The Dogmatic Core of the Discipline of Assent

In The Inner Citadel Pierre Hadot (pp. 107--8) shows how the discipline of assent is intimately linked to the doctrine of good, bad, and indifferent things.

"It is human beings who, thanks to their freedom, introduce trouble and worry into the world. Taken by themselves, things are neither good nor evil, and should not trouble us. The course of things unfolds in a necessary way, without choice, without hesitation, and without passion.

'If you are grieving about some exterior thing, then it is not that thing which is troubling you, but your judgment about that thing (VIII, 47)'

"Here we encounter an echo of a famous saying by Epictetus:

'What troubles people is not things, but their judgments about things (Manual, 5).'


"Things cannot trouble us, because they do not touch our ego, in other words, they do not touch the guiding principle within us. They remain on the threshold, outside our liberty. When Marcus and Epictetus add that "what troubles us is our judgment about things," they are clearly alluding to the discourse which it is within our power to pronounce within ourselves, in order to define for ourselves the meaning of a given event. It is this latter judgment which may trouble us, but this is where the fundamental dogma of Stoicism comes in: there is no good but moral good, and there is no evil but moral evil. That which is not moral--that is to say, that which does not depend on our choice, our liberty, or our judgment--is indifferent, and ought not to bother us. If our judgment about things is troubling us, the reason is that we have forgotten this fundamental dogma. The discipline of assent is thus intimately linked to the doctrine of good, bad, and indifferent things (XI, 16):

'To live one's life in the best way: the power to do this resides in our own soul, if we are capable of being indifferent to indifferent things. And we can be indifferent to indifferent things if we consider each of these things, in each of its parts and in its totality, remembering that none of them can produce within us a value-judgment about them, nor can they reach us. Rather, things remain immobile, whereas it is we who engender judgments about them, and, as it were, write them down within ourselves. But it is possible for us not to write them down; it is also possible, if we have not succeeded in this, to erase them instantaneously" (Hadot, The Inner Citadel, pp. 107--8).

The Inner Citadel: the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius by Pierre Hadot

 

The Use of Appearances According to Consequence

The use of appearances according to consequence is the subject of Epictetus' _Discourses_ 1.6 and 1.7.

From "The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus" by Phillip de Lacy:

[6] "The sixth discourse shows how the logical relation of consequence is used in ethics. Epictetus picks up from the second discourse the statement that man is endowed with reason. By the work of providence, this endowment, like every other, has its proper function and object. The objects of reason are appearances. Its function is not only to receive them but to select, abstract, add together, combine them, and pass from one to the other" (117).

"We attain our end only if we use appearances according to the consequences of our endowment (_akolouthos_te_kataskene). Thus the ethical principle of the second discourse, that we should preserve our character, and the formulation of ethics as the rational use of appearances have now been combined by the means of the logical relation of consequence" (117).

"Epictetus says also that action in accord with consequences must be in accord with method (_kata_tropon) and order (_tetagmenos_)" (117).

"For man is endowed with the powers necessary to endure any hardship. Hence the enduring of any hardship is merely a form of acting according to the consequence of our endowment. Hardship is a specific matter (_hule_) for ethical training (_gumnasia_)" (117).

""To conclude the sixth discourse, Epictetus relates other ethical notions to this new formulation of using appearances according to consequences. This use is in our power, unhindered and unconstrained. It gives us freedom and puts an end to our complaints and sorrows. It may be noted here, that the relation of consequence, though necessary, is not in any sense fatalistic or deterministic. It is at best a hypothetical necessity. As Epictetus says, if man is to attain his proper end, he must act according to the consequences of appearances. This is in no way a denial of man's freedom" (118).

"Thus the rational use of appearances has now become the use of appearances according to consequence. Now the relation of consequence in Stoic logic is a necessary relation and can be tested by a formal test. If Epictetus proclaims that this relation is basic in ethics, we should expect him to maintain that the correct use of appearances in ethics is based on necessary truth and is subject to a formal logical criterion. This is precisely the view he sets forth in the seventh discourse" (118).

