How the Stoic Cares and Loves
Steve Marquis:
"The Stoic rejection of the commonly understood 'good' emotions [e.g., compassion] is alien to all of us. Some reject Stoicism over this and others won't accept it and go to all ends to make this sacred cow of modern culture fit somehow. It is easy to explain this is the case - but hard for some to accept it. what is needed is a careful explanation of what replaces this in the Stoic context (correctly - without keeping any common pathe). This is not as easily explainable. Grant you can attempt this with me. I will listen. but at the moment I cannot clearly. I can very easily show that the common emotions of love, compassion, empathy, etc, are all pathe. I think having a ready answer for that vacuum may help with this (how a Stoic cares and loves etc) recurring difficulty though some will never give up the sacred cow regardless."
Grant Sterling:
"Jeremy Bentham asserts that the only thing that can ever
motivate anyone is the pursuit of pleasure and the absence of
pain. From this claim about human motivation, he deduces
an ethical maxim--that the right thing to do is to maximize
pleasure and minimize pain. (Pleasure is the only good, pain
the only evil). The basis of this transition is simple--if it is
impossible for us to be motivated by anything else, then claiming
that we "ought" to make decisions with any other motivation is
illogical and superfluous. (This idea is codified in philosophy with
the maxim "'Ought' implies 'can'".)
"But there is a hole in Bentham's philosophy. Bentham makes
it clear that we are supposed to maximize total pleasure and
minimize total pain--our own pleasures and pains don't count for
any more (or less) than anyone else's. So doing the right thing
may require massive sacrifices of pleasure. But suppose someone
says "I am motivated by _my own_ pleasures and pains, but I happen
not to care about the pleasures and pains of anyone else (or, if I
do, I only care about a handful of specific people)." Bentham has
no real response. Having tied his ethics to the claim that our
only motivation is based on pursuit of our desires, he can hardly
demand that we choose on the basis of motivations we don't happen
to have. (Bentham's disciple, John Stuart Mill, the most overrated
philosopher in the history of philosophy, attempted to bridge this
gap in "Utilitarianism", but his arguments are famously fallacious.)
"The Stoics, on the other hand, tie their flag to no similar principle.
The Stoics believe that we are perfectly capable of being motivated by
Reason. Bentham thought that reason could tell us that once we accepted
that pleasure was good, it followed that _anyone's_ pleasure was good.
But Bentham had begun his philosophy by denying that reason was a
source, even a possible source, of human motivation. The Stoics, not
so hampered, can tie this sort of argument to action and ethics in ways that
Bentham could not.
"Once I recognize that, say, health is a preferred indifferent, I can see that
anyone's health (ceteris paribus!) is preferred. And so I can see that when
making choices I ought to give weight to the health of everyone who might be
affected by my actions. {This is not the only relevant criterion, and so it might
turn out on some particular occasion that I ought not strive to promote the
health of some individual, but that's only because in this particular case the
positive weight of their health was overtaken by the positive weight of other
considerations in favor of a different act of will.}
"And so we come to the first consideration regarding other people. In making
my choices, my only goal is my own eudaimonia. But my own eudaimonia requires
that I act rightly and rationally, and acting in that way requires that I recognize
the value of various preferred indifferents in the lives of other people. Suppose
that I am invited to a party, and that I know that there will be a risk of contracting
Covid (or some other disease) while there. Perhaps I am willing to take that risk
for myself--the pleasures of the party outweigh the merely possible pains of
sickness. But that's not enough--I must also consider whether going to the party
risks contracting the disease _and spreading it to others_, and so I must take their
interests into account. I must, rationally, do this, and since humans can be motivated
to act on reason alone, I am obligated to do so. {Perhaps it will still turn out that I
am justified in going, but that possibility will require much more argument and
consideration than if I could ignore everyone else.}
"So the Stoic will consider the life, health, pleasure, etc. of other people when making
all of her decisions, and not only that but she will consider them equally with her
own. What could this be called other than (Stoic) Love? {I'd prefer that you not call it
"compassion", since it involves by its very definition the absence of passion. But if
you want to hold on to the term that badly, go ahead.}
"I much prefer this sort of love to passionate love. If someone tells me that they
love me (in the passionate sense), that's great. Until the day comes when their passions
fade, and they betray me--if passion is the root of one's care and consideration for
others, then we should not be surprised at the many people whose love turns to
indifference, or even hate. Or the day comes when the person who loves me does
wrong in the name of love. This is a staple of crime drama (the murderer says "I
did it for you (or 'for us')", while the 'loved one' is horrified at the crime). But it's
not fictional...I've seen it in real life (though I thankfully have little experience with
murder). I know of a man who stole thousands of dollars from his company--in
order to enrich his wife and children, who he 'loved'. I know of coaches who made
their children first-string players and indulged them on the field or court, when they
clearly did not deserve this. I know a parent who accepted his child's long descent
into alcoholism, because he loved him so much that he didn't want to punish him
or force him to do anything other than what he felt like doing. And that's not to
mention the many people who have committed suicide because the object of their
passionate love didn't love them back.
"Or maybe it won't come to those outcomes...maybe it will just be
a matter of someone neglecting their loved ones because while he feels passion
for them, he happens to feel greater passion for himself.
"So if someone really told me "I will not feel passion for you, but I will treat you
in such a way that I genuinely value your health, pleasure, life, etc. exactly as
strongly as I do my own, and I will do this consistently for all of my days", I will
take them up on it and apologize that I am not yet advanced enough in Stoicism to
be able to fully reciprocate. Stoic love is the very thing that many Christian theologians
(and Stoic theologians) ascribe the God. {As an aside: "Love thy neighbor as thyself"
surely cannot be a command to experience passion for one's neighbor. The story
of the good Samaritan doesn't dwell on whether the Samaritan experienced any
passion when he offered help. Etc.} I think that it is perfectly fair to say that the
Stoic "cares about" other people far more consistently and powerfully than the
non-Stoic does, even if the Stoic's "care" is not an emotion.
"{A parallel point stems from role-duties. If given a choice between appointing
a judge who rules on passions or a judge who sincerely recognizes and fulfills his
duty as a judge, which would you appoint? I will choose the latter every time.
I will choose a dutiful doctor or nurse ahead of a passionate one, and the US
would be a vastly happier place if people performed their duties as citizens to
be well-informed and rational in voting and campaigning, rather than the current
people who plunge into politics with passion.}
"Now in treating other people in these ways, the Stoic will not be void of
all feelings. On the contrary, he will experience Joy, the positive feeling that
comes when he recognizes that he has acted rightly. And remember that
'acting rightly' means 'acting in such a way as to value the preferred indifferents
of other people exactly as strongly as one's own'. "
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