant

That we do not practise the application of our judgements about things good and evil

Epictetus' Discourses 2.16; trans. W. A. Oldfather

That we do not practise the application of our judgements about things good and evil

Wherein lies the good?—In moral purpose.—Wherein lies evil?—In moral purpose.—Wherein lies that which is neither good nor evil?—In the things that lie outside the domain of moral purpose.—Well, what of it? Does any one of us remember these statements outside the classroom? Does any ​one of us when by himself practise answering facts in the way he answers these questions? "So it is day, is it?" "Yes." "What then? Is it night?" "No." "What then? Is the number of the stars even?" "I cannot say."^[1] When you are shown money, have you practised giving the proper answer, namely, that it is not a good thing? Have you trained yourself in answers of this kind, or merely to answer sophisms? Why, then, are you surprised to find that in the fields in which you have practised you surpass yourself, but in that in which you have not practised you remain the same? ⁵For why is it that the orator, although he knows that he has composed a good speech, has memorized what he has written and is bringing a pleasing voice to his task, is still anxious despite all that? Because he is not satisfied with the mere practice of oratory. What, then, does he want? He wants to be praised by his audience. Now he has trained himself with a view to being able to practise oratory, but he has not trained himself with reference to praise and blame. For when did he ever hear any one say what praise is, what blame is, and what is the nature of each? What kinds of praise are to be sought, and what kinds of blame are to be avoided? And when did he ever go through this course of training in accordance with these principles? Why, then, are you any longer surprised because he surpasses all others in the field in which he has studied, but in that in which he has not practised he is no better than the multitude? He is like a citharoede who knows how to play to the harp, sings well, has a beautiful flowing gown, and still trembles when he comes upon the stage; for all that has gone before he knows, but ​what a crowd is he does not know, nor what the shouting and the scornful laughter of a crowd are. ¹⁰Nay, he does not even know what this anxiety itself is, whether it is something that we can control, or beyond our powers, whether he can stop it or not. That is why, if he is praised, he goes off the stage all puffed up; but if he is laughed to scorn, that poor windbag of his conceit is pricked and flattens out.

We too experience something of the same kind. What do we admire? Externals. What are we in earnest about? About externals. Are we, then, at a loss to know how it comes about that we are subject to fear and anxiety? Why, what else can possibly happen, when we regard impending events as things evil? We cannot help but be in fear, we cannot help but be in anxiety. And then we say, "O Lord God, how may I escape anxiety?" Fool, have you not hands? Did not God make them for you? Sit down now and pray forsooth that the mucus in your nose may not run! Nay, rather wipe your nose and do not blame God! What then? Has he given you nothing that helps in the present case? Has he not given you endurance, has he not given you magnanimity, has he not given you courage? When you have such serviceable hands as these do you still look for someone to wipe your nose? ¹⁵But these virtues we neither practise nor concern ourselves withal. Why, show me one single man who cares how he does something, who is concerned, not with getting something, but with his own action. Who is there that is concerned with his own action while he is walking around? Who, when he is planning, is concerned with the plan ​itself, and not with getting what he is planning about? And then if he gets it, he is all set up and says, "Yes, indeed, what a fine plan we made! Did I not tell you, brother, that, if there was anything at all in my views, it was impossible for the plan to fall out otherwise?" But if the plan goes the other way, he is humble and wretched, and cannot even find any explanation of what has happened. Who of us ever called in a seer for a case of this kind? Who of us ever slept in a temple^[2] for enlightenment about our action? Who? Show me but one, that I may see him, the man that I have long been looking for, the truly noble and gifted man; be he young or old, only show him!

Why, then, do we wonder any longer that, although in material things we are thoroughly experienced, nevertheless in our actions we are dejected, unseemly, worthless, cowardly, unwilling to stand the strain, utter failures one and all? For we have not troubled ourselves about these matters in time past, nor do we even now practise them. Yet if we were afraid, not of death or exile, but of fear itself, then we should practise how not to encounter those things that appear evil to us. ²⁰But as it is, we are fiery and fluent in the schoolroom, and if some trivial question about one of these points comes up, we are able to pursue the logical consequences; yet drag us into practical application, and you will find us miserable shipwrecked mariners. Let a disturbing thought come to us and you will find out what we have been practising and for what we have been training! As a result, because of our lack of practice, we are ever going out of our way to heap up terrors and to make them out greater ​than they actually are. For example, whenever I go to sea, on gazing down into the deep or looking around upon the expanse of waters and seeing no land, I am beside myself, fancying that if I am wrecked I shall have to swallow this whole expanse of waters; but it does not occur to me that three pints are enough. What is it, then, that disturbs me? The expanse of sea? No, but my judgement. Again, when there is an earthquake, I fancy that the whole city is going to fall upon me; what, is not a little stone enough to knock my brains out?

