Theoretical foundations: Grant C. Sterling (Eastern Illinois University). Analysis and synthesis: Dave Kelly. Prose rendering: Claude (Anthropic). 2026.
The question is what exists, what kinds of things exist, and how they stand to one another: mind and matter, causes and choices, truths and the things they are about. This is one of seventeen realms into which Sterling’s thought is extended by the ratified pattern of his thought. An extension says what follows when that pattern is applied to a realm; it never says what Sterling would decide, and his name stands only on his quoted words.
The Beginning
Everyone wants happiness. Incomplete happiness is not worth accepting if complete happiness is available. Complete happiness must therefore lie wholly within our control. Only assent lies wholly within our control. Happiness is therefore correct assent, correct when it matches the truth about value. The truth about value is that only virtue is good and only vice is evil. Everything else is indifferent.
(Copied from CDV/DTI Reference Suite v0.5.4 — Three Worked Cases.)
Key
- S marks a line that quotes Sterling, with its source. X marks an extension: it applies the pattern, and Sterling’s name does not stand on it.
- [I] marks a line held as intuited, a necessary truth seen directly; [E] an empirical proposition taken as evident; [P] a line that could be proved but is not proved here.
- Th is a theorem, given without argument. Numbered lines without Th are Ergo lines, derived from the lines they name.
- Logic n, Epist. n are lines of the other ratified realms of this series: Logic, Epistemology.
- P1 to P12 are the ratified elements of the pattern of Sterling’s thought.
- Physical causation and Act of Reason are Sterling’s terms and are defined below.
- C1 to C6 are the six commitments: C1, the knower is the rational faculty, not physical; C2, assent is the agent’s own act, not fixed by what came before; C3, some truths are seen directly; C4, proof ends in foundations; C5, truth is a proposition’s match with what is; C6, there are facts about value.
Definitions
Nature. Taken, as Sterling takes it, as “the realm of all things that exist” (International Stoic Forum, 28 February 2013).
Physical. In Sterling’s usage, the world of matter that physics studies, in a sense “that excludes both God and mental processes” (International Stoic Forum, 18 August 2021).
Mental. What has qualitative experience or conceptual content, such as “the feeling of pain” or “the concept of modus ponens” (Sterling, International Stoic Forum, 20 January 2012).
Physical causation. “There are certain fixed laws of nature, there are definable physical states, and those two together dictate the next set of physical states” (Sterling, 2021).
Act of Reason. “I think about some alternatives, and I choose one of them to act on” (same).
Causally closed. Said of a system on which no force from outside it ever acts.
Necessary truth. A truth that could not have been otherwise. Sterling: “2+2 could not possibly have been anything other than 4” (International Stoic Forum, 26 May 2021).
Th 1) [I] S. “But the same is true for metaphysics itself, and for Logic as well. There are metaphysical and logical axioms” (International Stoic Forum, 23 September 2021).
Th 2) [I] S. “I think it is obvious that no single way of investigating a problem applies to all domains. Despite frantic efforts, no-one has convinced me that mathematical (or logical) questions are best answered by empirical observation” (International Stoic Forum, 28 February 2013, in Stoic Dualism and “Nature”).
3) X. Ergo, metaphysics has its own foundations and its own method. It is not a branch of physics, and physics does not decide it. [By Th 1, Th 2 and P3.]
Th 4) [I] S. “But if we define ‘Nature’ as ‘the realm of all things that exist’, then of course all of us dualists are just as much ‘naturalists’ as anyone, and just as committed to a ‘unity of all knowledge’” (2013).
5) X. Ergo, the unity of knowledge is a unity of its object, everything that exists. It is not a unity of method. [By Th 2 and Th 4.]
Section Two: What Exists
Th 6) [I] S. “I am absolutely certain, beyond any possibility of error, that I have qualitative mental experiences. I am more certain of this than any other proposition” (International Stoic Forum, 20 January 2012, in A Brief Reply: Re Dualism).
Th 7) [E] S. “Modern Physics recognizes only physical matter in the brain, consisting of various particles undergoing various electro-chemical processes. None of those particles or processes are understood as having characteristics like ‘the feeling of pain’ or ‘the concept of modus ponens’, etc.” (2012)
8) X. Ergo, at least two kinds of thing exist: the physical, and the mental, which is not physical. [By Th 6 and Th 7.]
Th 9) [I] X. Necessary truths exist as truths, in logic, mathematics and value. They have “no ‘source’” (Sterling, 2021), and no one’s thinking makes them true. [By Logic 8 and C6.]
Th 10) [I] S. The ancient school itself admitted what is not corporeal: “The ancient Stoic system already allowed for the ‘sayables’, which are not corporeal” (2013).
11) X. Ergo, the inventory of what exists has three parts: physical things, minds, and necessary truths. Value facts belong to the third part. [By 8, Th 9 and C6.]
Section Three: Mind and Body
Th 12) [I] S. “My identity is defined as the rational part of me, the part that chooses” (Nine Excerpts, section 5).
13) X. Ergo, I am a mind, and my body is something I have. Th 12 states what I am, and line 8 states that a mind is not physical. [By Th 12 and 8.]
Th 14) [E] S. The materialist owes an explanation he has not given: “you must either explain how it is that various brain particles can have such properties, or claim that there exist forms of ‘matter’ that are utterly unlike any that physicists have discovered. I see no hope in accomplishing either of those goals” (2012).
Th 15) [E] S. “Experience consistently tells me that I make choices on the basis of the qualitative content of these experiences” (2012).
16) X. Ergo, the mind is not idle. Its contents, its reasons and its recognitions make a difference to what it does, and through the body to the world. [By Th 15 and Section Four.]
Section Four: Causation
Th 17) [I] S. “all laws of nature include a clause that they hold only if no other forces operate on the system” (2021, in Free Will and Causation).
Th 18) [E] S. On causal closure: “we have no substantial evidence in favor of this idea” (2021).
19) X. Ergo, physical laws are true ceteris paribus, other things being equal. They do not by themselves imply that the physical world is closed. [By Th 17 and Th 18.]
Th 20) [I] S. “we have a much clearer understanding of how my dislike of Aunt Wilma’s cooking leads me (not ‘causes me’) to choose to offer to take everyone out to a restaurant for dinner, than we have of how adding Mentos causes Diet Coke to explode” (2021).
21) X. Ergo, there are two kinds of causation, physical causation and Acts of Reason. Neither is reducible to the other, and Acts of Reason are the better understood of the two. [By 19 and Th 20.]
22) S. “If physical causation is a system of ceteris paribus rules, and if Reason (divine and human) can make ceteris not paribus, then there is no conflict between causation and free will, they are both parts of a larger nexus (or story)” (2021).
Section Five: Freedom
Th 23) [I] S. Against Chrysippus: “since his initial character was totally and completely out of his control (even in Chrysippus’ sense), and since every action and every modification of character follows necessarily from that initial state, that (it seems to me) makes everything out of his control” (2021).
Th 24) [I] S. Chance does not help: “Even if we introduce quantum indeterminacy into the system, it doesn’t really matter” (2021).
25) X. Ergo, neither determinism nor chance gives control. Control requires an Act of Reason: a choice “guided by our character, by our preferences, etc., but not dictated by those things” (Sterling, 2021). (C2) [By Th 23, Th 24 and line 21.]
26) X. Ergo, what lies in our control, which Th 6 of Core Stoicism gives as “our beliefs and will”, is an Act of Reason. That is the metaphysical ground of the control line (P8). [By 25 and Epist. 5.]
Th 27) [I] S. Sterling holds Stoic ethics is based on metaphysics only in the broad sense. Basing it robustly on a non-ethical metaphysics “is optional” (Sterling, International Stoic Forum, 23 September 2021, as given in The Melding Question).
Th 28) [I] S. Denying Th 20 or 21, on Nature and Providence, “would undermine a great deal of the Stoic view of positive happiness, but would not obvious damage the views on virtue or avoiding unhappiness too seriously” (Core Stoicism).
29) X. Ergo, the ethics needs exactly this much metaphysics: minds that are not physical (C1), the power of Acts of Reason (C2), and value facts that hold (C6). It does not need pneuma, fire, the ancient cosmology or determinism. Providence bears on positive happiness, not on virtue. [By 11, 13, 25, Th 27 and Th 28.]
30) X. Ergo, a metaphysics that denies any of C1, C2 or C6 cannot host the ethics. Sterling’s own exclusions, Ayer and Bentham, are cases of this. [By 29 and The Melding Question.]
Objections and Verdicts
Interaction: how can what is not physical move matter? By Th 20, the question has the wrong default. We understand reason leading to choice better than we understand most physical causation, and closure was never shown (Th 18). Verdict: the objection assumes the closure it needs to prove.
Conservation of energy. Verdict, mine and inconclusive: conservation laws are stated for closed systems. By line 19, whether the world is closed is exactly the open question, so they cannot settle it without assuming the answer. This argument comes from general knowledge of the debate and is not drawn from Sterling.
Epiphenomenalism: the mind exists but does nothing. Against Th 15, and against the fact that we can reason about our reasons at all. If the mind did nothing, our beliefs about the mind would not be caused by it. Verdict: this is rejected. On the ratified C1 reading, the final answer to it rests on what can be seen directly, the limit set by C4.
Property dualism: mental properties of a physical brain. Verdict: it concedes line 8, that the mental is not physical. It must still supply a single subject who performs the Act of Reason. If it can, it meets what the chain needs. If it cannot, it fails at C2.
Physicalism: only the physical exists. It must deny Th 6, which is “more certain than any other proposition”, or explain the mental, which by Th 14 no one has done. Sterling: “I am asserting that they have never explained how this is possible” (2012). Verdict: it fails.
Determinism as the scientific view. By Th 17 to Th 19, determinism is not a finding of science. It is a further assumption added to science. Verdict: it is rejected as unproven, and by Th 23 it is contrary to the chain.
The ancient Stoic corporealist. He keeps the value assignment but makes the soul a body and fate universal. Verdict: by line 29, his physics is not required by the ethics, and at C2 it contradicts the chain. On the value assignment, he remains an ally.
Deny line 8, and nothing is left to be the “I” of Th 12. Deny line 21, and Acts of Reason become physical causation under another name, line 25 falls, and so does the control line on which the whole chain stands. Deny Th 9, and the truth about value has nothing to be true of. So look carefully at what supports what.
Sources
- Grant C. Sterling, Stoic Dualism and “Nature” (International Stoic Forum, 28 February 2013).
- Grant C. Sterling, A Brief Reply: Re Dualism (International Stoic Forum, 20 January 2012).
- Grant C. Sterling, Free Will and Causation (International Stoic Forum, 18 August 2021).
- Grant C. Sterling, Core Stoicism.
- Nine Excerpts, section 5.
- The Melding Question.
- Sterling, International Stoic Forum, 26 May 2021 and 23 September 2021.
Declared Gaps
1. Stoic Dualism: The Unified Soul and the Collapse of the Tripartite Model was not opened for this realm. The unity of the soul is developed in Philosophy of Mind, not here.
2. The C1 reading in the comment to line 16, and the verdict on epiphenomenalism, are cited from the record of the ratified C1 study note, not from the note itself.
3. Th 27 is Sterling as summarized in The Melding Question. It is not his own words.
4. The conservation-of-energy verdict comes from general knowledge.
5. The comment to line 11 on whether necessary truths are objects is mine and open.
6. No Derivation Trace has been run on this document.
Previous in this series: Philosophy of Mind: Sterling’s Pattern Extended v0.1.
Theoretical foundations: Grant C. Sterling (Eastern Illinois University). Analysis and synthesis: Dave Kelly. Prose rendering: Claude (Anthropic). 2026.