The Correct Use of Impressions: Inner Discourse and the Three Topoi
The Correct Use of Impressions: Inner Discourse and the Three Topoi
A Complete Account
Draft for editing. All seven sections present. Nothing cut. Text: Dave Kelly, 2026. Theoretical foundations: the Stoic philosophical corpus of Grant C. Sterling; Keith Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes (Routledge, 2006), pp. 13–20, 113–4; Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel (Harvard University Press, 1998); Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Epictetus” (Fall 2025 Edition). Prose rendering: Claude.
I. The Philosophical Foundation
Three foundational claims structure Sterling’s reconstruction of Stoic practice. The first: certain things are in our control and certain things are not, and this distinction is the governing fact of practical life. What is in our control is the activity of our rational faculty — our judgments, our assents, our impulses, our desires and aversions. What is not in our control is everything else: the body, reputation, property, the behavior of others, the outcomes of our actions, all events in the external world. The second: only virtue is genuinely good; only vice is genuinely evil; everything else — health, wealth, relationships, achievement, pleasure, even life itself — is an indifferent, appropriate to pursue where rational but not to be mistaken for a genuine good or genuine evil. The third: right assent — the correct governance of one’s own judgments — guarantees eudaimonia. The flourishing life is not contingent on external conditions but on the quality of one’s own rational engagement with what arrives.
These three foundational claims are not merely practical maxims. Each requires specific philosophical commitments to be coherent. The first requires substance dualism — the rational faculty must be genuinely distinct from the body and its conditions — and libertarian free will — the act of assent must be the agent’s genuine first cause, not a determined output of prior conditions. The second requires moral realism — there must be objective facts about what is genuinely good and evil, independent of preference or cultural formation — and correspondence theory of truth — the claim that an external is a genuine good must be assessable as true or false by reference to how things morally are. The third requires ethical intuitionism — the rational faculty must have direct apprehensive access to those moral facts — and foundationalism — the correction procedure must terminate in self-evident first principles rather than generating an infinite regress. These six commitments are the philosophical skeleton of Stoic practice. Remove any one and the structure collapses.
Within this structure, one operation is central to everything else: the assent to impressions. An impression (phantasia) is what is impressed into the mind by any of the senses, in a way directly analogous to a signet ring imprinting its image into wax. To have an experience of anything is at one and the same time to have an impression of something. The interpretive faculty takes the agent from having an impression of something to having an impression that something is the case — from awareness to propositional belief. As Seddon states: “The content of this second stage can always be expressed in terms of a proposition.” This propositional content is what the agent assents to.
There are two distinct stages of assent and the distinction is load-bearing for everything that follows. The first stage is factual: the agent assents to what the impression represents as being the case. I see my jacket on the mat; I assent to the proposition that my jacket is on the mat. This assent can be correct or incorrect at the purely factual level. The second stage is evaluative: the agent assents to whether what he takes to be the case is good or bad. The jacket is on the mat — is this bad? This second assent is where the false value judgment is formed or refused. As Seddon writes, it is this second type of assent that most interests Epictetus, and it is this second assent that the entire practical program of Stoicism is organized around governing correctly.
Sterling states the governing claim with maximum force: the only thing that distinguishes the sage from the non-sage is the correctness of the second assent. The sage assents only to true evaluative propositions. The prokoptōn is working toward this through training. Everyone else assents to false evaluative propositions automatically and without examination, generating disturbance from within rather than receiving it from without.
II. The Three Topoi and Their Architecture
Epictetus organized the practical program of Stoicism into three topoi — fields of study and practice. He states them in Discourses 3.2.1–2: the first concerns desires and aversions; the second concerns impulses to act and not to act and appropriate behavior; the third concerns freedom from deception and hasty judgment, and whatever is connected with assent.
The three are not three equal disciplines running in parallel. They have an internal architecture. The Discipline of Desire is explicitly identified by Epictetus as “the principle, and most urgent” (Discourses 3.2.3) — because the passions, which are the source of all disturbances, arise from nothing other than the disappointment of desires and the incurring of aversions that should never have been formed. Get the desires right and the emotional life corrects itself. The Discipline of Action is second: having governed desire, the agent now acts correctly within his social roles and relationships. And the Discipline of Assent, though presented as the third in Epictetus’s list, is not a third practice alongside the other two but, as Epictetus himself states, what “concerns the security of the other two” (Discourses 3.2.5). If the evaluative second assent is faulty, desire is corrupted at its root — the agent desires indifferents as though they were genuine goods — and action is corrupted at its source — the agent acts from faulty evaluations of what the situation is and what it requires.
Pierre Hadot drew from this the governing claim: if the Discipline of Assent is the method through which both the Discipline of Desire and the Discipline of Action operate, then the practice of philosophy as a way of life consists of exactly two things: governing what one desires and governing how one acts. The Discipline of Assent is the how; the other two are the what. This collapses the three topoi into two phases of a single continuous practice, with one governing method — the correct use of impressions through inner discourse — applied across both phases.
The ordering of the two phases matters. The Discipline of Desire always comes first because it addresses the foundational false value judgment — the evaluative second assent that assigns genuine-good status to an indifferent. This is the root error. If the agent correctly refuses the evaluative impression that an indifferent is genuinely good or evil, the desire for that indifferent does not arise, the action aimed at securing it is not generated, and the Discipline of Action has nothing false to correct. Get the first phase right and the second follows correctly. Attempt the second phase while leaving the first uncorrected and the agent is redirecting behavioral outputs while the false value judgments generating those outputs remain in place.
This is precisely the level difference between Glasser’s Choice Theory and the Stoic framework. Glasser’s WDEP procedure operates at the level of the Discipline of Action — redirecting Total Behavior once a behavioral event is underway. The Stoic framework operates at the level of the Discipline of Desire — addressing the evaluative second assent that generates the desire that drives the behavioral event. Both are genuine and effective within their scope. They are consecutive interventions at different levels of the same structure, not competitors.
III. Prosochē
Before the disciplines can operate, a prior condition must be in place: the structural gap between the impression’s arrival and the evaluative assent must be maintained. This is prosochē — attention, vigilance, watchfulness. Its Greek root, proséchō, means to attend to, to hold toward, to apply oneself to. Philosophically, Pierre Hadot characterized it as “a fundamental attitude of continuous attention, which means constant tension and consciousness, as well as vigilance exercised at every moment.”
Prosochē is not one practice among the three disciplines. It is the foundational attitude that makes the disciplines possible. Christopher Fisher states this directly: prosochē is the necessary foundation upon which the Stoic disciplines rely. Without it, impressions slide directly to assent — the evaluative judgment is made automatically, without examination, and the disciplines have no purchase. With it, every impression becomes an occasion for the correct use of impressions.
What prosochē specifically attends to is threefold. First, present impressions as they arrive — particularly their evaluative dimension, the value claim embedded in the impression before the agent has had occasion to examine it. Second, present desires and aversions — the impulses that arise when evaluative assents have been made, correct or incorrect. Third, present actions — the behavioral outputs that follow from assented impressions and formed desires. Epictetus compared the practice to a guard at the gates: impressions come knocking, but not every visitor deserves entry. Prosochē is the guard. The correct use of impressions is what the guard performs.
Prosochē is distinct from the correct use of impressions itself. Prosochē is the vigilance that maintains the pause; the correct use of impressions — chrēsis tōn phantasiōn — is the operation that occurs within the pause. The one is the posture; the other is what the posture enables.
When prosochē succeeds, the impression is caught before the evaluative second assent can complete itself automatically. The agent examines the impression. If the impression carries a false value claim — if it presents an indifferent as a genuine good or evil — the agent refuses assent. Nothing follows. No false desire arises. No disturbance results. This is the ideal operation of the entire Stoic practical program.
When prosochē fails — when the structural gap is not maintained and assent to the false evaluative impression has completed itself before examination can occur — pathos has been produced. Sterling’s reading of Epictetus’s Enchiridion 1.5, grounded in the framework’s value theory, is unambiguous: any disturbance of any degree is pathos. Not because it is dramatic or intense, but because any disturbance was produced by a false evaluative assent, and that is the full Stoic definition of pathos. The mild irritation, the faint anxiety, the slight disappointment — each is pathos in the complete sense if it was produced by a false value judgment. Intensity is not what classifies the experience. Causal origin is what classifies it.
This binary character of pathos is the most important point that the popular Stoic literature consistently softens. The literature tends to treat progress as the reduction of the frequency and intensity of false assents — implying that a mild disturbance represents partial success of prosochē. Sterling’s framework forecloses this. Mild disturbance is not partial success. It is a failure of prosochē that produced mild pathos rather than severe pathos. Progress consists in the decreasing frequency of prosochē’s failures, not in the acceptable residual level of disturbance.
Epictetus’s warning about relaxing attention is precise: “When you relax your attention for a while, do not fancy you will recover it whenever you please; but remember this, that because of your fault of today your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition in future occasions” (Discourses 4.12.1). The failure of prosochē is not merely an episode. It establishes a worse condition for the next encounter with the same class of impression, because the pattern of automatic evaluative assent is reinforced by each failure.
IV. Chrēsis Tōn Phantasiōn — The Correct Use of Impressions
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on Epictetus identifies the two governing concepts of his philosophy as prohairesis — the rational faculty, the moral character, the will — and chrēsis tōn phantasiōn, the correct use of impressions. These are not two separate concerns. The correct use of impressions is what the rational faculty does; prohairesis is what does it. The two concepts name the same reality from different angles: the agent and the agent’s governing activity.
What distinguishes human beings from other animals is precisely the capacity for the correct use of impressions. Animals and humans both receive impressions and both behave in accordance with them. But human beings can do something animals cannot: step back from the impression and examine it. The rational faculty has the capacity of assent — the capacity to say yes or no to the proposition the impression presents, rather than simply being driven by the impression toward automatic response. This capacity is what makes the correct use of impressions possible as a practice rather than merely as a biological event.
Epictetus identifies four types of impressions in Discourses 1.27.1: things are and appear so; things are not and do not appear to be; things are but do not appear to be; things are not but appear to be. The first two are correct impressions at the factual level. The third and fourth are false impressions at the factual level. But the value-laden impression — the impression that carries a false evaluative claim — is a specific instance of the fourth type: something that is not a genuine good or evil appearing as though it were. The correct use of impressions catches this false appearance before the evaluative second assent completes it.
Seddon’s statement of what the correct use of impressions requires is the most precise in the secondary literature: the prokoptōn must strive to stand between their awareness of mere facts — of how things stand — and their evaluations of those facts. This is the exact position prosochē maintains and the exact operation the inner discourse performs. Stand in that gap. Examine what is there. Make the evaluative second assent correctly.
The operational instruction is Enchiridion 1.5. Epictetus states it as a practice to be trained: “Make a practice of saying to every strong impression: ‘An impression is all you are, not the source of the impression.’ Then test and assess it with your criteria, but one primarily: ‘Is this something that is, or is not, in my control?’”
The instruction has three components. First: the naming move. “An impression is all you are, not the thing itself.” This creates the structural gap by establishing the categorical distinction between the representation and what it purports to represent. The impression is not the situation; it is a representation of the situation that may or may not carry a true evaluative claim. Naming it as an impression prevents the automatic slide from impression to evaluative assent.
Second: the primary test. Is this in my control or not? If the impression presents something outside the agent’s control as a genuine good or evil, it has already failed the first filter. The dichotomy of control applied to the evaluative second assent is the governing criterion of the Discipline of Desire.
Third: the practice. “Make a practice of.” This is not a philosophical position to be intellectually assented to. It is a trained activity to be performed, impression by impression, in the present moment, continuously. Seddon makes this explicit: “It is not enough simply to know philosophical principles; we must also develop the capacity to put them into practice.” Knowledge of the arguments is not the practice. Performing the examination, in the moment, on the actual impression that has arrived, is the practice.
The standard of correct assent is the phantasia kataleptikē — the grasping or apprehensive impression. The wise person assents only to impressions that are so clear and true they could not be false. For the moral domain, the kataleptic impressions are those that correspond to how things morally are as established by the foundational theorems: only virtue is genuinely good (Theorem 10); externals are neither genuinely good nor genuinely evil (Theorem 12). An impression that presents an external as a genuine good fails the kataleptic standard. It should not receive assent. The epistemological access to this standard — the direct rational apprehension of moral truth that makes the correspondence test possible — is what ethical intuitionism (C5) provides.
The additional exercise Epictetus prescribes in Discourses 2.18.24–25 extends the instruction: “In the first place, do not allow yourself to be carried away by the intensity of your impression: but say, ‘Impression, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent. Let me test you.’ Then, afterwards, do not allow it to draw you on by picturing what may come next… But rather, you should introduce some fair and noble impression to replace it, and banish this base and sordid one.”
Seddon’s commentary on this passage establishes the governing practical principle: in waiting, the agent needs to stick merely at the factual interpretation without progressing to a faulty evaluative interpretation. The waiting is not passive. It is the active maintenance of the gap between Stage One and Stage Two assent. The testing is the application of the Stoic value standard to the evaluative proposition the impression is presenting. The replacement impression is the formulation of the true evaluative proposition — this is an indifferent, not a genuine good or evil — that correctly describes the situation once the false evaluative addition has been refused.
V. The Inner Discourse
Pierre Hadot’s contribution to this account is the term and the concept of inner discourse. In The Inner Citadel (1992/1998) Hadot argues that Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations are not a philosophical treatise, a diary, or a collection of maxims. They are a record of inner discourse — the actual first-person speech of the rational faculty addressing itself in the moment of practice. Marcus was writing the inner discourse he needed to conduct in order to maintain prosochē and practice chrēsis tōn phantasiōn correctly. The Meditations are inner discourse made visible on the page.
Inner discourse is the specific verbal activity through which the correct use of impressions actually occurs in the moment of practice. It is not merely thinking about Stoic principles. It is speaking to oneself, in the first person, in the present tense, about the specific impression that has arrived. The discourse is inner because it is addressed to the self by the self; it is discourse because it has the propositional structure of genuine speech — subject, predicate, evaluative judgment, directive conclusion. The reason discourse rather than silent thought is required is philosophical: since impressions are cognitive and propositional — they claim that the world is a certain way — the correct response to a propositional claim is a propositional response. The agent who receives the impression “this loss is a genuine evil” is receiving a propositional claim. The correct use of that impression requires a propositional response: “This is an impression presenting an external as a genuine evil. The impression is false. The loss is a dispreferred indifferent.” This propositional response, conducted in the first person in the present moment, is inner discourse.
Seddon provides the most complete explicit account of the inner dialogue in the secondary literature, at pages 113–114 of Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes. He distinguishes the normal two-phase inner discourse from the corrective inner discourse that operates when prosochē has already failed.
The normal inner discourse runs as follows. Phase One — the Discipline of Desire:
“Now, what has happened here?” — the factual first assent. What is actually the case, stripped of evaluative addition.
“Ah yes, this is not in my power and is nothing to me.” — the evaluative second assent made correctly. The Discipline of Desire operating through inner discourse. Foundation Two stated in the first person: only virtue is genuinely good; this external is an indifferent.
Phase Two — the Discipline of Action:
“How then should I respond?” — the transition from evaluated situation to appropriate action.
“In my role as such-and-such, I shall be acting virtuously in accordance with nature if I do this.” — the correct action proposition. Role identification, appropriate object of aim, reserve clause implied. Foundation One and Foundation Three in the first person.
The corrective inner discourse runs when prosochē has failed and pathos has already been produced. Seddon:
“Now, I appear to be experiencing a pathos.” — the signal noticed. Any disturbance of any degree is this signal.
“Yes, stop everything and think: this is because I have assented wrongly to an impression.” — the diagnosis. The pathos is traced to its cause: a false evaluative second assent has occurred.
“The best course then is to go back to the offending impression and judge it correctly.” — Sterling’s Section 7 sub-step (b): do not compound the failure. Return to the source impression and apply the correct evaluative assent retrospectively.
“Does it concern something external? Yes. Then it is nothing to me.” — the correct evaluative second assent made retrospectively. Sub-step (c): formulate the true proposition.
“And so forth.” — Seddon’s indication that the dialogue continues into sub-step (d): what does my role now require?
Epictetus provides the canonical form of the inner discourse applied to specific situations in Discourses 3.8.1–5:
“His son is dead. What happened? His son is dead. Nothing else? Not a thing. His ship is lost. What happened? His ship is lost. He was carried off to prison. What happened? He was carried off to prison. But the observation: ‘He has fared ill’ is an addition that each man makes on his own responsibility.”
The factual first assent: a son has died. The refusal of the false evaluative addition: this is not an evil. The correct evaluative second assent: this lies outside the sphere of moral purpose; it is an indifferent. And then the positive inner discourse on genuine good and evil: “He was grieved at all this — that lies within the sphere of the moral purpose; it is an evil. He has borne up under it manfully — that lies within the sphere of the moral purpose; it is a good.”
This final exchange is the most important. The grief is the evil — not the death, not the lost ship, not the prison. The grief is the evil because the grief is pathos produced by a false evaluative second assent: the son’s death was treated as a genuine evil when it is a dispreferred indifferent. And the bearing up is the only good — not the survival of the son, not the recovery of the ship, not the avoidance of prison. The bearing up is the rational faculty in correct operation, the prohairesis in the right condition, the only thing that can be genuinely good.
This is Foundation Two stated as inner discourse, applied to a specific situation, in the first-person voice of the agent who has learned to use impressions correctly. It is also the complete expression of Foundation Three: right assent guarantees eudaimonia. The agent who makes the correct evaluative second assent — who refuses the false addition and assents to the true proposition about the indifferent — has, in that act, guaranteed his own eudaimonia regardless of what the external situation contains.
Seneca adds the retrospective dimension in De Ira 3.36: each evening, he reviewed the day through inner discourse: “What fault of mine have I remedied today? What vice have I resisted? In what respect am I better?” This retrospective inner discourse complements the real-time discourse Epictetus prescribes. Together they form a complete temporal structure: prospective preparation before situations arise (Sterling’s sub-step c — formulate true propositions about indifferents in advance), concurrent inner discourse in the moment (the normal two-phase dialogue), and retrospective review of where attention lapsed (the evening examination). This is askēsis — training — in its complete temporal form.
VI. The Level Difference: Glasser and the Stoic Framework
The relationship between Glasser’s Choice Theory and the Stoic framework is not a relationship between alternatives. Both hold that the agent’s emotional state is the downstream consequence of something the agent is doing rather than something being done to him. Both hold that the agent has governing power over that something. Both hold that exercising that power changes the emotional state as a consequence. This is the genuine shared ground — it is substantial, and it corresponds precisely to the three foundational claims both frameworks hold in their different ways.
The difference is in where each framework locates the governing act.
Glasser locates it at the behavioral level. The agent is generating a Total Behavior — acting, thinking, feeling, physiology simultaneously. The components directly within the agent’s control are the acting and thinking. Change those, and the feeling follows. The WDEP procedure operationalizes this: what are you currently doing, is it getting you what you want, what will you do differently? The question is always about the behavioral event that is already underway.
The Stoic framework locates the governing act one level prior to the behavioral event — at the evaluative second assent. Before the behavioral event begins, before acting and thinking have been initiated, the agent has received an impression. That impression has arrived carrying an embedded evaluative claim. At the moment between the impression’s arrival and the behavioral response, the agent has made or failed to make the correct evaluative second assent. If he has made it correctly — if the inner discourse has operated and the false evaluative addition has been refused — the behavioral event that follows is generated from correct evaluation. If he has made it incorrectly — if prosochē has failed and the false evaluative addition has completed itself — the behavioral event is generated from a false value judgment, and Glasser’s procedure addresses it from there.
Glasser’s WDEP procedure catches the patient inside a behavioral event that is already running. The Stoic inner discourse catches the impression before the behavioral event is generated. These are consecutive interventions at different levels of the same structure. The Glasser intervention is appropriate and effective once a behavioral event is underway. The Stoic intervention addresses the level prior to that.
The most philosophically significant divergence is at Foundation Two. Glasser’s five basic needs — survival, love and belonging, power, freedom, and fun — are treated as genuine goods whose satisfaction constitutes flourishing. The therapeutic procedure asks: is what you are doing getting you what you want? This is the right first question. Foundation Two asks the prior question: is what you want correctly valued? Are these needs held as preferred indifferents — appropriate to pursue, appropriate to prefer, not to stake identity or equanimity on — or as genuine goods whose non-satisfaction is a genuine evil?
Glasser cannot ask this question because his framework takes the five needs as genetically encoded facts about human nature that are not subject to rational revision. The needs are given; the therapeutic work addresses how effectively the patient is pursuing them. Foundation Two does not deny that the needs are real and their pursuit rational. It asks whether the patient is holding the specific Quality World images through which he pursues those needs as preferred indifferents or as genuine goods. A patient who has learned through the WDEP procedure to pursue his Quality World images more effectively but who is still holding them as genuine goods will find that effective pursuit provides temporary relief without genuine equanimity. He will always be one loss, one disappointment, one relationship failure away from renewed disturbance, because his equanimity is hostage to the external conditions his Quality World images require.
The two frameworks are not competing. They are consecutive, addressing the same structure at different levels. Glasser’s procedure covers the behavioral event as it runs. The Stoic inner discourse covers the evaluative second assent as it forms — and, through the long-term work of askēsis, progressively alters the character of what arrives as an impression in the first place.
VII. The Long-Term Trajectory: Askēsis Toward Sophos
The correct use of impressions is not a practice that produces results through a single application. It is a lifelong askēsis — training — whose long-term effect is the progressive alteration of what impressions arrive and what evaluative claims they carry.
Sterling states this in Nine Excerpts Section 7, sub-step (a): refuse assent to impressions that depict externals as good or evil. Sub-step (b): if (a) fails, refuse assent to subsequent impressions that depict immoral responses as appropriate. Sub-step (c): consciously formulate true propositions about indifferents — do this in advance where possible, and at the time where not. Sub-step (d): formulate correct action propositions and act from them. Sub-step (e): when you have acted correctly, assent to the proposition that you have done well — then the appropriate positive feeling (eupatheia) follows. Sub-step (f): over time, the character changes such that false value impressions no longer arise in the first place. This is eudaimonia.
Sub-step (f) is the long-term trajectory of the entire program. The prokoptōn is not someone who has eliminated false impressions. He is someone who is working, impression by impression, through correct evaluative second assent, toward the condition in which false impressions no longer arise. Each correct assent weakens the corresponding false impression. Each false assent strengthens it. The cumulative effect of consistent practice, over time, is the gradual transformation of the character of experience itself — what Hadot identifies as the alteration of the agent’s relationship to what he receives from the world.
Seddon states the arc with precision: “The ability to do this perfectly is what distinguishes the Sage from the philosopher.” The sophos — the sage — is the ideal who has completed this trajectory. He no longer receives false value impressions because his prohairesis is in full correct condition; the impressions themselves have been corrected at their source. For him the inner discourse is no longer a corrective discipline but the natural mode of his rational engagement with the world. Prosochē as an effortful practice is no longer needed because the character it was training has been formed.
The prokoptōn is positioned between the layman and the sage. He has accepted the foundational conversion — the recognition that externals are not genuine goods or evils, that value lives in the rational faculty alone, that right assent is sufficient for eudaimonia. He is working toward the condition of the sage through the disciplined practice of inner discourse, the sustained maintenance of prosochē, and the gradual reduction of prosochē’s failures. Epictetus is unsparing about the difficulty and equally unsparing about the possibility: “Is it possible to be altogether faultless? No, that is impracticable. But it is possible to strive continuously not to commit faults, with the realistic hope that by never relaxing our attention, we shall escape at least a few” (Discourses 4.12.19).
The choice that presents itself to Epictetus’s student — and to every reader of this account — is the choice Seddon names directly: either to take up the practice of philosophy in its full sense, modifying and perfecting the ruling principle, governing desires and aversions, impulses, opinions, judgments, and intentions through the inner discourse; or to remain an uneducated person, applying oneself to externals, and giving up all hope for lasting and unshakable peace of mind, freedom, and serenity. This is the choice between the philosopher and the layman. It is the choice Epictetus places at the start of the Enchiridion and returns to throughout the Discourses. It is what the entire account of the correct use of impressions, the three topoi, prosochē, and the inner discourse serves to make fully visible: what the practice consists in, what it requires, and what it makes possible.
Draft for editing. Analysis and text: Dave Kelly, 2026. Theoretical foundations: the Stoic philosophical corpus of Grant C. Sterling; Keith Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes (Routledge, 2006); Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel (Harvard University Press, 1998); Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Epictetus.” Prose rendering: Claude.
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