What, then, are the things that weigh upon us and drive us out of our senses? Why, what else but our judgements? For when a man goes hence abandoning the comrades, the places, and the social relations to which he is accustomed, what else is the burden that is weighing him down but a judgement? ²⁵Children, indeed, when they cry a little because their nurse has left, forget their troubles as soon as they get a cookie. Would you, therefore, have us resemble children? No, by Zeus! For I claim that we should be influenced in this way, not by a cookie, but by true judgements. And what are these? The things which a man ought to practise all day long, without being devoted to what is not his own, either comrade, or place, or gymnasia, nay, not even to his own body; but he should remember the law and keep that before his eyes. And what is the law of God? To guard what is his own, not to lay claim to what is not his own, but to make use of what is given him, and not to yearn for what has not been given; when something is taken away, to give it up readily and ​without delay, being grateful for the time in which he had the use of it—all this if you do not wish to be crying for your nurse and your mammy! For what difference does it make what object a man has a weakness for and depends upon? In what respect are you superior to the man who weeps for a maid, if you grieve for a trivial gymnasium, a paltry colonnade, a group of youngsters, and that way of spending your time? ³⁰Someone else comes and grieves because he is no longer going to drink the water of Dirce.^[3] What, is the water of the Marcian aqueduct inferior to that of Dirce? "Nay, but I was accustomed to that water." And you will get accustomed to this in turn. And then, if you become addicted to something of this kind, weep for this too in turn, and try to write a line after the pattern of that of Euripides:

To Nero's baths and Marcian founts once more.^[4]

Behold how tragedy arises, when everyday events befall fools!

"When, then, shall I see Athens once more and the Acropolis?" Poor man, are you not satisfied with what you are seeing every day? Have you anything finer or greater to look at than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? And if you really understand Him that governs the universe, and bear Him about within you, do you yet yearn for bits of stone and a pretty rock?^[5] When, therefore, you are about to leave the sun and the moon, what will you do? Will you sit and cry as little children cry? What was it you did at ​school? What was it you heard and learned? Why did you record yourself as a philosopher when you might have recorded the truth in these words: "I studied a few introductions, and did some reading in Chrysippus, but I did not even get past the door of a philosopher?^[6] 35Since what part have I in that business in which Socrates, who died so nobly, and so nobly lived, had a part? Or in that in which Diogenes had a part?" Can you imagine one of these men crying or fretting because he is not going to see such-and-such a man, or such-and-such a woman, or to live in Athens or in Corinth, but, if it so happen, in Susa or in Ecbatana? What, does he who is at liberty to leave the banquet when he will, and to play the game no longer, keep on annoying himself by staying? Does he not stay, like children,^{[† 1]} only as long as he is entertained? Such a man would be likely, forsooth, to endure going into exile for life or the exile of death, if this were his sentence.

Are you not willing, at this late date, like children, to be weaned and to partake of more solid food, and not to cry for mammies and nurses—old wives' lamentations? ⁴⁰"But if I leave, I shall cause those women sorrow?" You cause them sorrow? Not at all, but it will be the same thing that causes sorrow to you yourself—bad judgement.^[7] What, then, can you do? Get rid of that judgement, and, if they do well, they will themselves get rid of their judgement; otherwise, they will come to grief and have only themselves to thank for it. Man, do something desperate, as the expression goes, now if never before, to achieve peace, freedom, and ​mindedness. Lift up your neck at last like a man escaped from bondage, be bold to look towards God and say, "Use me henceforward for whatever Thou wilt; I am of one mind with Thee; I am Thine; I crave exemption from nothing that seems good in Thy sight; where Thou wilt, lead me; in what raiment Thou wilt, clothe me. Wouldst Thou have me to hold office, or remain in private life; to remain here or go into exile; to be poor or be rich? I will defend all these Thy acts before men; I will show what the true nature of each thing is." Nay, you will not; sit rather in the house as girls do^{[8][† 2]} and wait for your mammy until she feeds you! If Heracles had sat about at home, what would he have amounted to? He would have been Eurystheus^[9] and no Heracles. Come, how many acquaintances and friends did he have with him as he went up and down through the whole world? Nay, he had no dearer friend than God. That is why he was believed to be a son of God, and was. It was therefore in obedience to His will that he went about clearing away wickedness and lawlessness. ⁴⁵But you are no Heracles, you say, and you cannot clear away the wickedness of other men, nay, nor are you even a Theseus, to clear away the ills of Attica merely. Very well, clear away your own then. From just here, from out your own mind, cast not Procrustes and Sciron,^[10] but grief, fear, desire, envy, joy at others' ills; cast out greed, effeminacy, incontinency. These ​things you cannot cast out in any other way than by looking to God alone, being specially devoted to Him only, and consecrated to His commands. But if you wish anything else, with lamentation and groaning you will follow that which is stronger than you are, ever seeking outside yourself for peace, and never able to be at peace. For you seek peace where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

Compare Discourses 3.3.14--19, 3.8.1--5.

On the radical nature of Stoicism

 

On the radical nature of Stoicism

On 2/27/17 Grant Sterling wrote to the International Stoic
Forum in response to Nigel Glassborow:

*****
        I am entirely happy with the suggestion that when
we explain Stoic ideas to a lay-person, we should have
ways of explaining them that do not involve simply confronting
them with translations or transliterations of ancient Greek
sentences.  That is obviously true.  So, to that extent, I
am in complete sympathy with the basic suggestion of your
"plea for tolerance".  The problem I have, and what Steve is
trying to get at, is that what we need are ways of explaining
Stoic ideas to a lay-person so that they're easier to
understand, as long as those new ways of explaining things aren't
actually _modifications of the ideas_.
        So, for example, you rightly point out that it will
not be successful for a Stoic to tell their spouse "I consider
you an indifferent".  That wording won't accurately convey to
the spouse what you're trying to say (unless your spouse reads
lots of Stoic philosophy, of course).  The ordinary English
meaning of "indifferent" is not exactly what the Stoics are
talking about.
        But suppose you were in a situation where your spouse
really says "I know that you like Stoicism and I really want
to understand what it says".  And suppose that you judge that
it is appropriate for you to respond truthfully to this
request.  Then you can say things like "the Stoics think that
nothing outside our own choices are truly important to our
well-being" (or something like that).  And if, as the conversation
goes along, the spouse says "does that mean that you should be
exactly as happy if I were to die tomorrow as if I like?", the
Stoic should say "yes".  I suspect that most spouses would find
that view just as unappealing as being told that they are an
indifferent, but that's what the view says.  The person who
says "No, the Stoics think that some degree of unhappiness
should accompany the death of a loved one" is not "explaining the
Stoic ideas in different words"--that person is _lying_ about
Stoic views to make them more palatable.
        Stoic doctrine says that the lives of any human being
(including oneself) are indifferents (preferred indifferents,
yes, but still indifferents).  As such, one's happiness should
not be diminished even an iota by the deaths of anyone else.
One should not feel even the slightest negative feeling as a
result--no grief, no "upset", nothing.  [If anything, one should
be happy that the perfect god(s) have chosen to do this.]  That's
what Stoicism says.  There are any number of different ways to
explain this idea in English, but this is what the worldview says.
        So that's what Steve is getting at--it often seems as
though you're not merely "saying the same things in different words",
in which case of course tolerance is called for.  It often seems
as though you are denying fundamental Stoic truths, and that's
totally different.  It's like a husband who has had an affair and
has decided to come clean and admit it to his wife.  Rather than
say "I've been having sex with another woman", he may want to
approach things differently and use different words.  But those words
can't be "I've never had sex with another woman".

        Notice--the Greeks had many ways of expressing degrees
of distress.  What is critical to notice is that Epictetus
_doesn't_ use a different word.  He could easily have said
in Greek what Oldfather (is that right) translated him as
saying--he could easily have suggested that some distress was
ok in the case of a dead child and all we need to do is prevent
excessive distress.  But he doesn't say that.  Indeed, the entire
point of the passage is that we should start by working towards
being able to handle the breaking of a cup (or jug) without ANY
distress, and then work our way up to the point where we can
handle the death of a spouse or child without ANY distress.  The
passage is absolutely unambiguous.  You may not like what he's
saying, but that's what he's saying.
        And I think he's clearly right.
***

> To add to this we have from Cicero the suggestion that some Stoic ideas
> could be better talked of if one used two words to translate the Greek
> word ‘pathos’ (feelings) into Latin - namely ‘inner stirrings’
> (emotions) for what are to be seen as instinctive and natural feelings
> that are part of the nature of being a human social animal and
> ‘perturbations’ for those unnatural feelings that the Stoic is guided to
> avoid - namely the ones caused by incorrect judgements or false
> impressions that take one’s feelings to a stage whereby the ‘ruling
> faculty’ has it’s capacity for reasoned judgement swamped.