"Logic teaches us how one thing is a consequence of another and when one thing follows on one thing or on many. One must master these things if he is to establish proofs and determine consequences properly and not be misled by fallacies. That is why students have been required to study and practice logic. The obedience to the laws of logic is itself a duty. Once we have granted the premises, it is a duty and a necessity to abide by the consequences from them. But if the premises are changed, then the consequence is no longer binding. The student must know when to grant a hypothesis and accept its consequences and reject what conflicts with it. He cannot acquire this ability without careful training in logic" (118).

"The failure to learn logic means the inability to use appearances according to consequence, and that means that the basic error in ethics, as well as in logic, has been committed. In this way Epictetus establishes the rules of logic as the criteria of value judgments and justifies the opening statement of the seventh discourse, that the study of logical fallacies and hypothetical propositions is relevant to moral conduct" (118).

 The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus by Phillip de Lacy

A brief review of the main features of Stoic logic by Phillip de Lacy

 "The whole of ethics, then, is included in the rational use of appearances. What makes this use rational? The next four discourses, 5--8, answer this question by showing how the operations of logic are employed in ethics" (116).

"Before the examination of these discourses, however, it is necessary to review briefly the main features of Stoic Logic. The Stoics maintained that philosophy is based on absolute certainty. They recognized no theory of probability and they rejected skepticism in all of its forms. The Stoic wise man assents only to those propositions which are necessarily true. He never holds a mere opinion, as opposed to knowledge, for he never assents to anything false. Of course, complete infallibility is not within the reach of the ordinary man, but every soul naturally assents to the true, rejects the false and withholds judgment about the obscure. In order to avoid assenting to anything false, the Stoic uses certain criteria of certainty. There are two forms of knowledge, mediate and immediate. The latter of these is derived from appearances. The criteria of the truth of an appearance is _katalepsis_. An appearance is _kataleptike_ when it expresses accurately the underlying object it reveals, in such a way that the appearance would not be possible if that object did not exist. Mediate knowledge, or inference, is valid when there is a necessary connection between the premise and the inference to be made from it. All inference is of the form: "If _p_, then _q_," or equivalent hypothetical, disjunctive, and conjunctive forms; e.g., "Either not _p_ or _q_," "Not both _p_ and not _q_," "If not _p_, then not _q_." The hypothetical form of inference (_sunemmenon_), which is regarded as the fundamental form, is valid only when there is a necessary connection between the hypothesis, or sign, and the conclusion, or the thing signified. This necessary connection is called "consequence" (_akolouthia_). It is tested by contraposition (_anaskeue_), i.e., the inference: "If _p_, then _q_," is valid if it is true that, "If not _q_, then not _p_." The favorite Stoic example of inference is: "If it is day, it is light." We may prove the validity of this by contaposition: "If it is not light, it is not day." Or, as Diogenes states it, the hypothetical inference is valid if the opposite of the conclusion contradicts the hypothesis. For example, the proposition, "It is not light," contradicts the proposition., "It is day." Therefore, the hypothetical inference, "If it is day, it is light," is valid. The tests of both mediate and immediate knowledge are based on the principle of contradiction. A thing is true if its denial results in contradiction or impossibility. Hence all tested truth for the Stoics is necessary truth. A set of terms preserved by Diogenes emphasizes this fact. Dialectic, he says, is characterized as avoidance of rash assent (_aproptosia_), resistance to mere probability (_aneikaiotes_), irrefutability (_anelenxia_), correct reference of appearances to reason (_amataiotes_), and science (_epistime_) is sure (_asphales_) and unchangeable (_amataptotos_)" (116)."

The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus by Phillip de Lacy

Should we pursue preferred indifferents?

 There was a problem with a maxim of mine: 'pursue nothing external,' derived from _Discourses_ 4.12.15, which other members of the International Stoic Forum tried to help me correct.

"First, therefore, we ought to have these principles at command, and to do nothing apart from them, but keep the soul intent upon this mark; we must pursue none of the things external, none of the things which are not our own, but as He that is mighty has ordained; pursuing without any hesitation the things that lie within the sphere of the moral purpose, and all other things as they have been given us" (Oldfather).

The main objection was that my wording (and even many translations) made it sound like Epictetus was saying that we shouldn't pursue preferred indifferents.

Grant Sterling provided the best solution:

"All:
    Part of the problem is that English (and probably ancient Greek)
lacks good terminology to express an important distinction.
    Imagine that my _only_ goal was to perform the action that would
increase the number of purple things in the universe by the
greatest amount possible.  The problem is that this goal, stated in those
terms, is insufficient for action.  I have to figure out which concrete plan
_is_ the one that would maximize purple.  Suppose it turns out that the
purple-maximizing option is to use my savings to purchase a factory
that manufactures paint, convert it so that it only makes purple, and offer
the paint at wildly discounted prices.  So I go to the factory owner and offer
him money for the plant...
    Now suppose that someone asks me "what are you trying to do?"  In
English, all of these answers are 'true':
    1) I am trying to increase the amount of purple in the world.
    2) I am trying to buy a paint factory.
    3) I am trying to manufacture inexpensive purple paint.
    4) Etc.
    So in one sense I am aiming at purchasing a factory, and in another
sense I am aiming at maximizing purple.
    The Stoics now run into the same problem.  My goal is to do the
virtuous thing.  Fine.  But what _is_ the virtuous thing?  Maybe at this
moment the virtuous thing is to provide tutoring to a student who is
struggling in my class.  OK, then in one sense of the word I am striving to
help this student learn more about Hume's philosophy, and in another
sense I am striving to be virtuous.  These are two descriptions of the very
same action, and they are both accurate descriptions in some sense.

    So, I think, it is true that for the Stoics the _only_ thing we aim at
should be virtue, and also true that we should constantly aim at external
things other than virtue.  Those ideas seem contradictory, but they aren't--
the are compatible because they represent descriptions at different levels.
    To see this, imagine the following case.  Suppose Abimelech desires
to do the right thing.  And suppose that he calculates (correctly) that
the right thing for him to do at that moment is to campaign to help
Candidate P get elected Mayor.  So he campaigns for Candidate P.
    But he becomes frustrated, because people don't seem receptive to
voting for P.  When P loses the election, Abimelech is miserable.
    This illustrates the difference between:
    a) Pursuing an external thing _only_ insofar as it represents the
concrete path to virtue, (or, to put it another way, aiming at the
correct _action_) and
    b) Pursuing the external thing _pre se_ (or, aiming at the desired
_outcome_).
    Abimelech started out purely aiming at virtue.  At first, campaigning
for P was _only_ the concrete execution of his pursuit of virtue.  But
then it became an end in itself, and the result was that Abimelech was led
away from eudaimonia instead of towards it--he's miserable instead of
happy.
    The next election comes.  This time, Abimelech discovers how to
rig voting machines so that they will convert some votes for the other
candidate into votes for P.  P wins the rigged election, and Abi is
happy.  But, of course, he doesn't have eudaimonia, because he is not
acting as he ought to act.  Again, he is pursuing an external (securing
election of P as Mayor) in itself, not as a distillation of the pursuit of
virtue.  Once you fall into pursuing the external thing itself, you will
fail to be consistently happy, and fail to act consistently in the correct
manner.  You will fail to achieve eudaimonia.

    So, again, in one sense of the word it is perfectly fine to say that
Stoics pursue things other than virtue, indeed the pursuit of virtue
in the abstract cannot lead to any actions at all.  But in another sense
it is very dangerous to start talking as though Stoics pursue the external
thing _itself_.  There is a big difference between "aiming at helping
Candidate P get elected" and "aiming at doing the virtuous thing, which
at this moment happens to involve helping P get elected"."

    "Regards,
        GCS"

Determinism is fatal to Stoicism

A message from Grant Sterling to the International Stoic Forum on 12/10/2018.

All:

    I don't have nearly enough time to discuss all the things that I
want to discuss in this very interesting thread.  (Please stop cheering.)
So I'll settle for some 'small plate' comments.

    1) I think the sentence "we influence these choices through...genes,
learning, and experience" is incoherent.  If "choices" are simply physical
phenomena caused by physical elements in the brain and central nervous
system, then there is no such thing as "we" and certainly no such thing
as "influence".  Just as well say "the rock influences its choices through
its mass and shape". 
    2) Chrysippus (and perhaps other Stoics, although this is by no means
clear) was a determinist, with a view of choice not substantially different
from Harris.  But I think determinism is absolutely fatal for Stoicism, because
I don't think there is a _meaningful_ distinction between "things in our control"
and "things not in our control" on deterministic grounds.  There are "things
caused by the physical state of our brains" and "things not caused by the
physical state of our brains (though they might be caused by the physical
state of other bodily organs)", but this is a trivial distinction on which no
substantive metaphysical conclusions can be based.  Why the former could be
good and evil but the latter could not be becomes a random mystery.
    3) I think Harris and others radically underestimate the corrosiveness
of their doctrines.  They model their worldview on the hard sciences (and,
don't get me wrong, I love real science), but hard science has no room for
"desires" or "beliefs" or "well-reasoned arguments".  If you believe that
everything is caused by particles colliding with other particles, and causing
outcomes with mass, velocity, electrical charge, etc., then say that.  You
didn't change your beliefs about free will because of Harris' arguments--
the electro-chemical state of your brain was caused to move from alpha to
beta as a result of photons crashing into your eyes in a certain pattern.
    4) I also disagree with Harris' attempts to suggest that this doesn't matter
very much.  For example, with determinism, there is no such thing as morality.
    Suppose that Smith sees a small child drowning in a swimming pool.  Smith
is an excellent swimmer, and the child is small--he could in fact simply lean
over and scoop the child up from out of the pool with little effort and no risk
at all.  But Smith doesn't do so--let us say that, using unscientific language,
he is angry at the child's mother for spurning his sexual advances, and wants
to see her suffer when she finds her dead child.  And we all say that he did
"the wrong thing".  But the notion of "the wrong thing" makes sense only
_by comparison to an alternative_.  No-one would say that I am doing the wrong
thing by typing this e-mail, because "initiating permanent world peace" would
be a better outcome than telling people my thoughts about Stoicism and free
will.  No-one would say that because "initiating permanent world peace" is
not something that I can possibly do--it's not an alternative that I have.  Had
I really had the option of world peace or this e-mail, and chose this e-mail,
then you could meaningfully criticize my choice.  But I didn't have that option.
    But if we call Smith's action wrong, then we must have in mind some
alternative.  And we do--we think that the right thing for him to do would
have been to walk over and scoop up the child and save its life.  But that's
because we're used to seeing the world through the lens of free will.  We
should recognize that it is _physically impossible_, a _violation of the laws
of nature_ for Smith to do anything other than salivate over the thought of
the mother's horrific pain.  Smith has exactly the same opportunity to
save the child as I have to initiate world peace--0%.  All moral categories
are based on the assumption that people can freely choose between
meaningful alternatives--determinism says that they can't.
    Of course we can still punish people for their actions, in the same way
that I can spray my cat with a water bottle when she claws the furniture.
I want her to act a certain way, and I inflict suffering on her to force her
to change her behavior.  Perhaps Harris finds this notion of punishment
for human beings innocuous--I find it terrifying.
    5) Most importantly, though, the experiments on which Harris leans
heavily are scientifically flawed.  Not just "imperfect"--no experiment on
human beings is scientifically perfect, especially ones that require us
to take seriously people's reports of their mental life.  No, I mean that the
experiments are fundamentally and fatally flawed.  They not only do not
prove that there is no free will, they don't even lend any serious evidence
to that thesis.  If you're interested in this, read the works of Al Mele
(unfortunately, I don't have a link for you to use).  Mele systematically
destroys the experiments, from a purely scientific point of view.  (I
should say that I don't agree with Mele's own view of free will, but I
do agree with his refutation of the experiments.)

    So I happily throw aside Harris.  But I admit that in your post there
is an argument more powerful than the experimentally-based argument.
If you will permit to to do a small bit of extrapolation:

    1) Our choices and everything that contributes to them are nothing more
than physical events in our brains.
    2) All physical events are caused by prior physical events.  (Perhaps we
should make an exception here for quantum indeterminacy, but let us
leave that aside for the moment.)
    3) Ergo, our choices and everything contributing to them are caused
by prior physical events.
    4) Ergo, either there is no such thing as free will, or free will must
simply be redefined as some sort of deterministic physical process.

    This argument is logically valid, and so anyone who believes both
premises should accept the conclusion.  (Actually, I have much more
sympathy for the "there is no free will" solution than for the "let's
redefine 'free will' to fit determinism" solution {although Chrysippus
chose the latter}.)
    The problem is that I think that the first premise is obviously
false, and there is good reason to doubt the second premise as
well.  Certainly there is no _proof_ of either premise that should
satisfy anyone who claims to be a scientist, although I know many
scientifically-obsessed philosophers who embrace both premises
because they falsely think that science supports or demands them.

