How the Stoic Cares and Loves

In a message to the International Stoic Forum of 12/15/2020, Steve Marquis asked for an explanation of what replaces (ruled-out) 'compassion' in Stoic teaching. Grant Sterling gave an answer.



Steve Marquis:

"The Stoic rejection of the commonly understood 'good' emotions [e.g., compassion] is alien to all of us.  Some reject Stoicism over this and others won't accept it and go to all ends to make this sacred cow of modern culture fit somehow.  It is easy to explain this is the case - but hard for some to accept it.  what is needed is a careful explanation of what replaces this in the Stoic context (correctly - without keeping any common pathe).  This is not as easily explainable.  Grant you can attempt this with me.  I will listen.  but at the moment I cannot clearly.  I can very easily show that the common emotions of love, compassion, empathy, etc, are all pathe.  I think having a ready answer for that vacuum may help with this (how a Stoic cares and loves etc) recurring difficulty though some will never give up the sacred cow regardless."



Grant Sterling:

    "Jeremy Bentham asserts that the only thing that can ever

motivate anyone is the pursuit of pleasure and the absence of

pain.  From this claim about human motivation, he deduces

an ethical maxim--that the right thing to do is to maximize

pleasure and minimize pain.  (Pleasure is the only good, pain

the only evil).  The basis of this transition is simple--if it is

impossible for us to be motivated by anything else, then claiming

that we "ought" to make decisions with any other motivation is

illogical and superfluous.  (This idea is codified in philosophy with

the maxim "'Ought' implies 'can'".)

     "But there is a hole in Bentham's philosophy.  Bentham makes

it clear that we are supposed to maximize total pleasure and

minimize total pain--our own pleasures and pains don't count for

any more (or less) than anyone else's.  So doing the right thing

may require massive sacrifices of pleasure.  But suppose someone

says "I am motivated by _my own_ pleasures and pains, but I happen

not to care about the pleasures and pains of anyone else (or, if I

do, I only care about a handful of specific people)."  Bentham has

no real response.  Having tied his ethics to the claim that our

only motivation is based on pursuit of our desires, he can hardly

demand that we choose on the basis of motivations we don't happen

to have.  (Bentham's disciple, John Stuart Mill, the most overrated

philosopher in the history of philosophy, attempted to bridge this

gap in "Utilitarianism", but his arguments are famously fallacious.)


     "The Stoics, on the other hand, tie their flag to no similar principle.

The Stoics believe that we are perfectly capable of being motivated by

Reason.  Bentham thought that reason could tell us that once we accepted

that pleasure was good, it followed that _anyone's_ pleasure was good.

But Bentham had begun his philosophy by denying that reason was a

source, even a possible source, of human motivation.  The Stoics, not

so hampered, can tie this sort of argument to action and ethics in ways that

Bentham could not. 

     "Once I recognize that, say, health is a preferred indifferent, I can see that

anyone's health (ceteris paribus!) is preferred.  And so I can see that when

making choices I ought to give weight to the health of everyone who might be

affected by my actions.  {This is not the only relevant criterion, and so it might

turn out on some particular occasion that I ought not strive to promote the

health of some individual, but that's only because in this particular case the

positive weight of their health was overtaken by the positive weight of other

considerations in favor of a different act of will.}

     "And so we come to the first consideration regarding other people.  In making

my choices, my only goal is my own eudaimonia.  But my own eudaimonia requires

that I act rightly and rationally, and acting in that way requires that I recognize

the value of various preferred indifferents in the lives of other people.  Suppose

that I am invited to a party, and that I know that there will be a risk of contracting

Covid (or some other disease) while there.  Perhaps I am willing to take that risk

for myself--the pleasures of the party outweigh the merely possible pains of

sickness.  But that's not enough--I must also consider whether going to the party

risks contracting the disease _and spreading it to others_, and so I must take their

interests into account.  I must, rationally, do this, and since humans can be motivated

to act on reason alone, I am obligated to do so.  {Perhaps it will still turn out that I

am justified in going, but that possibility will require much more argument and

consideration than if I could ignore everyone else.}


     "So the Stoic will consider the life, health, pleasure, etc. of other people when making

all of her decisions, and not only that but she will consider them equally with her

own.  What could this be called other than (Stoic) Love?  {I'd prefer that you not call it

"compassion", since it involves by its very definition the absence of passion.  But if

you want to hold on to the term that badly, go ahead.}

     "I much prefer this sort of love to passionate love.  If someone tells me that they

love me (in the passionate sense), that's great.  Until the day comes when their passions

fade, and they betray me--if passion is the root of one's care and consideration for

others, then we should not be surprised at the many people whose love turns to

indifference, or even hate.  Or the day comes when the person who loves me does

wrong in the name of love.  This is a staple of crime drama (the murderer says "I

did it for you (or 'for us')", while the 'loved one' is horrified at the crime).  But it's

not fictional...I've seen it in real life (though I thankfully have little experience with

murder).  I know of a man who stole thousands of dollars from his company--in

order to enrich his wife and children, who he 'loved'.  I know of coaches who made

their children first-string players and indulged them on the field or court, when they

clearly did not deserve this.  I know a parent who accepted his child's long descent

into alcoholism, because he loved him so much that he didn't want to punish him

or force him to do anything other than what he felt like doing.  And that's not to

mention the many people who have committed suicide because the object of their

passionate love didn't love them back.

     "Or maybe it won't come to those outcomes...maybe it will just be

a matter of someone neglecting their loved ones because while he feels passion

for them, he happens to feel greater passion for himself.

     "So if someone really told me "I will not feel passion for you, but I will treat you

in such a way that I genuinely value your health, pleasure, life, etc. exactly as

strongly as I do my own, and I will do this consistently for all of my days", I will

take them up on it and apologize that I am not yet advanced enough in Stoicism to

be able to fully reciprocate.  Stoic love is the very thing that many Christian theologians

(and Stoic theologians) ascribe the God.  {As an aside: "Love thy neighbor as thyself"

surely cannot be a command to experience passion for one's neighbor.  The story

of the good Samaritan doesn't dwell on whether the Samaritan experienced any

passion when he offered help.  Etc.}  I think that it is perfectly fair to say that the

Stoic "cares about" other people far more consistently and powerfully than the

non-Stoic does, even if the Stoic's "care" is not an emotion.


     "{A parallel point stems from role-duties.  If given a choice between appointing

a judge who rules on passions or a judge who sincerely recognizes and fulfills his

duty as a judge, which would you appoint?  I will choose the latter every time. 

I will choose a dutiful doctor or nurse ahead of a passionate one, and the US

would be a vastly happier place if people performed their duties as citizens to

be well-informed and rational in voting and campaigning, rather than the current

people who plunge into politics with passion.}


     "Now in treating other people in these ways, the Stoic will not be void of

all feelings.  On the contrary, he will experience Joy, the positive feeling that

comes when he recognizes that he has acted rightly.  And remember that

'acting rightly' means 'acting in such a way as to value the preferred indifferents

of other people exactly as strongly as one's own'. "


     

The Twin Pillars of Stoic Ethics

Grant Sterling holds that the twin pillars of Stoic ethics are the doctrines concerning preferred and dispreferred indifferents, and role-duties. 


An exchange on the International Stoic Forum (8/30/2018) between Michael Edelstein and Grant Sterling:


Michael Edelstein:

"Every consequence has advantages and disadvantages. For example, my death has advantages: no more bills to pay, no more getting stuck in traffic, no more worrying about what is and is not in my power, etc. 

"Is it the Stoic way for avoiding any negative emotion about any consequence and maintaining eudaimonia and eupatheiai to focus on the advantages of a consequence only, as in my example with death?"


Grant Sterling:

"Not really.
It is true that most things that people think of
as simply "bad" in fact do have some consequences that
they would not regard in that way, and that reminding people
of that fact may to some extent help them to see that
the thing isn't so bad after all. (Sometimes--I have seen
the attempt fail, as well.)
The problem is that this simply focuses people on
other consequences to value. If I say "death means not
having to worry about my taxes any more", that suggests that
worrying about your taxes really is bad. You might succeed
in reducing the negative feelings associated with one thing,
only to retain the negative feelings (granted that they are
usually less powerful feelings) associated with something else.
So the secret [is] to change the person's focus entirely
away from consequences of all kinds, and direct it instead
exclusively to what the individual himself controls and can
use to manifest his own identity--namely, his choices."


Michael Edelstein:

"I appreciate your clear, concise response!

"It leads me to this: If I am not to focus on consequences, what motivates me to pay my taxes, drive within the speed limit, wear my seatbelt, etc.?"


Grant Sterling:

        "First, I want to separate two contexts--the context of
choice and the context of reality, to illustrate one kind of
motivation the Stoics recognize.  Then later I need to
describe a different sort of motivation[] one can have.  Between
them, they describe the Stoic answers to your questions.

        "By the first, what I mean is this.  Imagine that you're a young
doctor who has just taken a job as an assistant to an experienced
doctor ministering to a small community in the third world.
While the senior physician is away, a patient comes in with
severe pains.  You use your knowledge of medicine to the best
of your ability, diagnose the patient, and prepare an injection
of a drug to treat him.  Just as you start to give the injection,
the senior doctor arrives and loudly orders you to stop.  You
are puzzled, but trusting her expertise you refrain from giving
the injection, even though it seems to you to be the best
treatment.  It turns out later that although your diagnosis
was correct, this particular patient is severely allergic to
this particular medication, and the consequences of the
allergic reaction would be worse than the disease...and there
is a different drug, not quite as effective, which can be
administered and to which he is not allergic.
       "When _making a choice about what to do_ it seemed that
this medicine was best, but in reality it turned out that
it wasn't best--you are grateful that what you were trying to
do didn't happen, even though you were trying to do the best
thing.

        "That's how the Stoics see the world.  I am getting
ready to drive somewhere.  Death is a dispreferred indifferent.
That means, first, that it is a rational thing to try to avoid
(ceteris paribus).  Since wearing my seatbelt significantly
decreases my chance of dying (or being maimed), it is rational
for me in normal circumstances to choose to wear my seatbelt.
Since driving at a moderate speed decreases my chance
of killing (or maiming) someone else as well as myself, it is
rational for me to drive at a reasonable speed in normal circumstances.
In the context of making choices, death is to be avoided.
       "The Stoics think that this is sufficient motivation for
action.  That is, they think (unlike, for example, Hume) that
our recognition that something is rational is enough for us
to choose to act on doing it.
       "On the other hand, death is not _bad in reality_.  That
is, it is rational for me to aim away from death, but if death
comes I have no reason to be upset.  Some of the Stoics focus on
necessity--although I aimed away from death, the laws of nature
dictated that death would come.  Since death was necessary, no
other outcome (life) would actually have been "better", since no
other outcome was actually possible (I only thought that it was).
I do the right thing by aiming away from death, but also by
accepting death without the least unhappiness if it comes anyway.
       "This is the basic Stoic idea of 'preferred indifferents"...
things that are rational to seek, and yet are not truly "good"
in the sense that we should celebrate if we get them or mourn if
we fail.  It's like exerting extreme effort to make a free throw
in basketball, doing every possible thing to increase chances of
success, and then the instant the basketball leaves your hand you
are completely unaffected by whether or not it actually goes in.
Your responsibility ended at the moment it left your hand.
        "Other Stoics focus on the goodness and rationality of
God or the gods.  God takes on the role of the experienced doctor--
in His all-knowing goodness he sees what outcome is truly best,
and makes it happen.  I don't know why it is best for the universe
that a friend of mine was murdered when I was in college, but
it must have been or else God wouldn't have allowed it to happen.
I must strive not to kill people, and yet accept God's decision
when people die.  I control my choice itself, and must make it
conform to Reason...the instant the choice is made, the consequences
are irrelevant.  (My neighbor once was driving at a reasonable
speed, when a hidden child suddenly jumped in front of her car.  She
was horrified that she hit him.  A Sage wouldn't have been upset--she
was driving at a reasonable speed, was paying attention to her
surroundings, etc.  When choosing, choose rationally...and accept
whatever happens, even if it is the opposite of what you sought.)

        "The other sort of motivation is role-duty.  The Stoics
think that we have valid roles in life, and with those roles
come moral responsibilities.  If I am chosen to be a Judge, then
I must uphold justice, must not take bribes, etc.  If I am a
father I must care for my children and try to help them grow to
be morally virtuous (as well as physically healthy, etc.)  If I
am a citizen, I must pay my taxes, obey the laws, etc.

        "Those are the twin pillars of Stoic motivation--preferred
and dispreferred indifferents, and role-duties.  Both are simply
forms of recognizing the rational and moral requirements of correct
choice.  Once you turn the focus towards giving the consequences of
our actions real value (value that goes beyond being 'selection-
worthy'), then we must logically be upset if 'bad' consequences
ensue, or good ones fail to materialize.  On top of this, we will
now be motivated sometimes to do immoral things in order to try to
achieve the 'good' outcomes.  Go vote for the best candidate, but
don't be upset if the gods choose for the other candidate to win.
Drive safely, even if you're in an unavoidable accident.  Etc."


Michael Edelstein:

"It’s my impression you’re saying a true Sage believes in god(s) and in the morality and utility of the State. Suppose I’m an atheist and don’t believe in gods and am an anarchist who believes the Govt is an unjust institution. Such beliefs appear to dramatically alter what would consist of preferred and dispreferred indifferents and disqualify me from the Stoic fold."


Grant Sterling:

"Let's tackle God and Government separately (separation
of church and state?).... :)

"God:
The traditional Stoics were all theists of some sort,
unless (as is possible, but by no means certain) some of them
were pantheists of the specific sort that is indistinguishable
to me from atheism. And I think that theistic Stoicism is
more powerful than atheistic Stoicism, precisely because it
has recourse to the argument described below (we need never be
upset by anything that happens, because God/the gods will see
to it that what happens is for the best). Although I have in
the past maintained that atheistic Stoicism is coherent and is
by no means a contradiction in terms, and although I will defend
that view again in a moment, I want to make it clear that I
think theistic Stoicism is not only more in tune with the historical
roots of Stoicism, but is (as I said above) stronger and more
like[ly] to be convincing.
"That having been said...notice that nothing in the definition
of 'preferred indifferent' has anything to do with God at all.
I could be an atheist and still hold that nothing can be good or
evil except that which benefits or harms my true self; my true self
is my faculty of choice; ergo death, disease, loss of job, etc. are
not evils. I could go farther and believe that nevertheless it
is rational (all things equal) to aim away from them in my choices.
So I can believe in preferred indifferents, and can include exactly
the same things in the category of preferred indifferents, regardless
of whether or not I believe in any sort of deity at all, or what sort
of deity I believe in. Some people on this list believe that being
an atheist _in and of itself_ disqualifies someone from being a
Stoic. I disagree. But I am certain of this--one can have a view
of correct action and (dis)preferred indifferents that is identical
to the Stoic view, even if one is an atheist.
(Atheists who are determinists of some sort can also use
the argument from necessity, described in my last post, to back up
their view, just as easily as theists can.)
{{{I am struck by the degree to which this is a perfect
parallel, in reverse, of Sartre's discussion of existentialism.
Sartre says that there are theistic and atheistic existentialists,
and then makes it clear that he thinks the atheistic ones are
more coherent. {He then goes farther and starts making claims
that the theists couldn't accept at all, but I won't follow him
in that sort of error.} End digression.}}}

"Government:
The traditional Stoics weren't anarchists. Anarchism
is irrelevant to (dis)preferred indifferents, but is relevant to
the other pillar of Stoic ethics, role-duties.
But here, too, the difference is not in concept but in
application. The _concept_ of role-duties has nothing to do with
anarchism, monarchism, belief in democracy, etc. It simply holds
that one has legitimate roles in life that give rise to obligations
that one must fulfill. We can argue about _which_ roles are legitimate
and which roles are artificial. We can argue about which specific
duties arise from each legitimate role. And yet we can still both
defend the existence of role-duties.
"For example, the ancient Stoics accepted the legitimacy of
slavery, and so they accepted that there are role-duties for slaves
and for masters. (Epictetus, remember, was a slave...Marcus Aurelias,
among others, owned slaves. Neither of them sees any contradiction
in this with Stoic doctrine.) Many people today believe that slavery
is always and without exception inherently immoral. If this is true,
then there are no role-duties for the role of 'slave' or 'master'.
But I don't see that this means that modern opponents of slavery
are necessary excluded from Stoicism.
Some traditional Stoic roles have nothing to do with
government at all--parent, child, friend, etc. Even the most
hardened anarchist could hold that such roles are legitimate and
give rise to duties.

"Notice, by the way, that the Stoic doctrine of role-duties
does not necessarily mean acceptance of the current government and
its policies (or the current structure of society). It can be
surprisingly radical. Helvidius Priscus stood in defiance of
Caesars when few others would do so...because he thought that the
role-duty of a Senator was to attend the Senate and speak in favor
of legislation that he believed would be beneficial for the state and
against legislation that would be harmful for it. Cato the Younger
is another example...he committed suicide in the end because even
to surrender to Julius Caesar and allow him to grant a pardon
(or not) would have been to imply that he accepted Caesar's
legitimacy as a ruler.

"So, in sum--I think that one can be an atheist and/or
an anarchist and still be a Stoic. Some on this List disagree.
But in any case it is clear to me that being an atheist or an
anarchist do not require any substantial abandonment of the Stoic
doctrines of (dis)preferred indifferents and role-duties, which
are the two fundamental doctrines of Stoic decision-making. But
they _do_ require a revision of how the former doctrine is justified,
and how the latter doctrine plays out in specific cases. I think
theistic, non-anarchistic Stoicism is more consistent and internally
stronger (as well as being historically-rooted)."

Ninety-nine percent of all moral problems are caused by mistaken selfishness

In a message of 12/30/2014 to the International Stoic Forum stoics@yahoogroups.com, Grant Sterling states the Stoic view that it's not selfishness that's the problem, but _mistaken selfishness_.


"Socrates, Butler and the Stoa"

"Apologies for not responding to comments directly--
our system is shut down for "improvements", so I can't
access any of my mail at the moment.

The Stoics believed that the vast majority of
human beings utilize seriously flawed reasoning, and
consequently make frequent wrong choices. (And, hence,
they fail to achieve or even approach eudaimonia.)

Why? Of course, the obvious answer is that
there are multiple reasons. People, through lack of
training and interest, are very poor at reasoning in
general. (They don't understand statistics, they
don't give serious thought to the credibility of
sources, they spend virtually no time thinking about
the attitudes and interests of other people and so
they do a poor job of anticipating their reactions, etc.,
etc., etc.) But given the recent thread, I wish to
concentrate on only two sources of error--a) confusing
social norms with genuine moral norms, and b) mistaken
selfishness.

Steve (and others) evince great concern about
the former, and no doubt it does occur. As such, the
person making progress needs to take this source of error
into account and make allowances for it. (I still think
that most of these cases actually involve cultural beliefs
about non-moral principles, such as religious matters,
and so they aren't really examples of moral confusion
at all. But I'll put this aside.)
The problem is, in my experience 99% of all moral
problems are caused by the latter. By mistaken selfishness,
I mean assenting to the impression that the things that
please you (and the things your culture tells you are
good for you) are really good. Grab a newspaper and read
the accounts of local people who have been convicted of
crimes. It's the same sort of list every day, in every
community, for the same reasons. Person A stole something.
Why? Because she didn't believe that it was wrong to steal?
No, because she desired the object she stole (or the object
she was hoping to steal), and her assent to the proposition
that it would be good to have that was allowed to over-ride
her clear knowledge that it was wrong to steal. {Unless,
perhaps, she has allowed these desires to override that
knowledge so often that the knowledge has been pushed into
the darkness.} B was manufacturing illegal and dangerous
drugs to sell. Why? Because he thinks money is good. C
raped someone. D committed murder. This happens a million
times a day...a billion times a day.
My view that this is the source of virtually all
wrongdoing may of course be mistaken...but I can take
comfort in knowing that the Stoics shared it. Read their
writings, and you will find that when they discuss a moral
problem they virtually always diagnose it as resulting from
a person assenting to the idea that something that they
_like_ is good. They virtually never discuss moral faults
that result from a person who thought they intuited that he
or she was doing the right thing. The predominant Stoic
view is that we have little problem knowing what we ought to
do, but we have a big problem making ourselves do it because
it conflicts with our desires.
So this, I think, is the great problem. It's not
kamikazes or suicide bombers. In just the US last year 15,000
people were murdered. That's a substantial _decrease_
from past years. But it's vastly higher than the number of
people killed around the world each year by suicide bombers.
Add in the "ordinary" rapes and thefts and beatings, etc.,
and this is the great moral problem around the world. And
it's caused not by the norms of some culture, but by the
simple desire for sex, money, power, etc.

So Steve asks what the danger is of taking moral
norms not as certainties but as merely provisional guidelines.
And the danger is the danger Butler pointed to--given that
my desires are fundamentally disfunctional, I will always
attempt to twist any provisional guideline to my advantage.
There are two dangers--trusting my intuitions too much and
blinding myself to a culturally-induced error, and trusting
my intuitions too little so that I engage in vice when it
appears to be in my self-interest. Since I think there are
a million wrongs that stem from the latter for every wrong
that stems from the former, I think it's far better to
concentrate all our energies on it.

Butler gives an excellent discussion of the relationship
between conscience, benevolence, and self-love, and the best
discussion in history of the confusion between self-love
(self-interest) and particular desires. Not everything he
says is compatible with Stoicism, but the vast majority
of it is, and some of it is far clearer than the writings of
any of the Stoics on those matters. This despite his being
an Anglican clergyman.

Now why is Socrates in the title? Because we've
also had discussion of Socratic skepticism. But if you
read the dialogues, you find that:
a) by no means all of the dialogues feature Socrates
claiming complete ignorance, and
b) even the ones that do feature Socrates denying
knowledge aren't talking about knowledge of very basic
moral truths like "all other things being equal, one ought
not steal". He denies knowing the general definition of
Virtue (etc.) from which one could deduce the right thing
to do in every situation. That is, he denies having the kind
of universal, perfectly-integrated knowledge that the Sage
possesses.

Now I agree that the Stoics show very little skepticism
about cultural norms, and that sometimes they may have too
little skepticism. (As Jan, for example, has argued for years.)
I'm just saying that since I am not yet a Sage, nor even a
short step away from being a Sage, I am in far greater danger
(I think) from going the other direction. I don't need anything
in my life that will make it easier for me to think that murder,
theft, adultery, rape, lying, breaking promises, etc. might
be OK. My desires push me to try to rationalize these things
all the time--they don't need any help. The more vividly I
depict to myself the wrongness of theft, the easier it is for me
to remember that the thing that I want to steal is not truly
a good at all.

But maybe that's just me (and a few billion other
people). If you don't struggle with this, then indeed you
may be in a position to worry more about excessive acceptance
of supposed intuitions. I hope that's true, because it will
mean that you're nearly a sage, and the world needs more
Sages. But I think Butler speaks for most people.

Regards,
Grant

The only good is virtue

From: George Richard [ ... ] [stoics] • stoics@yahoogroups.com

Grant writes elsewhere: "The only good is virtue"

 

Not criticising Grant here, but I've never really understood this statement. What does it mean? How does someone _apply_ this 'information' to help their quest for eudaimonia?

 

Also, Epictetus does not say this anywhere.

 

Virtuous _activity_ is the key I think, being both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia.

 

From: Grant C Sterling [ ... ] [stoics] • stoics@yahoogroups.com

All:

  Again, comments interspersed....

*****



Steve: "Replace 'virtue with 'correct use of impressions' and see if that is more palatable or understandable."

 

George: You're on the right track, Steve, I think, but, if we do this, Grant's sentence becomes: "The only good is 'correct use of impressions."


