The Twin Pillars of Stoic Ethics
An exchange on the International Stoic Forum (8/30/2018) between Michael Edelstein and Grant Sterling:
Michael Edelstein:
"Every consequence has advantages and disadvantages. For example, my death has advantages: no more bills to pay, no more getting stuck in traffic, no more worrying about what is and is not in my power, etc.
"Is it the Stoic way for avoiding any negative emotion about any consequence and maintaining eudaimonia and eupatheiai to focus on the advantages of a consequence only, as in my example with death?"
Grant Sterling:
"Not really.
It is true that most things that people think of
as simply "bad" in fact do have some consequences that
they would not regard in that way, and that reminding people
of that fact may to some extent help them to see that
the thing isn't so bad after all. (Sometimes--I have seen
the attempt fail, as well.)
The problem is that this simply focuses people on
other consequences to value. If I say "death means not
having to worry about my taxes any more", that suggests that
worrying about your taxes really is bad. You might succeed
in reducing the negative feelings associated with one thing,
only to retain the negative feelings (granted that they are
usually less powerful feelings) associated with something else.
So the secret [is] to change the person's focus entirely
away from consequences of all kinds, and direct it instead
exclusively to what the individual himself controls and can
use to manifest his own identity--namely, his choices."
Michael Edelstein:
"I appreciate your clear, concise response!
"It leads me to this: If I am not to focus on consequences, what motivates me to pay my taxes, drive within the speed limit, wear my seatbelt, etc.?"
Grant Sterling:
"First, I want to separate two contexts--the context of
choice and the context of reality, to illustrate one kind of
motivation the Stoics recognize. Then later I need to
describe a different sort of motivation[] one can have. Between
them, they describe the Stoic answers to your questions.
"By the first, what I mean is this. Imagine that you're a young
doctor who has just taken a job as an assistant to an experienced
doctor ministering to a small community in the third world.
While the senior physician is away, a patient comes in with
severe pains. You use your knowledge of medicine to the best
of your ability, diagnose the patient, and prepare an injection
of a drug to treat him. Just as you start to give the injection,
the senior doctor arrives and loudly orders you to stop. You
are puzzled, but trusting her expertise you refrain from giving
the injection, even though it seems to you to be the best
treatment. It turns out later that although your diagnosis
was correct, this particular patient is severely allergic to
this particular medication, and the consequences of the
allergic reaction would be worse than the disease...and there
is a different drug, not quite as effective, which can be
administered and to which he is not allergic.
"When _making a choice about what to do_ it seemed that
this medicine was best, but in reality it turned out that
it wasn't best--you are grateful that what you were trying to
do didn't happen, even though you were trying to do the best
thing.
"That's how the Stoics see the world. I am getting
ready to drive somewhere. Death is a dispreferred indifferent.
That means, first, that it is a rational thing to try to avoid
(ceteris paribus). Since wearing my seatbelt significantly
decreases my chance of dying (or being maimed), it is rational
for me in normal circumstances to choose to wear my seatbelt.
Since driving at a moderate speed decreases my chance
of killing (or maiming) someone else as well as myself, it is
rational for me to drive at a reasonable speed in normal circumstances.
In the context of making choices, death is to be avoided.
"The Stoics think that this is sufficient motivation for
action. That is, they think (unlike, for example, Hume) that
our recognition that something is rational is enough for us
to choose to act on doing it.
"On the other hand, death is not _bad in reality_. That
is, it is rational for me to aim away from death, but if death
comes I have no reason to be upset. Some of the Stoics focus on
necessity--although I aimed away from death, the laws of nature
dictated that death would come. Since death was necessary, no
other outcome (life) would actually have been "better", since no
other outcome was actually possible (I only thought that it was).
I do the right thing by aiming away from death, but also by
accepting death without the least unhappiness if it comes anyway.
"This is the basic Stoic idea of 'preferred indifferents"...
things that are rational to seek, and yet are not truly "good"
in the sense that we should celebrate if we get them or mourn if
we fail. It's like exerting extreme effort to make a free throw
in basketball, doing every possible thing to increase chances of
success, and then the instant the basketball leaves your hand you
are completely unaffected by whether or not it actually goes in.
Your responsibility ended at the moment it left your hand.
"Other Stoics focus on the goodness and rationality of
God or the gods. God takes on the role of the experienced doctor--
in His all-knowing goodness he sees what outcome is truly best,
and makes it happen. I don't know why it is best for the universe
that a friend of mine was murdered when I was in college, but
it must have been or else God wouldn't have allowed it to happen.
I must strive not to kill people, and yet accept God's decision
when people die. I control my choice itself, and must make it
conform to Reason...the instant the choice is made, the consequences
are irrelevant. (My neighbor once was driving at a reasonable
speed, when a hidden child suddenly jumped in front of her car. She
was horrified that she hit him. A Sage wouldn't have been upset--she
was driving at a reasonable speed, was paying attention to her
surroundings, etc. When choosing, choose rationally...and accept
whatever happens, even if it is the opposite of what you sought.)
"The other sort of motivation is role-duty. The Stoics
think that we have valid roles in life, and with those roles
come moral responsibilities. If I am chosen to be a Judge, then
I must uphold justice, must not take bribes, etc. If I am a
father I must care for my children and try to help them grow to
be morally virtuous (as well as physically healthy, etc.) If I
am a citizen, I must pay my taxes, obey the laws, etc.
"Those are the twin pillars of Stoic motivation--preferred
and dispreferred indifferents, and role-duties. Both are simply
forms of recognizing the rational and moral requirements of correct
choice. Once you turn the focus towards giving the consequences of
our actions real value (value that goes beyond being 'selection-
worthy'), then we must logically be upset if 'bad' consequences
ensue, or good ones fail to materialize. On top of this, we will
now be motivated sometimes to do immoral things in order to try to
achieve the 'good' outcomes. Go vote for the best candidate, but
don't be upset if the gods choose for the other candidate to win.
Drive safely, even if you're in an unavoidable accident. Etc."
Michael Edelstein:
"It’s my impression you’re saying a true Sage believes in god(s) and in the morality and utility of the State. Suppose I’m an atheist and don’t believe in gods and am an anarchist who believes the Govt is an unjust institution. Such beliefs appear to dramatically alter what would consist of preferred and dispreferred indifferents and disqualify me from the Stoic fold."
Grant Sterling:
"Let's tackle God and Government separately (separation
of church and state?).... :)
"God:
The traditional Stoics were all theists of some sort,
unless (as is possible, but by no means certain) some of them
were pantheists of the specific sort that is indistinguishable
to me from atheism. And I think that theistic Stoicism is
more powerful than atheistic Stoicism, precisely because it
has recourse to the argument described below (we need never be upset by anything that happens, because God/the gods will see to it that what happens is for the best). Although I have in
the past maintained that atheistic Stoicism is coherent and is
by no means a contradiction in terms, and although I will defend
that view again in a moment, I want to make it clear that I
think theistic Stoicism is not only more in tune with the historical
roots of Stoicism, but is (as I said above) stronger and more
like[ly] to be convincing.
"That having been said...notice that nothing in the definition
of 'preferred indifferent' has anything to do with God at all.
I could be an atheist and still hold that nothing can be good or
evil except that which benefits or harms my true self; my true self
is my faculty of choice; ergo death, disease, loss of job, etc. are
not evils. I could go farther and believe that nevertheless it
is rational (all things equal) to aim away from them in my choices.
So I can believe in preferred indifferents, and can include exactly the same things in the category of preferred indifferents, regardless of whether or not I believe in any sort of deity at all, or what sortof deity I believe in. Some people on this list believe that being an atheist _in and of itself_ disqualifies someone from being a Stoic. I disagree. But I am certain of this--one can have a view of correct action and (dis)preferred indifferents that is identical to the Stoic view, even if one is an atheist.
(Atheists who are determinists of some sort can also use
the argument from necessity, described in my last post, to back up their view, just as easily as theists can.) {{{I am struck by the degree to which this is a perfect
parallel, in reverse, of Sartre's discussion of existentialism.
Sartre says that there are theistic and atheistic existentialists,
and then makes it clear that he thinks the atheistic ones are
more coherent. {He then goes farther and starts making claims
that the theists couldn't accept at all, but I won't follow him
in that sort of error.} End digression.}}}
"Government:
The traditional Stoics weren't anarchists. Anarchism is irrelevant to (dis)preferred indifferents, but is relevant to
the other pillar of Stoic ethics, role-duties. But here, too, the difference is not in concept but in
application. The _concept_ of role-duties has nothing to do with
anarchism, monarchism, belief in democracy, etc. It simply holds
that one has legitimate roles in life that give rise to obligations
that one must fulfill. We can argue about _which_ roles are legitimate
and which roles are artificial. We can argue about which specific
duties arise from each legitimate role. And yet we can still both
defend the existence of role-duties. "For example, the ancient Stoics accepted the legitimacy of
slavery, and so they accepted that there are role-duties for slaves
and for masters. (Epictetus, remember, was a slave...Marcus Aurelias, among others, owned slaves. Neither of them sees any contradiction in this with Stoic doctrine.) Many people today believe that slavery is always and without exception inherently immoral. If this is true, then there are no role-duties for the role of 'slave' or 'master'. But I don't see that this means that modern opponents of slavery are necessary excluded from Stoicism.
Some traditional Stoic roles have nothing to do with government at all--parent, child, friend, etc. Even the most hardened anarchist could hold that such roles are legitimate and give rise to duties.
"Notice, by the way, that the Stoic doctrine of role-duties does not necessarily mean acceptance of the current government and
its policies (or the current structure of society). It can be
surprisingly radical. Helvidius Priscus stood in defiance of
Caesars when few others would do so...because he thought that the
role-duty of a Senator was to attend the Senate and speak in favor
of legislation that he believed would be beneficial for the state and against legislation that would be harmful for it. Cato the Younger
is another example...he committed suicide in the end because even
to surrender to Julius Caesar and allow him to grant a pardon
(or not) would have been to imply that he accepted Caesar's
legitimacy as a ruler.
"So, in sum--I think that one can be an atheist and/or
an anarchist and still be a Stoic. Some on this List disagree.
But in any case it is clear to me that being an atheist or an
anarchist do not require any substantial abandonment of the Stoic doctrines of (dis)preferred indifferents and role-duties, which
are the two fundamental doctrines of Stoic decision-making. But
they _do_ require a revision of how the former doctrine is justified, and how the latter doctrine plays out in specific cases. I think theistic, non-anarchistic Stoicism is more consistent and internally
stronger (as well as being historically-rooted)."
by no means a contradiction in terms, and although I will defend
that view again in a moment, I want to make it clear that I
think theistic Stoicism is not only more in tune with the historical
roots of Stoicism, but is (as I said above) stronger and more
like[ly] to be convincing.
"That having been said...notice that nothing in the definition
of 'preferred indifferent' has anything to do with God at all.
I could be an atheist and still hold that nothing can be good or
evil except that which benefits or harms my true self; my true self
is my faculty of choice; ergo death, disease, loss of job, etc. are
not evils. I could go farther and believe that nevertheless it
is rational (all things equal) to aim away from them in my choices.
So I can believe in preferred indifferents, and can include exactly the same things in the category of preferred indifferents, regardless of whether or not I believe in any sort of deity at all, or what sortof deity I believe in. Some people on this list believe that being an atheist _in and of itself_ disqualifies someone from being a Stoic. I disagree. But I am certain of this--one can have a view of correct action and (dis)preferred indifferents that is identical to the Stoic view, even if one is an atheist.
(Atheists who are determinists of some sort can also use
the argument from necessity, described in my last post, to back up their view, just as easily as theists can.) {{{I am struck by the degree to which this is a perfect
parallel, in reverse, of Sartre's discussion of existentialism.
Sartre says that there are theistic and atheistic existentialists,
and then makes it clear that he thinks the atheistic ones are
more coherent. {He then goes farther and starts making claims
that the theists couldn't accept at all, but I won't follow him
in that sort of error.} End digression.}}}
"Government:
The traditional Stoics weren't anarchists. Anarchism is irrelevant to (dis)preferred indifferents, but is relevant to
the other pillar of Stoic ethics, role-duties. But here, too, the difference is not in concept but in
application. The _concept_ of role-duties has nothing to do with
anarchism, monarchism, belief in democracy, etc. It simply holds
that one has legitimate roles in life that give rise to obligations
that one must fulfill. We can argue about _which_ roles are legitimate
and which roles are artificial. We can argue about which specific
duties arise from each legitimate role. And yet we can still both
defend the existence of role-duties. "For example, the ancient Stoics accepted the legitimacy of
slavery, and so they accepted that there are role-duties for slaves
and for masters. (Epictetus, remember, was a slave...Marcus Aurelias, among others, owned slaves. Neither of them sees any contradiction in this with Stoic doctrine.) Many people today believe that slavery is always and without exception inherently immoral. If this is true, then there are no role-duties for the role of 'slave' or 'master'. But I don't see that this means that modern opponents of slavery are necessary excluded from Stoicism.
Some traditional Stoic roles have nothing to do with government at all--parent, child, friend, etc. Even the most hardened anarchist could hold that such roles are legitimate and give rise to duties.
"Notice, by the way, that the Stoic doctrine of role-duties does not necessarily mean acceptance of the current government and
its policies (or the current structure of society). It can be
surprisingly radical. Helvidius Priscus stood in defiance of
Caesars when few others would do so...because he thought that the
role-duty of a Senator was to attend the Senate and speak in favor
of legislation that he believed would be beneficial for the state and against legislation that would be harmful for it. Cato the Younger
is another example...he committed suicide in the end because even
to surrender to Julius Caesar and allow him to grant a pardon
(or not) would have been to imply that he accepted Caesar's
legitimacy as a ruler.
"So, in sum--I think that one can be an atheist and/or
an anarchist and still be a Stoic. Some on this List disagree.
But in any case it is clear to me that being an atheist or an
anarchist do not require any substantial abandonment of the Stoic doctrines of (dis)preferred indifferents and role-duties, which
are the two fundamental doctrines of Stoic decision-making. But
they _do_ require a revision of how the former doctrine is justified, and how the latter doctrine plays out in specific cases. I think theistic, non-anarchistic Stoicism is more consistent and internally
stronger (as well as being historically-rooted)."
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home