    Regards,
        Grant

Epictetus' Enchiridion, Chapters 1--5

 The best introduction to Stoicism can be had in the first five chapters of Epictetus' Enchiridion.

Chapter 1. Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion, movement toward a thing, desire, aversion (turning from a thing); and in a word, whatever are our own acts: not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the control of others. Remember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men: but if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is another's, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm.

If then you desire (aim at) such great things, remember that you must not (attempt to) lay hold of them with a small effort; but you must leave alone some things entirely, and postpone others for the present. But if you wish these things also (such great things), and power (office) and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things (power and wealth) because you aim also at those former things (such great things): certainly you will fail in those things through which alone happiness and freedom are secured. Straightway then practice saying to every harsh appearance, You are an appearance, and in no manner what you appear to be. Then examine it by the rules which you possess, and by this first and chiefly, whether it relates to the things which are in our
power or to the things which are not in our power: and if it relates to anything which is not in our power, be ready to say, that it does not concern you.


Chapter 2. Remember that desire contains in it the profession (hope) of obtaining that which you desire; and the profession (hope) in aversion (turning from a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you attempt to avoid: and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate; and he who falls into that which he would avoid, is unhappy. If then you attempt to avoid only the things contrary to nature which are within your power, you will not be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if you attempt to avoid disease or death or poverty, you will be unhappy. Take away then aversion from all things which are not in our power, and transfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power. But destroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire anything which is not in our power, you must be unfortunate: but of the things in our power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet is before you. But employ only the power of moving toward an object and retiring from it; and these powers indeed only slightly and with exceptions and with remission.

Chapter 3. In everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the (description, notion); what is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has been broken, you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed.


Chapter 4. When you are going to take in hand any act, remind yourself what kind of an act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what happens in the bath: some splashing the water, others pushing against one another, others abusing one another, and some stealing; and thus with more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformable to nature. And so you will do in every act: for thus if any hindrance to bathing shall happen, let this thought be ready; it was not this only that I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a way conformable to nature; but I shall not maintain it so, if I am vexed at what happens.


Chapter 5. Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things: for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, it would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinion about death, that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded or disturbed or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves, that is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame others for his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself.

The Heart and Soul of Stoicism

From: Grant Sterling [...] Sent: 03 October 2017 19:54 To: stoics@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [stoics] Structural Soundness

 "I've said this before and no-one showed me where I was wrong. I'll say it again and maybe this time someone will do so. You (Malcolm) say that Stoicism would have to be subjected to an extreme process to winnow the ethics away from the Physics. Without commenting on the 'extremity' involved, that process has already been completed, by a guy named Epictetus. Pick up the Encheiridion. In sections 1-5, Epictetus presents Stoic ethics with no reliance on anything in the Physics. Only internal things are in my control. Unhappiness is caused by (falsely) believing that externals are good or evil, which causes us to desire the world to be one way rather than another, which inevitably causes unhappiness when the world doesn't conform. If I eliminate my belief that externals are ever bad, I can even prevent all grief when my child or wife dies, or when I myself face death. The only thing that isn't here in sections 1-5 is a discussion about preferred and dispreferred indifferents. This is the heart and soul of Stoic ethics (and obviously, on my view, of Stoicism itself). And this is the book from which the majority of contemporary "Stoics" learned Stoicism (in my experience). There are passages later on that mention the gods, but none of them are central to the text. The section that discusses the gods most thoroughly, #31, doesn't place the ethics on the foundation of the Physics, but actually connects our proper religious beliefs to the ethics (i.e., the ethical system that has already been discussed is the foundation of the discussion of theology, not v.v.). And there is absolutely nothing about Logos, pneuma, pantheism, materialism, or any of that. So Epictetus stripped away almost the entirety of Stoic Physics in order to present an entirely coherent and compelling ethical theory--and he could have easily removed the handful of theological references as well if he had wanted to. And my position, repeated many times, is this-- if Epictetus doesn't deserve to be called a "Stoic", then your definition of "Stoicism" is far too narrow. I'll happily be whatever Epictetus is, and you can take your "Stoicism" home with you."

 "Regards, 

   Grant"