*****

  Steve is correct.  I would have no problem with that

formulation of my sentence.  Nor do I object in any way to

your emphasis on virtuous activity rather than virtue.

You say that we can easily understand what virtuous

activity is...but that would only be because we easily

understand what virtue is, and understanding what

virtue is necessarily includes understanding what sorts

of activity virtue requires.  So except in the bizarre case

Aristotle imagines (someone who is asleep all their lives)

there is no practical difference between saying that

eudaimonia comes from virtue and saying that it comes

from virtuous activity..  But if you prefer the latter, that's

fine with me...it is (minutely) more accurate.

*****



I'm not sure we're any further forward. What does this sentence mean? How does someone _apply_ this 'information' to help their quest for eudaimonia? The Stoic could spend his life alone, in the wilderness, contemplating 'virtue' or the 'correct use of impressions' and what does he achieve. We can imagine a good Stoic just sitting on a log, doing nothing, accepting one moment to the next until he dies from dehydration.


*****

   This, on the other hand, is a fundamental distortion of

Stoic thought, and a distortion that is common enough that

I feel the need to say something about it.


  Suppose that I am sitting on a log beside the road, and 

someone runs into a pedestrian and then speeds off.  If 

I possess all the virtues, then I will _act_ to help the pedestrian.

(Perhaps by giving medical aid, perhaps by calling for an

ambulance, perhaps by running to the nearest house to get help...

whatever is called for..)  It is impossible, on the Stoic view, for

someone to truly possess a virtue and not act on it when the

situation arises.  

  Or phrase this in terms of right use of impressions.  In the

case above, I will receive the impression (for example) "I ought to 

(try to) call an ambulance".  If I am making the right use of

 impressions, I will assent to that impression...and that means that I

 will _in fact_ try to call an ambulance.  

  People often have the idea that "assenting to the correct

impressions" means that I can know what the right thing is

to do in some situation and yet not do it.  But the Stoic view of

human action says that if I don't try to summon an ambulance

then I _didn't_, actually, assent to the impression that calling

an ambulance was the best thing to do in that situation.  We

all know of occasions when people said "I knew I shouldn't do

that, but I did it anyway".  On the Stoic view this is always false--

if you truly assented to the impression "this isn't the best thing

for me to do right now", then you wouldn't have done it.


  So the Sage can sit on the log and die of dehydration while

making coirrect use of impressions only if continuing to sit on

the log is truly the rational thing to do...in which case, sitting

on the log would be virtuous activity.  It is impossible for those

two thing to come apart--it is impossible for engaging in

virtuous activity and making the right use of impressions to be

two different things.


  This is important because I actually think that it's easier to

explain to someone the Stoic view of right impressions than

it is to explain to them virtuous activity.  But if the other way

works better for you, that's fine.

*****

 

*****

  I completely agree with everythinhg in your note below.

Notice again, however, that the only reason Aristotle

emphasizes virtuous activity is because he is imagining the

bizarre possibility of someone posessing a virtue but being

continually asleep or unable to act on that virtue.  Since that

never happens in the real world, the distinction is purely academic.


  Regards,

            GCS


*****


Something from my Notebook may be of interest:

----------------

[Kraut] Aristotle asks what the ergon ("function", "task", "work") of a human being is, and argues that it consists in _activity_ of the rational part of the soul in accordance with _virtue_. What sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using _reason_.

Aristotle's search for _the good_ is a search for the highest good, and he assumes that the highest good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake. Aristotle thinks everyone will agree that the terms "eudaimonia" ("happiness") and "eu zên" ("living well") designate such an end.

Aristotle says, not that eudaimonia is virtue, but that _eudaimonia is virtuous activity_. Eudaimonia consists in _doing something_, not just being in a certain state or condition."

 

George: The _correct use of impressions_ involves controlling desire for things not in our control (or power) or in the control (or power) of others. All activity should be directed at things in our control (or power), and not at things in the control (or power) of others. We should not attach primary importance to the thing targeted: everything is pursued 'with reservation'. Continuous virtuous activity is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia!