A Brief Reply, Re: Dualism

 

Post by Grant C. Sterling. Originally posted to the International Stoic Forum, January 20, 2012.

A Brief Reply, Re: Dualism

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Malcolm:

In brief, my position is like this:

1) I am absolutely certain, beyond any possibility of error, that I have qualitative mental experiences. I am more certain of this than any other proposition.

2) Experience consistently tells me that I make choices on the basis of the qualitative content of these experiences. For example, I engage in complex reasoning (I may read a philosophical proof, which I find convincing because I recognize it as having a certain logical form which I have previously analyzed and found to be deductively valid), and on the basis of this reasoning I may come to believe a proposition which leads me to act in certain ways. [As an example, I have turned down an opportunity to eat veal (which I find to be extremely delicious) on the basis of arguments designed to show that the way in which the veal is raised is morally repugnant. Or, I have consciously chosen to think about outcomes in a different way as a result of long discussions about Stoic theory of personal identity and harm.]

3) Science tells us that when we are having mental experiences our central nervous system is undergoing various sorts of electro-chemical processes.

My dualism is not developed in opposition to the ancient Stoic metaphysics, but to modern scientific physics.

You say that for the ancient Stoics, the human mind is a “state of matter”. The problem that I was bringing up is that there is no room in modern Physics for any such notion. Modern Physics recognizes only physical matter in the brain, consisting of various particles undergoing various electro-chemical processes. None of those particles or processes are understood as having characteristics like “the feeling of pain” or “the concept of modus ponens”, etc.

So, today, in 2012, if you say that “the mind is a state of matter” then you must either explain how it is that various brain particles can have such properties, or claim that there exist forms of “matter” that are utterly unlike any that physicists have discovered. I see no hope in accomplishing either of those goals. Hence, I see no way that a philosopher today can claim that the mind is a form of matter. {I am no idiot — I know full well that many, perhaps most, philosophers hold such a view. I am asserting that they have never explained how this is possible.}

Regards,
Grant