*****
        Cicero found Stoicism appealing but was not himself
a Stoic partly because Stoicism was too radical for him.
I am not aware of the exact passage that you refer to, but
the Stoics already had a Greek word for the distinctions _they_
made between a good, acceptable and unacceptable feelings:
Eu-, pro-, and (prescriptless) Pathos.  Only the Sage has the
first, the second is momentary and involuntary, and everything
else is in the third category.  None of these distinctions
correspond to what you find in Cicero.
***

> So it is right to see the Stoic exercise in dealing with the cup to be
> the same exercise required to deal with the loss of a loved one – but
> one is also right to class them of being of different degree of
> difficulty – to repeat,  Epictetus is advising his student to start with
> the easier situation.

*****
        Absolutely true.  One begins with the cup (or jug),
and works up to spouses and children.  Recognizing that the
lives of spouses and children are neither good nor evil is
much more difficult that recognizing that the breaking of a
cup is neither good nor evil.  I totally agree with you when
you say (as you have often said) that we must overcome ingrained
habits of seeing the world differently, and so moving towards
the Stoic ideal will be a long process that will have to be
completed one step at a time.
***

> This applies to many Stoic principles.  Something either is or it is not
> – there are no degrees in between.  But if something is, then (with the
> fact that this something is of the category that defines it) it is also
> to be found that that something may admit to differing degrees as to how
> much ‘force’ it may exercise.
>
> This is true of ‘pathos’ in that not all ‘pathos’ is at the level that
> Cicero classes as ‘perturbations that ought to be avoided’.  The
> critical factor in much that Stoicism offers us is that the ‘feelings’
> must answer to the rule of the ‘ruling faculty’ in that it rules through
> the reasoned appraisal of the impressions and the reasoned judgements
> that follow.

*****
        And then you plunge over the edge.  This is simply not what
the Stoics taught.  They gave a million examples that explicitly
deny this.  Whatever Cicero might or might not have said (and
remember, again, that Cicero thought Stoicism too radical to
embrace), everyone else in the ancient world understood Stoicism
in that way.  The logic of their argument leads inevitably to
that conclusion--they always asserted emphatically that all external are neither good nor evil, and everything outside of our own judgments
and choices are externals.  If the death of my spouse is neither good
nor evil, then NO distress, however slight, is appropriate.  That's
the view, Nigel.  In the first part of this post, you seem to be
offering Stoic ideas--it's _harder_ to avoid distress when a loved one
dies than it is to avoid distress when a cup is broken.  That's true,
for everyone except the Sage.  But that's not because it's ok to be'
distressed at the death--it's because the false view of the universe is
more firmly entrenched in that case, and harder to overcome.  It's like
a double dose of poison--it's harder to fight off than a single dose,
and it's more understandable when someone succumbs to it, but that
doesn't mean that we shouldn't fight against it.
***


> And in reasoning that all in our lives are ‘the gift of Fate’ and that
> Fate may at any time take such from us, then being ready for such an
> occurrence, in that we often have no idea when Fate will redeem any
> particular gift, we will be better able to prevent a ‘feeling’
> associated with the gift from running wild.

*****
        There is no feeling associated with the gift.  There is
a feeling associated with misunderstanding the gift, and thinking
it's one's own property that's being stolen.  In that sense, one
should think of it as being a gift and this will help prevent the
feeling of loss from arising.
***

> With practice we will be better able to cope and to keep our feelings
> within bounds whereby the false judgement that ‘Fate will never redeem
> the gifts it has bestowed on us’ will not be part of our reasoning about
> *anything* in our lives.  And as such while the ‘redemption’ may stir up
> natural feelings, such feelings will always answer to the rule of reason
> and we will not feel any perturbations – at least that is the theory.

*****
        This isn't Stoicism.
***


> So we practice on the little things, gradually habituating the idea that
> all is only on loan to us so that when things that carry a greater
> investment in feelings are taken form us we are better able to keep our
> feelings under the rule of reason.  In this, we are looking at feelings
> that the nature of a role demands, such as exampled in the natural
> feelings of a human social animal that relate to one’s role as a spouse
> or a parent.

*****
        Not according to Stoicism.
***


> Naturally this is not the total extent of the ideas behind
> ‘indifferents’ and ‘externals’, but it is part of it and it does offer a
> common sense approach to explaining some of the ideas that appear to be
> difficult concepts.

*****
        Indeed, it offers a common sense approach which is
an _alternative to_ what Stoicism teaches.  That's exactly
what Cicero offered--a less radical alternative to Stoicism.
***


> Nigel.

        Sincerely,
                Grant