Stoic Dualism and “Nature”

 

Post by Grant C. Sterling. Originally posted to the International Stoic Forum, February 28, 2013

Stoic Dualism and “Nature”

---

On 2/26/2013, TheophileEscargot wrote:

This dualism however creates some differences from ancient Stoicism. First, the appealing unity of Stoic thought, where a single system applies to all domains, is lost.

The ancient Stoic system already allowed for the ‘sayables’, which are not corporeal.

More seriously, I think it is obvious that no single way of investigating a problem applies to all domains. Despite frantic efforts, no-one has convinced me that mathematical (or logical) questions are best answered by empirical observation. And I think Sam Harris’ work contains a clear and obvious error right at the beginning — science cannot tell us what life is “better” than another life, and even if it could it cannot tell us why we have a genuine obligation to pursue ends that are not important to us. But that’s a very long story, which I won’t explore right now — suffice it to say that I don’t think morality is or can ever be empirical. And since I don’t see how science can ever claim to evaluate the subjective content of people’s minds, I don’t think real psychology is empirical, either. [The discipline called “psychology” pretends to be a science, but psychologists blatantly cheat by accepting the introspective reports people give of their mental states as data, while then claiming not to be following an introspective — and hence non-empirical and non-physicalist — discipline.]

But if we define “Nature” as “the realm of all things that exist”, then of course all of us dualists are just as much ‘naturalists’ as anyone, and just as committed to a ‘unity of all knowledge’. Indeed, I would have much preferred it if the word ‘science’ still had its original meaning (any type of knowledge) rather than its modern meaning (a strictly empirical investigation). I would be happy to say that I study “moral science”, if that word had not been corrupted.

Second, it becomes more difficult to apply decision criteria to what is virtuous, since nature-studied-scientifically cannot be used for guidance. E.g. suppose I miss breakfast, and at work I see a tasty-looking sandwich someone has stored in the fridge, which I could eat without being identified as the culprit. Is it moral for me to eat the sandwich? The ancient Stoics would say no, it is immoral, because the nature of human beings is cooperative and social, and it goes against that nature to eat a sandwich reserved for someone else. What criteria does a dualistic modern Stoic use to decide whether to eat the sandwich?

But is it not also my nature to seek self-preservation? So why isn’t it ‘natural’ for me to eat nourishing food when I’m hungry?

Suppose we change the case — suppose that it is my sandwich sitting on the table in front of me, but some other person grabs it to eat it himself. Now is it moral for me to take the sandwich back from the other person?

Or suppose that you and I are in a plane that crashes on a (previously) deserted island, and we’re the only survivors. We both see a sandwich, which belonged to one of the now-deceased passengers. Who gets it? It’s in my nature to seek self-preservation, but also in my nature to be socially cooperative. It’s in your nature to seek self-preservation, but also to be socially cooperative. What should I do?

Or take a radically different case — I am a judge, you are on trial. There is overwhelming proof of your guilt, and you have been convicted. The law says that the penalty is 10–20 years in prison. Do I uphold my social nature by enforcing the law of society, or uphold my social nature by acting altruistically towards you and setting you free, or uphold my goal of self-preservation by asking you for a bribe to set you free?

This is why I hate it when people (often empiricist-physicalists, but often not) equate “morality” with “altruism”. Even if the two concepts often coincide, they by no means always coincide. That an action was “altruistic” can (with proper finagling of definitions) be observed. That the altruistic action is truly virtuous or appropriate cannot.

So unless we accept that we have some sort of ability to intuit the truth of certain fundamental propositions (in logic, mathematics, ethics, theory of knowledge, etc.), we cannot get anywhere in any subject. Few empiricists have actually acknowledged the paucity of information we receive from the senses. Even fewer physicalists have attempted to explain how the idea of “understanding”, “thinking” etc. make sense in the realm of a theory which allows only for mass, charge, etc.

So, as a dualist, I think that we can know that it is wrong to take that which belongs to another, and we can know that in the original circumstances my desire for tasty food is insufficient reason to overturn the prima facie wrongness of stealing. I would happily say that it violates my nature as a rational being to act in this way — I just see no reason to think that my nature as a rational being is a physical thing, known by means of the five senses.

Regards,
Grant, unabashed Stoic dualist