Seddon’s Glossary of Stoic Terms
The following definitions are drawn from Keith Seddon’s Appendix of Terms, covering the principal Greek vocabulary of Epictetus’ Stoic ethics. Each entry gives the Greek term, its transliteration, and Seddon’s definition in full.
1. αδιάφορος — adiaphoros — “Indifferent”
The adiaphora are any of those things that are neither good nor bad — everything, in fact, that does not fall under the headings “virtue” or “vice.” The indifferents are what those lacking Stoic wisdom frequently take to be good or bad, and hence take to be desirable or undesirable. Pursuing them, or trying to avoid them, can lead to disturbing emotions that undermine one’s capacity to lead a eudaimōn life.
2. αγαθός — agathos — “Good”
Something agathos is that which truly benefits the person who possesses it, understood by the Stoics to be “virtue,” to be acquired by “following nature,” by being motivated by the right sort of impulses and keeping one’s moral character (prohairesis) in the right condition. For Epictetus, the essence of good is the proper use of phantasiai (“impressions”), for this is what is eph’ hēmin, “in our power.”
3. αιδήμων — aidēmōn — “Self-respecting”
Of someone who possesses aidōs: self-respect, honour, a sense of modesty, or a sense of shame. For Epictetus, a key characteristic of the prokoptōn’s prohairesis. Our aidōs is our own and cannot be taken away, nor its use prevented.
4. απαίδευτος — apaideutos — “Uneducated”
The condition from which the Stoic prokoptōn tries to save themselves by learning Stoic principles and putting those principles into effect. See idiōtēs.
5. απάθεια — apatheia — “Peace of Mind”
Literally “without passion,” that is, being free from passion. A constituent of the eudaimōn life. One who enjoys peace of mind is apathēs.
6. αφορμή — aphormē — “Repulsion”
The opposite of hormē; that which motivates our rejection of anything.
7. αποπροήγμενος — apoproēgmenos — “Dispreferred”
Used of adiaphoros (“indifferent”) things, including such things as sickness, physical impairment, death, pain, poverty, injustice, a “bad” reputation, unpopularity, and lack of practical skills — conventionally “bad” things usually taken to disadvantage those who suffer them. Enduring any of the dispreferred indifferents does not detract from the eudaimōn life enjoyed by the Stoic sophos. See also proēgmenos.
8. απροαίρετα — aprohaireta — “Things Independent of the Moral Character”
Each is aprohairetos. Those things which are outside the scope of one’s prohairesis. See prohairesis.
9. αρετή — aretē — “Excellence” or “Virtue”
In the context of Stoic ethics, the possession of “moral excellence” will secure eudaimonia. For Epictetus, one acquires this by learning the correct use of impressions, following God, and following nature. The virtues are the only things that are good (agathos); they are dispositions of one’s prohairesis that inform actions and duties generally. Four primary virtues had been recognised since the time of Plato: phronēsis (prudence or wisdom), sōphrosunē (temperance, moderation, or self-restraint), dikaiosunē (justice), and andreia (courage or bravery). The other virtues were taken to be subordinate to these four. The opposite of virtue, vice, is kakia.
10. άσκησις — askēsis — “Training”
“Exercise” or “practice” undertaken by the Stoic prokoptōn striving to become a Stoic sophos. The most important exercise for Epictetus is maintaining the correct use of impressions. See also phantasia.
11. αταραξία — ataraxia — “Imperturbability”
Literally “without disturbance or trouble,” translated variously as “peace of mind,” “serenity,” “calm,” “tranquillity,” or “impassiveness.” A state of mind that is a constituent of the eudaimōn life. Someone possessed of this state of mind is atarachos.
12. βούλησις — boulēsis — “Wish”
One of the three eupatheiai (“good feelings”), experienced only by the Stoic wise person. Boulēsis is defined as a eulogos orexis, a “reasonable desire.”
13. χαρά — chara — “Joy”
One of the three eupatheiai (“good feelings”), experienced only by the Stoic wise person.
14. έκκλισις — ekklisis — “Aversion”
“Avoidance”; the opposite of orexis (desire). Along with orexis, ekklisis should be exercised “in accordance with nature.”
