I must eradicate the belief that externals have value before I can become pious

On 7/21/2017 I posted the following message to the International Stoic Forum to which Chris Fisher and Grant Sterling responded.

"My sense of community is stimulated by a sense of shared or similar ethical beliefs. The main point of Handbook 31 is actually that we will not be able to hold the right opinions about the gods: that they exist and govern the cosmos well and justly and that we should follow them willingly, unless we regulate our desires and aversions."

"Epictetus Enchiridion Chapter 31, trans. George Long"

"Be assured that the essence of piety towards the gods lies in this, to form right opinions concerning them, as existing, and as governing the universe justly and well. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them amidst all events, as being ruled by the most perfect wisdom. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected in any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things which are not within our own power, and by making good or evil to consist only in those which are. For if you suppose any other things to be either good or evil, it is inevitable that, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you should reproach and blame their authors. For every creature is naturally formed to flee and abhor things that appear hurtful, and that which causes them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and that which causes them. It is impracticable, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should rejoice in the person who, as he thinks, hurts him; just as it is impossible to rejoice in the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by his son, when he does not impart the things which seem to be good; and this made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies, that empire seemed good to both. On this account the husbandman reviles the gods; the sailor, the merchant, or those who have lost wife or child. For where our interest is, there too is piety directed. So that whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought is thus made careful of piety likewise. But it also becomes incumbent on every one to offer libations and sacrifices and first-fruits, according to the customs of his country, purely, and not heedlessly nor negligently; not avariciously, nor yet extravagantly."


To which Chris Fisher responded:

"Dave,

"That's interesting. If I understand you correctly, you're suggesting that our ability to "regulate our desires and aversions" either affects our ability to hold right opinions about the gods or includes those right opinions about them. Is that correct?

"Chris"


To which I answered:

"I wasn't considering a general "ability to regulate our desires and aversions," just the possible effect of our desires for, and aversions to, things not in our control.

"For if you  judge things not in your control to be either good or evil, it is inevitable that when you don't get what you desire or get what you desire to avoid, you will reproach and blame those who you think are the authors of those events or circumstances.

"If you believe that you have been harmed by the gods, it is 'impracticable' that you will rejoice in those who you believe caused the harm, as it is 'impossible' to rejoice in the harm itself.

"So, piety and right opinions about the gods are threatened by any false valuation of externals.


Grant Sterling also responded to my original post:

"I completely agree with Dave. To put it another way, the belief 'the Gods control the universe well and justly' contradicts the belief 'it was bad for that thing {whatever it is} to have happened'. So if I assent to the impression 'some external things are good or evil', then I am doomed to be impious--it's just a matter of time before they don't turn out the way I want them to, and when that happens I will perceive the outcome as bad, and then I cannot also truly believe that the gods rule everything well and justly. If it's bad for my crops to die, or for the Steelers to win the Super Bowl, or for (so-and-so) to be elected to public office, and those things happen, then obviously the gods don't rule the universe well--they're either too weak to prevent the bad thing from happening, or they're not fully good, or they don't exist at all.

"Notice that Epictetus is not arguing here that I should start with the idea that the gods rule the universe well and justly and this will help me to rid myself of the idea that externals are good or evil--he thinks that I must eradicate the belief that externals have value before I can become pious.

"On the topic of reverence--notice that Epictetus' view is that all ceremonies are irrelevant if we are impious--that is, if I am unhappy about something that occurs, then I have insulted the gods by suggesting that they are stupid, weak, or evil. If I insult the gods with my unhappiness, then no ceremony that I perform makes a difference to my (im)piety. If I have first eradicated my belief that externals have value, and so I no longer insult the gods with my unhappiness, _then_ I can perform ceremonies in the proper way. The ceremonies have value as a public sign of respect for the gods, but it is the inner respect (or disrespect) that really matters most.

Regards,
Grant