DOGMA/DOGMATA IN EPICTETUS: A TEXTUAL INVESTIGATION

 

DOGMA/DOGMATA IN EPICTETUS: A TEXTUAL INVESTIGATION

Let me trace the actual function of δόγμα/δόγματα in Epictetus' system:

PRIMARY DEFINITION

Discourses 1.28.1-4: "What is the task of virtue? To make impressions truthful (φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς)... When, then, do we make progress? When we do not seek what is pleasant outside ourselves, when we do not depend on others... This is how every craft (τέχνη) improves: by making its product such that it agrees with the appropriate standards (κανόνι)."

Discourses 1.29.1: "The foundation of the good is some disposition of the prohairesis, and the foundation of evil likewise."

Discourses 2.11.1: "The beginning of philosophy is awareness of one's own weakness and incapacity regarding necessary things. For we come neither with any natural concept of a right-angled triangle... and we learn the whole of these things by systematic instruction (διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνικῇ). For this reason, those who do not know them think they know them. But with regard to the most important things (τῶν μεγίστων), we believe we are equipped with natural preconceptions concerning them - and this is where error begins."

Here's the key: dogmata are the principles/teachings that govern how we use impressions.

THE TECHNICAL USAGE

Discourses 1.27.6-7: "For this reason, since I cannot secure the right use of external things (τὴν ὀρθὴν χρῆσιν τῶν ἐκτός), I hold to what is my own (τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ), in order that I may use the externals in whatever way nature wishes. What does nature say? 'If it is at all possible, make your prohairesis in accord with nature.' But if I cannot, I will not make it otherwise: I will make it secure, unwavering, in accord with the dogmata (τοῖς δόγμασιν)."

Key point: Dogmata are the principles according to which prohairesis operates. They govern the use of impressions.

Discourses 3.2.1-3: "There are three areas (τόποι) concerning which someone who would be virtuous and good must be trained. The first concerns desires and aversions - so that he may never fail to get what he desires nor fall into what he wants to avoid. The second concerns impulse and repulsion - in general, appropriate action - so that he may act in orderly fashion, with good reason, and not carelessly. The third concerns freedom from deception and hasty judgment - in general, concerning assents."

These three topoi (disciplines) operate according to dogmata - the principles that govern each domain.

Discourses 3.3.14-15: "A good and excellent person, before doing anything, considers whether it is in accordance with reason (λόγον), and after he has done it, whether he has acted according to reason. He examines his dogmata (δόγματα) daily: 'Have I done something counter to tranquility? Have I done something unfriendly? Have I done something for which I must reproach myself?'"

Critical insight: Dogmata are what you examine - they're the operative principles whose application you review.

DOGMATA AS GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

Discourses 2.1.29: "What then is to be done? To make the best use of impressions (χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις) - that is the task. If you do this correctly, you have everything good (τἀγαθόν); if poorly, you have evil (τὸ κακόν)."

Discourses 2.11.13-14: "Every error involves a contradiction (μάχην)... For since one who errs does not want to err but to be correct, it's clear he's not doing what he wants. What then does the thief want to do? What is to his own advantage (τὸ συμφέρον). If then theft is to his disadvantage (ἐπὶ βλάβῃ), he's not doing what he wants. But every rational mind is by nature (πέφυκεν) repelled by contradiction... As long as you don't show someone this contradiction, don't be surprised if they persist in error. But when shown the contradiction, they necessarily withdraw from it."

The dogmata are what create either contradiction or coherence in judgment.

Discourses 2.16.35: "But examine your ruling principles (δόγματα) - what you value, what you aim at. Do you aim at pleasures? At reputation? At trivial things? Show me the fruit of your labor... Show me the state of your dogmata (τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν δογμάτων)."

THE CORRUPTION OF DOGMATA

Discourses 2.22.7-10: "When you see3r. someone in power, set against it your ruling principles (δόγματα), which show that you are truly free. When you see someone wealthy, set against it your dogmata about what is truly valuable. When you see someone indulging in pleasures, set against it the disposition of your dogmata."

Discourses 3.16.15: "You must practice  (μελετᾶν) everywhere... When you see someone weeping in grief at the departure of their child or loss of property, watch out that the impression doesn't carry you away to the belief that these externals are evils. Have ready to hand (πρόχειρον) the dogma (δόγμα) that it is not the event itself that afflicts them... but their judgment (δόγμα) about it."

Notice: δόγμα is used for BOTH:

1. The correct principle ("the dogma you should have ready")
2. The mistaken judgment ("their dogma about the event")

This is crucial - dogmata can be true or false, but they always govern response.

Discourses 4.1.41-42: "Freedom is not acquired by satisfying yourself with what you desire, but by destroying your desire. And this you shall know: if you use (ἀσκήσῃς) your prohairesis for maintaining correct dogmata (ὀρθῶν δογμάτων) only about things within your power, and not about externals beyond your power..."

THE STRUCTURE OF DOGMATA

Discourses 1.22.9-10: "Preconceptions (προλήψεις) are common to all people, and preconception does not contradict preconception. For who among us does not assume (ὑπολαμβάνει) that the good is beneficial and choiceworthy, and that we should seek and pursue it in every circumstance? Who among us does not assume that justice is noble and fitting? When then does contradiction arise? In the application of preconceptions to particulars - when one person says 'He acted nobly; he is brave,' and another says 'No, he is out of his mind.'"

The structure:

• Preconceptions (prolēpseis): Universal, shared, foundational concepts
• Dogmata: The principles formed by applying preconceptions correctly or incorrectly
• Judgments: Specific applications of dogmata to particular cases

Discourses 2.17.1-8: "Just as a target (σκοπὸν) is not set up to be missed, so too in the world there is nothing that is by nature evil (κακόν). Someone might say: 'What then? Has not So-and-so been beheaded? Has not So-and-so been exiled, deceived, murdered?' These are applications (ἐφαρμογαί) of people's judgments to specific circumstances... But if you have correct dogmata (δόγματα ὀρθά), these events are neither good nor evil."

THE SIX COMMITMENTS AS DOGMATA

Now we can locate the six commitments within Epictetus' technical usage:

1. SUBSTANCE DUALISM

Discourses 1.1.23: "They can bind my leg, but not even Zeus can overcome my prohairesis (τὴν προαίρεσιν)."

Dogma: Prohairesis occupies a metaphysically distinct domain from body/externals

2. LIBERTARIAN FREEDOM

Discourses 1.17.21-28: "Prohairesis is by nature (πέφυκε) free (ἐλευθέρα), unhindered (ἀκώλυτος), and unforced (ἀνάγκαστος)."

Dogma: The rational faculty possesses genuine originating power

3. ETHICAL INTUITIONISM

Discourses 2.11.2-5: "Preconceptions are common to all... who wishes to err? No one. Who wishes to go wrong? No one."

Dogma: Moral truths are directly accessible through rational preconceptions

4. FOUNDATIONALISM

Discourses 1.22: "The beginning of philosophy is recognition of the conflict between one's preconceptions."

Enchiridion 1: "Some things are up to us, others are not up to us."

Dogma: Self-evident starting points (archai) require no further justification

5. CORRESPONDENCE THEORY

Discourses 1.28.1: "What is the task of virtue? To make impressions truthful (φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς)."

Dogma: Judgments should correspond to reality, not convenience or preference

6. MORAL REALISM

Discourses 1.29.1: "The good is to be chosen, the bad to be avoided - this is agreed by all (ὁμολογεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων)."

Dogma: Moral facts exist independently of judgment about them

THE OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

Putting it together, here's what dogmata ARE in Epictetus:

Dogmata are the operative principles that:

1. Govern how prohairesis uses impressions
2. Can be correct (ὀρθά) or corrupt (διεφθαρμένα)
3. Are formed by applying preconceptions to particulars
4. Create coherence or contradiction in the soul
5. Are examined daily by the philosopher
6. Determine whether actions align with nature/reason
7. Make the difference between virtue and vice

The six commitments are the fundamental dogmata - the governing principles that structure how prohairesis functions rationally.

WHY THIS MATTERS

Modern translations often render δόγμα as "opinion" or "belief" - but this misses the technical force:

Dogma ≠ mere opinion

• Opinions can be tentative, hypothetical, pragmatic
• Dogmata are governing principles held as true
• They structure the entire operation of rational agency

Dogma ≠ blind faith

• Dogmata are based on rational insight (preconceptions)
• They're tested through application and examination
• They're held because they correspond to truth, not arbitrary commitment

Dogma = philosophical teaching affirmed as known truth

• This is exactly what "dogmatic philosophy" meant
• Against skeptical suspension of judgment
• For rational affirmation of demonstrated truth

THE BOTTOM LINE

When Epictetus says "examine your dogmata" (Discourses 3.3.14), he means:

"Examine the governing principles by which your prohairesis operates. Are they correct (corresponding to reality)? Are they consistent (non-contradictory)? Are they productive of virtue?"

The six commitments are Sterling's articulation of the dogmata that necessarily govern Epictetean rational agency. They're not add-ons to the system - they ARE the system's foundational principles, the archai that structure everything else.

This is why Epictetus is dogmatikos philosophy - and why Sterling's framework is the correct reading of what those fundamental dogmata are.