15. εκτός — ektos — “External”
Ta ektos, “the externals,” are any of those things that fall outside the preserve of one’s prohairesis, including health, wealth, sickness, life, death, pain — what Epictetus calls the aprohaireta, which are not in our power, the “indifferent” things.
16. ελευθερία — eleutheria — “Freedom”
A state of being, constitutive of the eudaimōn life, enjoyed by the Stoic wise person in virtue of their capacity to maintain their prohairesis in the right condition. In making the correct use of impressions and not assenting to false judgements, the Stoic wise person is free from disturbing emotions and so can never be constrained or impeded by external events or the actions of other people. Those who are free are eleutheros. The person who is free is said by Epictetus to be the “friend of God.”
17. εφ’ ήμίν — eph’ hēmin — “In Our Power”
“Up to us,” or “depending on us”; namely, making the correct use of impressions, by means of which we maintain our prohairesis in the right condition. This is the most important concept in Epictetus’ treatment of Stoic ethics.
18. επιθυμία — epithumia — “Desire”
“Appetite” or “yearning”; one of the four primary pathē (passions). Epithumia is the yearning that the non-wise person directs towards anticipated events and objects in the mistaken belief that they are of real benefit.
19. ευδαίμων — eudaimōn — “Happy”
“Flourishing”; descriptive of the sophos (Stoic wise person). See eudaimonia.
20. ευδαιμονία — eudaimonia — “Happiness”
“Flourishing” or “living well” was conceived by the ancient philosophers as the telos, “end” or “goal” of life. For Epictetus, one achieves this end by learning the correct use of impressions, following God, and following nature. More generally, the Stoics say that happiness consists in living virtuously. Zeno said that happiness is a “good flow of life” attained by “living in agreement.” See euroia biou; telos.
21. ευλάβεια — eulabeia — “Caution”
One of the three eupatheiai (“good feelings”), experienced only by the Stoic wise person.
22. ευπάθεια — eupatheia — “Good Feeling”
Possessed by the Stoic wise person (sophos), who experiences these special sorts of emotions but does not experience irrational and disturbing passions. There are three eupatheiai: (1) with respect to an anticipated good, whereas the non-wise person experiences epithumia (desire), the wise person experiences boulēsis (wish); (2) with respect to the presence of a supposed good, whereas the non-wise person experiences hēdonē (pleasure), the wise person experiences chara (joy); and (3) with respect to an anticipated evil, whereas the non-wise person experiences phobos (fear), the wise person experiences eulabeia (caution). There is no “good feeling” that correlates with the non-wise person’s experience of lupē (distress) with respect to the presence of a supposed evil. A “good feeling” correlates with a correct judgement about what is truly good (virtue, and action motivated by virtue), in contrast to a passion which correlates with a false judgement. See pathos.
23. εύροια βιού — euroia biou — “Good Flow of Life”
Zeno’s definition of eudaimonia (“happiness”), enjoyed by the sophos (wise person). Epictetus usually uses the abbreviated form, hē euroia. Other translators deploy a range of suitably synonymous expressions: peace of mind, peace, happiness, serenity, tranquillity, well-being, prosperity. See also eudaimonia, telos.
24. ευσεβής — eusebēs — “Dutiful”
“Pious”; the disposition of someone who takes proper care of their devotion to the gods.
25. ήδονή — hēdonē — “Pleasure”
One of the four primary pathē (passions). Hēdonē is the pleasure that the non-wise person experiences when events or objects that are mistakenly believed to be of real value are present. See pathos.
26. ήγεμονικόν — hēgemonikon — “Commanding Faculty”
The controlling part of the soul (psuchē); the centre of consciousness, the seat of all mental states, thought by the Stoics to be located in the heart. It manifests four mental powers: the capacity to receive impressions, to assent to them, to form intentions to act in response to them, and to do these things rationally. For Epictetus, keeping the prohairesis in the right condition and keeping the hēgemonikon in the right condition are essentially interchangeable notions. Both are in the right condition when maintained “in accordance with nature” or “in harmony with nature.”
27. όρμή — hormē — “Impulse to Act”
“Choice” or “intention”; that which motivates an action. “Impulse is a motion of the soul towards something” (Stob. 2.7.9). “Impulse is the stimulus to action” (Cicero, On Duties 1.132). Its opposite, repulsion, “a motion of the soul away from something,” is aphormē.
28. ύπεξαίρεσις — hupexhairesis — “Reservation”
The Stoic wise person undertakes all actions “with reservation,” recognising that the outcomes of all actions are not “in their power,” for only the intention to act, and to act with virtue, are in their power. Thus, in undertaking any action, the Stoic wise person understands that they will succeed in their action unless something intervenes, and if something does intervene, this is accepted as how Zeus wants the world to be, and is not an occasion for feeling upset and lapsing into passion.
29. ύπόλειψις — hupolēpsis — “Opinion”
“Assumption”; the Stoic prokoptōn guards against holding inappropriate or false opinions — something that occurs if they do not make “proper use of impressions.” The opinions we hold are “in our power”; thus maintaining one’s prohairesis in the right condition is in part accomplished by holding appropriate opinions.
30. ιδιώτης — idiōtēs — “Uneducated Person”
A common, private, or uneducated person. Epictetus uses this term to denote someone who is ignorant of philosophy (in particular, Stoic ethics), and who is in this sense uneducated. An idiōtēs is idiōtikos (“uneducated”). It is from this condition that the Stoic philosophos tries to save themselves — the achievement of which would be to attain eudaimonia — undertaken by maintaining one’s prohairesis in the right condition, following God, following nature, and above all by making the proper use of impressions.
31. ιδιωτισμός — idiōtismos — “The Way of the Uneducated Person”
The manner of the idiōtēs, the common, private, or uneducated person.
32. κακία — kakia — “Vice”
Characteristic of the idiōtēs, but alien to the sophos. Vicious actions inevitably befall the agent who makes false judgements about what is really good and bad, and about what constitutes the telos and the eudaimōn life. From the perspective of Stoic ethics, almost all people are vicious, being phaulos (worthless), idiōtikos, and apaideutos (uneducated). The prokoptōn is aware of their deficiencies and turns to Stoic ethics for philosophical enlightenment and practical remedies.
33. καλός — kalos — “Fine”
“Beautiful,” “honourable”; Epictetus describes the Stoic sophos as kalos kai agathos, “fine and good.”
34. κακός — kakos — “Bad”
“Evil”; the only thing that counts as truly bad for the Stoic philosophos is kakia, “vice.” Things commonly understood to be bad are regarded as adiaphoros, “indifferent,” by Stoics.
35. κατά φύσιν — kata phusin — “In Accordance with Nature”
The Stoic prokoptōn endeavours to maintain their prohairesis “in accordance with nature,” accomplished by making proper use of impressions, following God, and making manifest in their life the conviction that virtue is the proper telos for all rational beings. Thus to live in accordance with nature is one and the same as securing the eudaimōn life. That which is not in accordance with nature is contrary to nature, para phusin.
36. κάθηκον — kathēkon — “Appropriate Action”
“Proper function” or “duty” undertaken by someone aiming to do what befits them as a responsible, sociable person. The appropriate actions are the subject of the second of the three topoi.
37. κατόρθωμα — katorthōma — “Right Action”
A “complete or perfect action” undertaken by the Stoic sophos, constituted by an appropriate action performed virtuously.
38. λύπη — lupē — “Distress”
One of the four primary pathē (passions). Lupē is the distress that the non-wise person experiences when events or objects that are mistakenly believed to be of real harm are present. In Stoic philosophy of mind, lupē denotes mental pain — what someone suffers whilst in the grip of this passion.
39. όρεξις — orexis — “Desire”
Properly directed only at virtue; a type of “rational impulse” constituted by a movement of the soul towards something. Epictetus says that we should exercise desire and aversion “in accordance with nature.” See hormē.
40. πάθος — pathos — “Passion”
Any of the “disturbing or violent emotions” experienced inappropriately and sometimes excessively by those who lack Stoic wisdom and believe that externals really are good or bad, when in fact they are “indifferent.” A pathos, according to the Stoics, is an excessive impulse occasioned by assenting to a false judgement based on a misunderstanding of what is truly good and bad, and can be regarded as the affective component of such a judgement, or can be identified as the judgement itself. The Stoics identified four primary pathē: epithumia (desire) and phobos (fear), directed at what we expect to happen; and hēdonē (pleasure) and lupē (distress), directed at present circumstances. The Stoic sophos does not experience these pathē, but does experience the eupatheiai, “good feelings.” The prokoptōn strives not to eradicate the pathē directly, but to guard against making false judgements. Note that one cannot directly extirpate a passion that one is already suffering any more than one can prevent sugar from tasting sweet once the slice of cake is already in one’s mouth.
41. πεπρωμένη — peprōmenē — “Fate”
“Destiny”; conceived of as one’s appointed lot in life. The key feature of fate is its anankē (necessity or compulsion). The training that the Stoic prokoptōn engages in, if successful, will result in their embracing their own fate, and that of the world generally, as wholly acceptable and even desirable, no matter what its character may be.
42. φαντασία — phantasia — “Impression”
Phantasiai are what we are aware of in virtue of having experiences. They are not limited only to what is sensed in perception, but include as well what we are aware of when thinking abstractly, having memories, imagining things, and so forth. An impression is an “imprint on the soul,” the name having been borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax. Whereas non-rational animals respond to their impressions automatically, human beings, being rational, can “understand their use” and, with practice, assent or not assent to them as we deem appropriate. “The use of impressions” (hē chrēsis tōn phantasiōn) in this wider sense is an essential component of making progress, and it is this capacity that Epictetus strives to teach his students.
43. φιλοσοφία — philosophia — “Philosophy”
Literally, the “love of wisdom”; the discipline in which, as a Stoic, one immerses oneself in the pursuit of eudaimonia.
44. φιλόσοφος — philosophos — “Philosopher”
Literally, one who “loves wisdom”; in Stoicism the person for whom Stoic philosophy is a way of life, a way of engaging in affairs in which one aims to flourish as fully as one may in the pursuit of eudaimonia.
45. φόβος — phobos — “Fear”
One of the four primary pathē (passions). Phobos is the fear that the non-wise person directs towards anticipated events or objects in the mistaken belief that they are of real harm.
46. φύσις — phusis — “Nature”
Literally “growth”; the totality of everything, including the cosmic forces and principles that create and sustain all things. Depending upon our point of view, phusis is also God, providence, fate; and also logos, for the world is wholly rational because God brings about events according to His necessarily good purposes. Each individual thing has its own phusis, its own way of growing, behaving, and flourishing according to what is usual and beneficial for the species of thing it happens to be. Stoics hold that the rationality of Zeus/phusis/logos is manifest in each human being, taken to be literally a fragment of God, and that everyone therefore has the potential to understand in what the good life consists and how to attain it. To acquire eudaimonia one must “follow nature,” which means both accepting one’s own fate and the fate of the world, and doing what is appropriate for the type of creature that one happens to be — which for human beings includes doing what is required with respect to one’s social roles. A mother, for example, must care for her child; a judge must dispense justice wisely and impartially.
47. πιστός — pistos — “Trustworthy”
Of someone possessing pistis, trustworthiness; for Epictetus, a key characteristic of the prokoptōn’s prohairesis. See also aidēmōn.
48. προήγμενος — proēgmenos — “Preferred”
Used of adiaphoros (“indifferent”) things, conventionally taken to be good and advantageous, including such things as health and wealth, taking pleasure in the company of others, and so forth. Enjoying any of the preferred indifferents is not in itself constitutive of the eudaimōn life sought by the Stoic prokoptōn. See also apoproēgmenos.
49. προαίρεσις — prohairesis — “Moral Character”
The capacity that rational beings have for making choices and intending the outcomes of their actions; sometimes translated as will, volition, intention, choice, moral choice, or moral purpose. This faculty is understood by Stoics to be essentially rational. It is the faculty we use to “attend to impressions” and to give (or withhold) assent to them. Those things which are outside the scope of one’s prohairesis are the aprohaireta, which are “external” (ektos) and “not in our power” (ouk eph’ hēmin). See also hēgemonikon, sunkatathesis.
50. προκοπή — prokopē — “Progress”
What the Stoic prokoptōn tries to maintain by applying the principles of Stoic ethics, by living virtuously and, in particular for Epictetus, by “following nature,” “following God,” and making “proper use of impressions.”
51. προκόπτω — prokoptō — “To Make Progress”
The verb form of prokopē.
52. προκόπτων — prokoptōn — “One Who Is Making Progress”
One who is making progress (prokopē) in living as a Stoic, which for Epictetus means above all learning the “correct use of impressions.” See phantasia.
53. σοφός — sophos — “The Stoic Wise Person”
The “Sage,” who values only aretē and enjoys a eudaimōn life. The sophos enjoys a way of engaging in life that the prokoptōn strives to emulate and attain. The philosophos (philosopher), in contrast to the idiōtēs (“uneducated person”), is someone who has taken up the training required to make progress (prokopē) towards the condition enjoyed by the sophos. Epictetus also refers to such a person as phronimos (“wise”), spoudaios (“good”), and kalos kai agathos (“fine and good”).
54. συγκατάθεσις — sunkatathesis — “Assent”
A capacity of the prohairesis to judge the significance of impressions. It is because we are prone to making incorrect judgements that eudaimonia eludes us and we are vulnerable to the pathē (passions) under whose influence we lapse into vice. See also pathos, phantasia.
55. ταραχή — tarachē — “Distress”
“Disturbance” or “trouble”; what one avoids when one enjoys ataraxia.
56. τέλος — telos — “End”
“Goal”; that which we pursue for its own sake and not for the sake of any other thing. The Stoics accepted the traditional conception of the telos being eudaimonia (“happiness” or “flourishing”), but argued that this consists solely in aretē (moral excellence); the telos, then, can be attained by “living in accordance with virtue.” Epictetus formulates the end in several related ways: to maintain one’s prohairesis in proper order, to follow God, follow nature, live in accordance with nature, or live in harmony with nature. The means by which this is to be accomplished is to apply oneself assiduously to the “three topoi.”
57. θεός — theos — “God”
Who is material; a sort of fiery breath that blends with undifferentiated matter to create the forms that we find in the world around us. He is supremely rational and, despite our feelings to the contrary, makes the best world that it is possible to make. God is characterised as omniscient; the father of everyone; who has made everyone to be happy (eudaimōn) and to enjoy peace of mind; who protects and cares for us; who has given us what we need, including the virtues and the faculty of making proper use of impressions; and who is wholly providential. The Stoic’s relationship to God is characterised by regarding God as benevolent creator and friend, by not blaming God for misfortunes, by endeavouring to do God’s will, by “following God” and accepting the fate He bestows, and by understanding that everyone is literally a fragment of God and shares His reason. See also Zeus.
58. τόποι — topoi — “Topics”
The “three topics” or “fields of study” elucidated in the Discourses; an original feature of Epictetus’ educational programme. The three fields are: (1) The Discipline of Desire, concerned with desire and aversion (orexis and ekklisis), and what is really good and desirable — virtue, using impressions properly, following God, and following nature; (2) The Discipline of Action, concerned with impulse and repulsion (hormē and aphormē), and our “appropriate actions” or “duties” (see kathēkon) with respect to living in our communities in ways that befit a rational being; and (3) The Discipline of Assent (see sunkatathesis), concerned with how we should judge our impressions so as not to be carried away into anxiety or disturbing emotions, with the likelihood of failing in the first two Disciplines.
59. Ζεύς — Zeus
The name for God; Epictetus uses the terms “Zeus,” “God,” and “the gods” interchangeably. The Stoics also identify Zeus with nature, fate, and providence, conceived of as the rational and inevitable coming about of all events that, by being located just as they happen to be within the nexus of causation, constitute the entire history of the universe. See also theos.
