The Six Commitments and the Five Steps: A Complete Integration
The Six Commitments and the Five Steps: A Complete Integration
Sterling's Core Stoicism rests on six philosophical commitments: substance dualism, libertarian free will, moral realism, ethical intuitionism, foundationalism, and the correspondence theory of truth. These are not external scaffolding erected around the practice of examining impressions. They are the structural preconditions for the practice to be what it is. Each commitment is operative at a specific point in the five-step method. Together they constitute the complete philosophical architecture of making correct use of impressions.
Step One: Reception — Correspondence Theory and Moral Realism
An impression does not arrive as neutral data awaiting interpretation. It arrives already formatted as a proposition — asserting what is the case, claiming to match reality, demanding assent. "I have been harmed" does not present as a feeling about events. It presents as a report of events. It does not say "This seems bad to me." It says "This IS bad." Before philosophy can intervene, before the pause can occur, before any examination can begin, the impression has already made its claim.
This is correspondence theory operating at the perceptual level — not as philosophical doctrine applied afterward but as the native structure of impressional content. Every impression carries an implicit correspondence claim: I am true because I match what is. It presents itself as reality rather than as a representation of reality. It does not request verification. It assumes it.
And many impressions arrive soaked in moral evaluation. "I have been harmed" claims that real harm has occurred — not that harm seems to have occurred, not that the agent dislikes what happened, but that objective harm is present as a feature of the situation. "This is unjust" claims that actual injustice obtains. "This is shameful" claims that objective shameful quality exists.
This is moral realism at the perceptual level. The impression claims to detect real good and evil in the world. Without moral realism there is no false value — there are only preferences and feelings. Without correspondence theory there is no false fact — there is only how things seem. Both commitments are operative the moment the impression arrives, because both are presupposed by the impression's own structure.
The taxonomy of error that makes Stoic practice possible — false fact, false value, mixed error — is impossible without them. Without correspondence theory there is no criterion for identifying false fact. Without moral realism there is no criterion for identifying false value. Step One reveals that the six commitments are not added to experience. They are already embedded in the structure of experience itself.
Step Two: Recognition — Substance Dualism
An impression does not announce itself as an impression. It arrives as the world. It presents itself as what is the case, not as something about what is the case. Before recognition occurs there is no difference between what appears and what is believed. Appearance is belief. The impression and reality are identical in the agent's experience.
Recognition is the moment this identity is broken. It is the act by which what seemed to be reality is reclassified as a representation of reality. It introduces and enforces three separations that ordinary experience collapses into one: there is the external event, there is the impression that represents it, and there is the prohairesis — the rational faculty to which the impression appears.
This separation is not psychological. It is metaphysical. It presupposes that the mind is not identical with its representations, and that representations are not identical with the world. Prohairesis is not a function of the impression and not a product of the external event. It is a distinct locus of judgment — a genuine subject standing over against the object of experience.
This is substance dualism operative at Step Two. Without an immaterial rational faculty genuinely distinct from the body and its states, recognition collapses. If the self is simply one more physical event among physical events, there is no subject standing over against the impression, no one to whom the impression appears as distinct from the impression itself. There is only the flow of events — including the event of seeming-to-be-harmed — with no standpoint from which the claim could be evaluated.
Epictetus's instruction to address impressions directly — "You are an impression, and not at all what you appear to be" — is not a psychological technique. It is a declaration of ontological status. It places the impression in the category of object and the self in the category of subject. Recognition is the act by which the self reclaims its position as the one to whom things appear rather than being identical with what appears. Substance dualism is the metaphysical ground that makes this reclamation possible.
Step Three: Pause — Libertarian Free Will
The impression presses toward assent. It arrives with phenomenological authority — seeming true, seeming urgent, seeming to demand immediate response. The pause suspends this automatic movement. It is not a breathing exercise or a psychological technique. It is prohairesis asserting its jurisdiction over the claims brought before it.
But what kind of act is the pause? What is doing the pausing? And is the outcome genuinely open — or is the pause itself simply another determined event in a causal chain that has already fixed what assent will follow?
Libertarian free will answers these questions. The pause is an agent-causal act — an originating exercise of the soul's own powers that is not necessitated by prior physical or psychological conditions. At the point of the pause more than one outcome is genuinely possible. The impression does not necessitate assent. The past does not necessitate assent. The psychological state does not necessitate assent. Three alternatives are open: assent, refusal, suspension. None is forced. None is excluded by prior conditions. None is illusory.
This is not freedom from coercion. It is freedom from determination. The choice is not produced by the world. It is introduced into the world.
Without libertarian free will the pause is theater. If assent is the inevitable output of prior causes operating through the agent, then what appears to be a pause is simply a mechanical delay — a longer causal pathway to a predetermined conclusion. Responsibility dissolves. Virtue becomes impossible. The entire Stoic practical program becomes an elaborate description of a mechanism.
With libertarian free will the pause is what Epictetus always said assent was: the one thing genuinely up to us. The impression can arrive with force. The body can react automatically. But the rational endorsement of the impression's claim — the assent of the prohairesis — can be genuinely withheld. The pause is where philosophy interrupts nature and freedom becomes experientially real.
Step Four: Examination — Foundationalism, Moral Realism, and Correspondence Theory
The suspended impression now faces rational testing. Examination applies three constraints simultaneously: the impression is tested against the foundation, tested by recognition of what category the object belongs to, and tested against reality to determine whether the classification corresponds to what is actually the case.
Foundationalism is operative first. The examination draws on pre-settled beliefs that are not themselves under review during the examination. The Propositions — only virtue is genuinely good, only vice is genuinely evil, externals are indifferent — function as the foundational layer against which the impression is measured. These are not derived on the spot. They are already in place, already settled, retrieved rather than generated. Without foundationalism the examination generates an infinite regress — every standard would itself require a standard, and no impression could ever be tested.
Moral realism is operative second. The foundational beliefs the examination draws on are not preferences or conventions. They are objective facts about moral reality. Virtue really is the only good. Externals really are indifferent. There is a fact of the matter independent of what the agent feels or prefers. Without moral realism the examination collapses into coherence, comfort, or cultural agreement. It would no longer be testing but harmonizing.
Correspondence theory is operative third. The examination asks a single question: does the impression's claim match reality? The impression says: external event X is evil, has harmed me. Reality as structured by the foundational propositions says: only vice is evil, externals are indifferent. The claims do not match. The impression fails the correspondence test. No calculation occurs. No feeling is consulted. No preference is weighed. The claim simply does not correspond to what is.
Examination is where the world answers the mind. It is the act by which prohairesis measures the content of an impression against foundational moral structure and objective reality. It is the point at which truth becomes visible.
Step Five: Decision — Ethical Intuitionism
Examination has produced a determinate result. The impression either corresponds to moral reality or it does not. Decision is the act by which this result is enacted — assent granted to what corresponds, assent refused to what does not.
Ethical intuitionism is operative here. The verdict is not reached by further discursive reasoning. It is perceived directly — the way the eye sees that black is not white, the way Epictetus says genuine moral knowledge is delivered immediately rather than constructed argumentatively. The trained practitioner does not work toward the conclusion that the impression is false. He sees it. The examination has revealed the mismatch. The intuitional faculty perceives the verdict and the decision enacts it.
This is why Epictetus says that students who invoke skeptical questioning at the moment of crisis have missed the point entirely. The examination is not an occasion for academic deliberation. It is a rapid perceptual act by a trained moral faculty applying settled foundational beliefs to the impression at hand. The result is immediate because the groundwork has already been done — through the digestion of dogmata that Tremblay's scholarship confirms is the real work of Stoic training.
Decision is not expression. It is not regulation. It is not coping. It is the act by which rational agency introduces truth or falsehood into itself. It is the moment at which the self becomes what it knows. Freedom becomes deed. The agent owns the act because the act originates in the agent — not in the impression, not in the external event, not in prior causes operating through the agent.
Responsibility arises here because authorship arises here. The act is imputable because the agent could have chosen otherwise, knew what was true, and was not compelled. This is why error is blameworthy and virtue is praiseworthy — not because of what follows from the act, but because of where the act comes from.
The Complete Map
Step One — Reception — presupposes correspondence theory and moral realism. The impression arrives already embodying both: claiming to match factual reality, claiming to detect real moral properties.
Step Two — Recognition — requires substance dualism. The separation of prohairesis from impression from external event is a metaphysical operation that presupposes a genuine immaterial subject distinct from its representations.
Step Three — Pause — requires libertarian free will. The withholding of assent is a genuine agent-causal act, not a mechanical delay. The outcome is genuinely open. Freedom from determination, not merely from coercion.
Step Four — Examination — requires foundationalism, moral realism, and correspondence theory together. Pre-settled foundational beliefs supply the standard. Moral realism guarantees the standard reflects objective reality. Correspondence theory frames the test.
Step Five — Decision — requires ethical intuitionism. The verdict is perceived directly by a trained moral faculty rather than constructed discursively. The decision enacts what examination has revealed.
The six commitments are not philosophical additions to Stoic practice. They are the structural preconditions for Stoic practice to be coherent. When Epictetus instructs us to make correct use of impressions, he is presupposing all six. Sterling names them. The five steps show where each one does its work.