The only good is virtue

From: George Richard [ ... ] [stoics] • stoics@yahoogroups.com

Grant writes elsewhere: "The only good is virtue"

 

Not criticising Grant here, but I've never really understood this statement. What does it mean? How does someone _apply_ this 'information' to help their quest for eudaimonia?

 

Also, Epictetus does not say this anywhere.

 

Virtuous _activity_ is the key I think, being both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia.

 

From: Grant C Sterling [ ... ] [stoics] • stoics@yahoogroups.com

All:

  Again, comments interspersed....

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Steve: "Replace 'virtue with 'correct use of impressions' and see if that is more palatable or understandable."

 

George: You're on the right track, Steve, I think, but, if we do this, Grant's sentence becomes: "The only good is 'correct use of impressions."


*****

  Steve is correct.  I would have no problem with that

formulation of my sentence.  Nor do I object in any way to

your emphasis on virtuous activity rather than virtue.

You say that we can easily understand what virtuous

activity is...but that would only be because we easily

understand what virtue is, and understanding what

virtue is necessarily includes understanding what sorts

of activity virtue requires.  So except in the bizarre case

Aristotle imagines (someone who is asleep all their lives)

there is no practical difference between saying that

eudaimonia comes from virtue and saying that it comes

from virtuous activity..  But if you prefer the latter, that's

fine with me...it is (minutely) more accurate.

*****



I'm not sure we're any further forward. What does this sentence mean? How does someone _apply_ this 'information' to help their quest for eudaimonia? The Stoic could spend his life alone, in the wilderness, contemplating 'virtue' or the 'correct use of impressions' and what does he achieve. We can imagine a good Stoic just sitting on a log, doing nothing, accepting one moment to the next until he dies from dehydration.


*****

   This, on the other hand, is a fundamental distortion of

Stoic thought, and a distortion that is common enough that

I feel the need to say something about it.


  Suppose that I am sitting on a log beside the road, and 

someone runs into a pedestrian and then speeds off.  If 

I possess all the virtues, then I will _act_ to help the pedestrian.

(Perhaps by giving medical aid, perhaps by calling for an

ambulance, perhaps by running to the nearest house to get help...

whatever is called for..)  It is impossible, on the Stoic view, for

someone to truly possess a virtue and not act on it when the

situation arises.  

  Or phrase this in terms of right use of impressions.  In the

case above, I will receive the impression (for example) "I ought to 

(try to) call an ambulance".  If I am making the right use of

 impressions, I will assent to that impression...and that means that I

 will _in fact_ try to call an ambulance.  

  People often have the idea that "assenting to the correct

impressions" means that I can know what the right thing is

to do in some situation and yet not do it.  But the Stoic view of

human action says that if I don't try to summon an ambulance

then I _didn't_, actually, assent to the impression that calling

an ambulance was the best thing to do in that situation.  We

all know of occasions when people said "I knew I shouldn't do

that, but I did it anyway".  On the Stoic view this is always false--

if you truly assented to the impression "this isn't the best thing

for me to do right now", then you wouldn't have done it.


  So the Sage can sit on the log and die of dehydration while

making coirrect use of impressions only if continuing to sit on

the log is truly the rational thing to do...in which case, sitting

on the log would be virtuous activity.  It is impossible for those

two thing to come apart--it is impossible for engaging in

virtuous activity and making the right use of impressions to be

two different things.


  This is important because I actually think that it's easier to

explain to someone the Stoic view of right impressions than

it is to explain to them virtuous activity.  But if the other way

works better for you, that's fine.

*****

 

*****

  I completely agree with everythinhg in your note below.

Notice again, however, that the only reason Aristotle

emphasizes virtuous activity is because he is imagining the

bizarre possibility of someone posessing a virtue but being

continually asleep or unable to act on that virtue.  Since that

never happens in the real world, the distinction is purely academic.


  Regards,

            GCS


*****


Something from my Notebook may be of interest:

----------------

[Kraut] Aristotle asks what the ergon ("function", "task", "work") of a human being is, and argues that it consists in _activity_ of the rational part of the soul in accordance with _virtue_. What sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using _reason_.

Aristotle's search for _the good_ is a search for the highest good, and he assumes that the highest good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake. Aristotle thinks everyone will agree that the terms "eudaimonia" ("happiness") and "eu zên" ("living well") designate such an end.

Aristotle says, not that eudaimonia is virtue, but that _eudaimonia is virtuous activity_. Eudaimonia consists in _doing something_, not just being in a certain state or condition."

 

George: The _correct use of impressions_ involves controlling desire for things not in our control (or power) or in the control (or power) of others. All activity should be directed at things in our control (or power), and not at things in the control (or power) of others. We should not attach primary importance to the thing targeted: everything is pursued 'with reservation'. Continuous virtuous activity is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia!