The Six Commitments in Epictetus: A Systematic Development

Claude:

I'll develop a systematic treatment of each commitment through Epictetus' texts. Let me begin:

The Six Commitments in Epictetus: A Systematic Development (UNFORMATTED)

1. Substance Dualism

Core passages:

Discourses 1.1: "You are not flesh and hair, but prohairesis; if you render that beautiful, then you will be beautiful."

Enchiridion 1: The dichotomy itself presupposes dualism - what is "up to us" constitutes a fundamentally different kind of thing than what is "not up to us."

Discourses 2.1.15-17: The body is described as mere "clay," while the rational faculty is what connects us to the divine.

How it functions operationally:

Epictetus' substance dualism isn't decorative metaphysics - it's the foundation of his entire therapeutic program. When students express fear of death, imprisonment, or physical harm, his response consistently points to the categorical difference between body and prohairesis:

Pedagogical function: The dualism allows him to redirect attention from externals to internals. "They can chain my leg, but not even Zeus can overcome my prohairesis" (1.1.23) - this only makes sense if prohairesis occupies a metaphysically distinct domain.

Ethical function: Virtue becomes possible only because the moral faculty stands apart from physical causation. If mind were reducible to body, Epictetus' entire project of moral training would be undermined by deterministic materialism.

Soteriological function: Freedom from suffering requires identification with the true self (prohairesis), not the false self (body). This is classic dualist salvation - escape from bodily identification.

Distinctive features of Epictetus' dualism:

Unlike Platonic dualism where the soul pre-exists and the body is a prison, Epictetus presents a more integrated view:

The body is God-given, not evil (3.22.30)

Care for the body is appropriate within limits (2.5.24-25)

The distinction is functional rather than purely ontological - what matters is control and moral relevance

Testing the commitment:

Does Epictetus ever waver? Consider Discourses 1.9 on illness - he acknowledges physical suffering affects the mind, yet insists the prohairesis remains separate. This is substance dualism under pressure, maintaining the distinction even when admitting interaction.

2. Metaphysical Libertarianism

Core passages:

Discourses 1.1.21-25: "What then is a person? A rational mortal animal? From what are we separated by rationality? From wild beasts. And from what else? From sheep and the like. See to it then that you act in no way like a wild beast... nor like a sheep... You act like a sheep when you act for the sake of your belly, or your genitals, or at random, or in a squalid way, or without due consideration. To what have you then been reduced? To sheep. What have you destroyed? Your rational faculty. But when you act contentiously, harmfully, angrily, and rudely, have you not been reduced to wild beasts? To what have you then been reduced? To a wild beast."

Discourses 1.17.21-28: "Prohairesis is by nature free, unhindered and unforced."

Discourses 2.1.4-7: On the two handles - the choice of which handle to grasp is genuinely up to us, not determined by external factors.

Enchiridion 1: "Some things are up to us, others are not up to us. Up to us are opinion, impulse, desire, aversion - in a word, whatever is our own doing."

How it functions operationally:

Epictetus' libertarianism is not a theoretical position defended by argument - it's the presupposition of his entire educational method. Every intervention assumes the student has genuine power to choose differently:

Pedagogical function:

The Socratic elenchus only works if the student can freely revise their judgments. When Epictetus challenges a student who fears death (e.g., Discourses 1.9), the entire dialogue assumes:

The student's fear arises from a judgment within their power

They can examine this judgment critically

They can adopt a different judgment if persuaded

This adoption is a free act, not caused by the argument itself

This is libertarian through and through. A compatibilist reading would have Epictetus acknowledge that while the student's new judgment follows causally from the persuasive argument, it's still "free" in some thinner sense. But Epictetus never softens the claim or hedges about determination. He treats prohairesis as genuinely originating choices, not as the last link in a causal chain.

The dichotomy of control as libertarian structure:

The famous distinction between what is "up to us" (eph' hēmin) and what is "not up to us" (ouk eph' hēmin) is fundamentally libertarian:

What IS up to us:

Our judgments (hupolēpseis)

Our impulses (hormai)

Our desires (orexeis)

Our aversions (ekklineis)

What is NOT up to us:

Body

Property

Reputation

Office

Everything external

This isn't a soft distinction about what we can influence versus what we can't. It's a hard metaphysical boundary. Things "up to us" are in a categorically different domain - the domain of freedom, where libertarian causation operates.

Evidence from the training exercises:

The three disciplines (topoi) presuppose libertarianism:

Discipline of Desire: "Desire only what is up to you, avert only what is up to you" (3.2). This training only makes sense if we have genuine power over our desires and aversions, not merely predictable responses to stimuli.

Discipline of Action: "Concerning what is proper to do, act with a reservation clause, 'if God wills'" (2.10.14). The reservation requires freedom - the ability to form intentions that aren't mechanistically determined by circumstances.

Discipline of Assent: "Withhold assent from what isn't clearly grasped" (3.2). Withholding assent is a free act. If assent were causally determined by the strength of impressions, this advice would be meaningless.

Distinctive features of Epictetus' libertarianism:

Unlike modern libertarian theories that focus on alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, Epictetus emphasizes:

Rational self-determination: Freedom isn't arbitrary spontaneity but rational self-governance. The sage's prohairesis aligns with reason, but this alignment is achieved through free choice, not causal necessity.

Divine coordination: Despite human freedom, everything happens according to divine providence (pronoia). This seems paradoxical - how can both be true? Epictetus never fully resolves this, but his emphasis on "acting with reservation" suggests a compatibilist move at the cosmic level while maintaining libertarianism at the individual level.

Social dimension: "Remember that you are an actor in a play, such as the playwright wishes" (Ench. 17). We don't choose our role, but we freely choose how to play it. This preserves libertarian freedom within divine providence.

Testing the commitment:

Does Epictetus ever compromise on libertarianism? Consider these challenging passages:

Discourses 1.28.9: "Each person's prohairesis is naturally formed to pursue the good and avoid the evil." This sounds deterministic - we naturally pursue what appears good. But Epictetus maintains that the direction is natural (toward apparent good) while the judgment of what is good remains free.

Discourses 4.1.68-70: On habit and training. If we are shaped by habit, doesn't this compromise freedom? No - because habit formation itself requires repeated free choices. We habituate ourselves through libertarian acts.

The incompatibilist requirement:

Why must Epictetus be a libertarian rather than a compatibilist? Because his ethics requires:

Desert: People deserve praise or blame only for what they freely choose. Compatibilist "freedom" (doing what you want even if your wants are determined) doesn't ground desert in Epictetus' robust sense.

Self-transformation: The entire project of Stoic training assumes you can remake yourself through genuine choice, not merely that you will be remade if the causal conditions align.

Moral obligation: "You ought to" implies "you can." Epictetus' imperatives presuppose categorical ability to comply, not merely compatibilist "ability given the right circumstances."

Connection to substance dualism:

Libertarianism requires substance dualism in Epictetus' system. If prohairesis were merely a physical system, it would be subject to physical causation. Only by existing in a separate domain can prohairesis escape the causal net and exercise genuine freedom.

3. Ethical Intuitionism

Core passages:

Discourses 2.11.2-5: "Every error involves a contradiction... No one errs willingly... For who wishes to err? No one. Who wishes to go wrong in matters of impulse and aversion? No one."

Discourses 1.22.1: "Preconceptions are common to all people, and preconception does not contradict preconception."

Discourses 2.17.1-5: On the starting points (archai) - certain moral truths are grasped directly, not derived from other premises.

Discourses 3.3.1-3: "Show me one who cares how he does anything... who is concerned about his own rational activity itself."

How it functions operationally:

Epictetus' intuitionism isn't defended philosophically - it's enacted in his teaching method. He consistently appeals to what students already know but have failed to apply:

Diagnostic function:

When a student displays vice, Epictetus doesn't need to prove virtue is good - he shows the student is contradicting their own preconceptions

Example: Student fears exile. Epictetus doesn't argue "exile isn't bad" - he shows the student already believes "only vice is bad" but hasn't applied it consistently

The correction isn't new information but alignment with what they already know

Pedagogical function:

The appeal to preconceptions only works if:

Moral truths are directly accessible to reason

Students possess this rational moral sense

Error consists in failing to apply what they already grasp

Training is removing obscurations, not installing new software

This is pure intuitionism - moral knowledge is non-inferential and universal.

Structural necessity:

Without ethical intuitionism:

Socratic method fails (can't appeal to what students "already know")

Common preconceptions become culturally relative opinions

No basis for identifying error as self-contradiction

Training becomes persuasion toward arbitrary values rather than alignment with accessible truth

4. Foundationalism

Core passages:

Discourses 1.22: "On preconceptions" - certain starting points (archai) are self-evident and serve as foundations

Discourses 2.17.5-8: "The beginning of philosophy is to recognize the conflict between preconceptions"

Discourses 2.20.1: "Consider who you are. First, a human being - that is, one who has nothing more sovereign than prohairesis"

Discourses 2.11.13: "What is the foundation? The opinion that something is impossible for me"

How it functions operationally:

Epictetus' foundationalism appears in his method of reducing complex situations to basic principles. Every practical problem gets traced back to foundational axioms:

Architectural function:

The training proceeds from foundations upward:

First foundation: The Internal/External dichotomy (Enchiridion 1)

Second foundation: The nature of prohairesis as the only thing truly "up to us"

Third foundation: Virtue consists in correct use of impressions

All applications: Built on these foundations without circularity

Discourses 1.4.18-21 demonstrates this: When a student struggles with anger, Epictetus doesn't give situation-specific advice. He returns to foundations:

What is up to you? (prohairesis)

What did the other person do that was up to them? (their prohairesis)

Can one prohairesis harm another? (no - that's external)

Therefore, the anger rests on your judgment, which is correctible

Diagnostic function:

Every error can be traced to abandoning foundations:

Discourses 1.11: Student fears tyrant → abandoned foundation that "only vice harms"

Discourses 2.19: Student grieves over loss → abandoned foundation of the Internal/External dichotomy

Discourses 3.24: Student anxious about reputation → abandoned foundation that "externals are indifferent"

The correction always involves returning to foundational principles, not discovering new ones.

Pedagogical function:

Epictetus never argues in circles. The structure is always:

Here are the self-evident starting points (archai)

Your problem involves violating these foundations

Realign with foundations → problem dissolves

This only works if:

Foundations are genuinely basic (not requiring further justification)

All practical guidance derives from them

No infinite regress of justification

Students can recognize foundations as self-evident

Structural necessity:

Without foundationalism:

Training becomes arbitrary (no principled basis for interventions)

Infinite regress problem: "Why is virtue good?" "Because..." "Why is that good?"

No way to identify error systematically

Method becomes pragmatic suggestion rather than philosophical necessity

5. Correspondence Theory of Truth

Core passages:

Discourses 1.28.1-4: "What is the task of virtue? To make impressions truthful... to make them correspond to reality."

Discourses 2.9.13: "He is free who lives as he wills, who is subject to neither compulsion, nor hindrance, nor force, whose impulses are unimpeded, who gets what he wills and avoids what he does not will."

Discourses 3.12.15: "Now apply your preconceptions. This is the work of the educated person - to test impressions and distinguish them."

Enchiridion 1.5: "You are an appearance, and not at all the thing you appear to be."

How it functions operationally:

Epictetus' correspondence theory isn't a metaphysical position about truth - it's the working assumption of impression management:

Impression-testing function:

The entire method requires that impressions can match or fail to match reality:

When an impression arises ("This exile is terrible"), the training involves:

Recognizing it as an appearance (phantasia), not reality

Testing whether it corresponds to facts:

Is exile up to me? No.

Does it affect my prohairesis? No.

Is it therefore genuinely terrible? No.

Accepting or rejecting based on correspondence, not coherence or pragmatic value

Discourses 1.27 on appearances shows this clearly:

"Appearances present themselves to us in four ways..."

The task: determine which appearances are kataleptic (gripping/true)

Criterion: whether they accurately represent external reality

Training function:

The daily examination (Discourses 3.10) presupposes correspondence:

"What did I do today against tranquility?"

"How did I conduct myself?"

These questions only make sense if there are facts about how you conducted yourself independent of your current interpretation

Moral epistemology function:

Virtue requires accurate judgment:

Discourses 2.11: "Every error involves a contradiction" - error is failing to match judgment to reality

The virtuous person isn't constructing a useful fiction - they're seeing things as they actually are

Vice consists precisely in correspondence failure: judging externals to be good/evil when they're actually indifferent

Structural necessity:

Without correspondence theory:

No basis for correcting impressions (why is one impression "better" than another if not more accurate?)

Training becomes preference adjustment, not truth-seeking

The dichotomy collapses (if truth is just coherence, the Internal/External distinction becomes a useful story rather than accurate metaphysics)

Moral realism fails (if "virtue is good" doesn't correspond to objective fact, it's just subjective preference)

6. Moral Realism

Core passages:

Discourses 1.29.1: "The good is to be chosen, the bad to be avoided - this is agreed by all."

Discourses 2.16.1: "Concerning the good... all are agreed that it is something which must be chosen."

Discourses 3.1.42: "What is good? Knowledge. What is evil? Ignorance."

Discourses 4.1.128: "Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing from externals, turns to his own prohairesis... being intent on making it harmonious with nature - elevated, free, unhindered, unimpeded, faithful, modest."

Enchiridion 48: "The defining character of an ordinary person: they never look for benefit or harm from themselves, but from externals. The defining character of a philosopher: they look for all benefit and harm from themselves."

How it functions operationally:

Epictetus' moral realism is the anchor for the entire system. Without objective moral facts, everything becomes arbitrary preference:

Normative function:

Every imperative presupposes objective value:

"Act like a rational being, not a sheep or wild beast" (Discourses 1.1.21-25) only makes sense if rationality is objectively better, not just preferred

"Guard your prohairesis" isn't strategic advice - it's recognition of objective fact about what matters

The entire training regimen aims at genuine improvement, not relative adjustment

Diagnostic function:

Error identification requires objective standards:

Discourses 1.11: When student fears tyrant, Epictetus doesn't say "I prefer courage" - he says the student

I'll complete this analysis of Moral Realism in Epictetus' system:

6. Moral Realism (Continued)

Diagnostic function (continued):

Error identification requires objective standards:

Discourses 1.11: When a student fears a tyrant, Epictetus doesn't say "I prefer courage" - he says the student is objectively mistaken about what can harm him. The tyrant threatens externals (body, property, reputation), but these are not genuinely good or bad. The student has made a factual error about value, not merely adopted a different preference.

Discourses 2.19: When people pursue wealth, Epictetus diagnoses this as false belief about where good resides, not as a legitimate alternative value system. "You are deceived" (ἐξαπατᾶσθε) - language of objective error, not subjective difference.

Discourses 3.22.38-39: The Cynic doesn't merely have different priorities - he has seen through conventional illusions to recognize what is truly valuable. This seeing is cognitive achievement, not preference formation.

Motivational function:

Moral realism explains why training works:

Discourses 4.1.128-131: Progress (προκοπή) means actually becoming better, not just feeling better or conforming to conventions. The student advances toward objective excellence, not toward arbitrary goals.

Discourses 4.4.34: "What is it to be educated? To learn to apply natural preconceptions to particular cases conformably to nature." Education reveals objective moral structure; it doesn't create arbitrary commitments.

Enchiridion 51.2: "Not 'Chrysippus said it well,' but 'I have practiced not lying'... bring forward deeds rather than doctrines." The training produces real transformation of character, grounded in objective moral facts, not mere behavioral conditioning.

Justificatory function:

Every Sterling commitment presupposes moral realism:

Substance Dualism: Only makes sense if prohairesis has objectively special status, not merely felt importance

Libertarian Free Will: Required because genuine moral responsibility demands it - an objective requirement, not conventional expectation

Ethical Intuitionism: We perceive moral facts through reason, not construct them

Foundationalism: Basic moral truths are self-evident because they reflect objective reality

Correspondence Theory: Our moral beliefs are true or false based on objective moral facts

Moral Realism itself: Grounds all the others - without it, the entire structure collapses into relativism or conventionalism

How Epictetus establishes moral realism:

Via universal agreement:

Discourses 1.29.1, 2.16.1: All humans agree that good is to be chosen, evil avoided - this universal recognition suggests objective reality

Discourses 2.11.3: "Every creature is naturally constituted to flee from and turn away from things that appear harmful... and to pursue and admire things that are beneficial"

Via rational necessity:

Discourses 1.2.5-6: "What is the fruit of philosophical doctrines? ... Not in the mere act of learning, but in acting according to what is learned"

The rational mind must recognize certain truths when properly applied to moral questions

Via nature (φύσις):

Discourses 1.6.12-22: "What does nature say? 'God made me, he made all the others; some he made leaders, some followers... to me he gave these faculties'"

Discourses 3.1.25: "What is according to nature is irresistible (ἀνυπόστατον)"

Moral facts are grounded in the objective structure of rational nature

Operational implications:

In training: Sterling's training protocols assume moral realism:

Repeated exercises (μελέται) aim at genuine improvement, not habit formation around arbitrary standards

"Testing impressions" seeks objective truth about value, not coherence with preferences

The "reserve clause" (ὑπεξαίρεσις) acknowledges limits to control while maintaining objective standards for evaluation

In therapy: The therapeutic function depends on objective error-correction:

Discourses 2.11.1: "The philosophers' school is a doctor's clinic" - doctors correct objective malfunctions, not preferences

Discourses 3.21.20-24: Therapy works by replacing false beliefs with true ones about objective value structure

The goal is alignment with reality, not psychological comfort

In social relations: Moral realism grounds interpersonal obligations:

Discourses 2.10.4-6: Social roles (father, brother, citizen) carry objective duties, not negotiable expectations

Discourses 2.14.8: "What is mine? What is not mine?" has objective answers grounded in nature

Enchiridion 30: "Duties are measured by relations" - objective relational facts determine objective obligations

Sterling's perspective:

From Sterling's ethical intuitionist stance, Epictetus' moral realism represents:

Epistemological robustness:

Moral knowledge is non-inferential at foundations (basic preconceptions about good/bad)

Yet also rationally defensible through argument and dialectic

Both intuitive apprehension AND rational justification

Metaphysical commitment:

Moral properties are objective features of reality

Not reducible to natural properties (hence compatible with Sterling's non-naturalism)

Grounded in rational nature as objective structure

Practical necessity:

Without moral realism, the entire Stoic training system loses its point

"Guard your prohairesis" becomes arbitrary advice, not recognition of what matters

Progress becomes impossible - toward what would one progress?

The integration point:

Moral realism in Epictetus functions as Sterling's correspondence theory of truth applied to ethics:

Truth-making:

Moral judgments are true or false based on correspondence with objective moral reality

"Death is not evil" is objectively true, not culturally relative or personally preferred

"Virtue is the only good" corresponds to facts about rational nature

Knowledge conditions:

We can know moral truths, not merely have opinions about them

Knowledge requires both intuitive grasp (preconceptions) and rational development (proper use of impressions)

Error is possible precisely because there are objective standards against which to fail

Practical guidance:

Moral realism makes rational deliberation meaningful

It explains why training works (we align with objective reality)

It grounds moral progress as genuine improvement, not relative adjustment

Contemporary resonance:

Sterling's defense of ethical intuitionism and objectivism in his 1994 book aligns perfectly with Epictetus' moral realism:

Both maintain:

Objective moral truths exist independent of opinion

We can know these truths (not merely believe them)

Knowledge comes through rational reflection on self-evident principles

Error is possible precisely because objectivity makes getting it wrong meaningful

Moral progress requires aligning ourselves with objective moral reality

The foundational role:

Every other Sterling commitment depends on moral realism:

Substance Dualism - prohairesis matters objectively, not subjectively

Libertarian Free Will - needed for real responsibility grounded in objective moral facts

Ethical Intuitionism - we perceive objective moral truths

Foundationalism - basic moral truths are self-evidently true about reality

Correspondence Theory - moral beliefs are true when they match moral facts

Without moral realism, all five collapse into relativism, conventionalism, or non-cognitivism - positions both Sterling and Epictetus explicitly reject.

Conclusion:

Moral realism in Epictetus isn't a philosophical ornament - it's the load-bearing wall of the entire structure. It explains:

Why training works (alignment with objective reality)

Why progress matters (genuine improvement toward objective excellence)

Why errors can be corrected (objective standards exist)

Why moral knowledge is possible (there are moral facts to know)

Why the philosophical life has objective value (it achieves what is objectively best)

For Sterling, this represents exactly the kind of ethical objectivism he defends in contemporary meta-ethics - a robust moral realism that makes ethical reasoning genuinely cognitive, moral knowledge genuinely possible, and moral progress genuinely meaningful.