Why Substance Dualism Is Required for Epictetus' Scheme

 Substance dualism gets push back. Why is substance dualism actually better for Epictetus' scheme than monism?

Claude:

Excellent question - this goes to the heart of Sterling's systematic interpretation.

Why substance dualism is required for Epictetus' scheme:

1. The Internal-External distinction collapses under monism**

Epictetus' entire ethical framework depends on a radical distinction between:

- What's up to us (prohairesis, judgments, assent, impulses)

- What's not up to us (body, property, reputation, even bodily sensations)

If mind and body are the same substance (monism), this distinction becomes:

- Arbitrary (just different aspects of one thing)

- Pragmatic (useful fiction but not metaphysically grounded)

- Contingent (could be drawn differently)

Under substance dualism, the distinction is ontologically real:

- Mind = immaterial substance with different causal properties

- Body = material substance subject to external causation

- The boundary isn't negotiable - it tracks actual metaphysical difference

2. Libertarian free will requires it

Epictetus insists we have *absolute* freedom over prohairetic acts - assent, refusal, impulse, aversion.

Under monism:

- Mental events are physical brain states

- Physical states are causally determined by prior physical states

- No room for the kind of freedom Epictetus demands

Under substance dualism:

- Mental substance operates by different causal principles

- Agent causation becomes possible (not event-caused, but self-caused)

- The prohairesis can genuinely be "up to us" in the strong sense Epictetus requires

3. The discipline of assent becomes incoherent without it

Your five-step method requires:

- Pause - But if judgment is a brain state, what's pausing? Another brain state? Then it's just causal chain all the way down

- Testing - Comparing impression to axioms requires a faculty that stands apart from the causal flow

- Decision - Assent/refusal/suspension must be genuinely free choices, not just the output of prior causes

Under monism, the "discipline" is just: one brain state follows another according to physical law. You can't actually *choose* to pause or test - you just have the experience of choosing while determined processes unfold.

4. Moral responsibility disappears

Epictetus holds us absolutely responsible for our judgments and assents.

Under monism:

- "I couldn't help forming that judgment - my brain state was determined by prior causes"

- Responsibility becomes degree-based (how much control did you have?)

- The Stoic demand for perfect virtue becomes incoherent

Under substance dualism:

- You ARE your prohairesis (immaterial rational faculty)

- Nothing external determines your assents

- Full responsibility is possible because you're the unmoved mover of your judgments

5. The body-as-indifferent only makes sense with dualism

Epictetus treats the body as:

- Not really you (your true self is prohairesis)

- Morally neutral (health/sickness are indifferent)

- An external that happens to be closely associated with you

Under monism:

- You ARE your body (or body-mind unity)

- Bodily states are mental states

- How can pain be "not really yours" if you're a unified physical system?

Under substance dualism:

- Body is external object you're temporarily connected to

- Pain happens in body, not in prohairesis

- You (the rational soul) remain free regardless of bodily state

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Why people push back:

1. Contemporary physicalism is default - modern educated people assume monism

2. Dualism seems naive - "Descartes is refuted, everyone knows mind = brain"

3. They want Stoicism without the metaphysics - therapeutic techniques without ontological commitments

Sterling's point: You can't have it both ways. Either:

- Accept substance dualism and get coherent Epictetan ethics

- Reject substance dualism and admit you're doing something else (CBT, modern therapy, not actually Stoicism)

The alternative (monist "Stoicism"):

- Internal-External becomes pragmatic heuristic, not metaphysical truth

- Freedom becomes compatibilist (acting according to your nature, but still determined)

- Responsibility becomes probabilistic (you're mostly but not entirely responsible)

- The body is you, just the part you can't fully control

That might be defensible, but it's not Epictetus' system. It's a modern reconstruction.

Sterling's (and your) commitment: Preserve Epictetus' actual logic, even if it requires unfashionable metaphysics.

Is this the core argument you're making when you defend substance dualism?