Analogues of the Six Commitments — Thinkers and Traditions

 

Analogues of the Six Commitments — Thinkers and Traditions

Theoretical framework: Grant C. Sterling. Mind map architecture: Dave Kelly. Prose rendering: Claude.

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ANALOGUES OF THE SIX COMMITMENTS
│
├─ 1. SUBSTANCE-DUALISM (C1)
│   ├─ Ancient-Analogues
│   │   ├─ Plato — soul-body-distinction (Phaedo, Republic)
│   │   ├─ Plato — soul-as-true-self, body-as-instrument
│   │   └─ Augustine — soul-as-image-of-God, distinct-from-matter
│   ├─ Early-Modern-Analogues
│   │   ├─ Descartes — res-cogitans-vs-res-extensa (Meditations II, VI)
│   │   ├─ Descartes — thinking-thing-as-better-known-than-body
│   │   ├─ Malebranche — mind-as-non-extended-substance
│   │   └─ Leibniz — monads-as-immaterial-centers-of-perception
│   ├─ Kantian-Analogue
│   │   ├─ Kant — noumenal-self-vs-phenomenal-self
│   │   ├─ Kant — rational-subject-not-reducible-to-nature
│   │   └─ Kant — person-as-end-in-himself, not-mere-mechanism
│   └─ Contemporary-Analogues
│       ├─ Chalmers — property-dualism, hard-problem-of-consciousness
│       ├─ Swinburne — substance-dualism-defended (The Evolution of the Soul)
│       └─ Foster — immaterialist-account-of-mind
│
├─ 2. LIBERTARIAN-FREE-WILL (C2)
│   ├─ Ancient-and-Medieval-Analogues
│   │   ├─ Aristotle — voluntary-action-and-deliberation (NE III)
│   │   ├─ Augustine — will-as-free-origination (On Free Choice of the Will)
│   │   └─ Aquinas — will-as-self-moved-rational-appetite
│   ├─ Early-Modern-Analogues
│   │   ├─ Descartes — freedom-of-will-as-clearest-human-faculty
│   │   ├─ Reid — common-sense-agent-causation
│   │   └─ Reid — agent-as-genuine-first-cause-of-action
│   ├─ Kantian-Analogue
│   │   ├─ Kant — transcendental-freedom (Critique of Pure Reason)
│   │   ├─ Kant — autonomy-as-self-legislation-of-rational-will
│   │   └─ Kant — moral-law-presupposes-freedom
│   └─ Contemporary-Analogues
│       ├─ Robert-Kane — agent-causation-and-ultimate-origination
│       ├─ Timothy-OConnor — irreducible-agent-causation
│       └─ William-James — pragmatic-case-for-indeterminist-freedom
│
├─ 3. ETHICAL-INTUITIONISM (C3)
│   ├─ Rationalist-Precursors
│   │   ├─ Ralph-Cudworth — eternal-moral-truths-grasped-by-reason
│   │   ├─ Samuel-Clarke — fitness-of-things-as-self-evident
│   │   └─ Richard-Price — moral-truth-as-direct-rational-perception
│   ├─ Classical-Intuitionist-Tradition
│   │   ├─ G.E.-Moore — Principia-Ethica (good-as-indefinable-simple-property)
│   │   ├─ W.D.-Ross — prima-facie-duties-as-directly-apprehended (The Right and the Good)
│   │   ├─ Ross — no-single-supreme-principle, duties-grasped-contextually
│   │   └─ Sidgwick — moral-axioms-as-self-evident-rational-deliverances
│   ├─ Sterling-Specific-Fit
│   │   ├─ Ross — named-by-Sterling-as-natural-fit-for-Stoic-kathêkon
│   │   ├─ Ross — prima-facie-duties-parallel-contextual-kathekon
│   │   └─ Sterling — same-rational-faculty-for-math-logic-and-moral-truth
│   └─ Contemporary-Analogues
│       ├─ Audi — intuitionism-without-dogmatism
│       └─ Huemer — phenomenal-conservatism-as-epistemic-base
│
├─ 4. FOUNDATIONALISM (C4)
│   ├─ Ancient-Foundationalists
│   │   ├─ Aristotle — first-principles-in-Posterior-Analytics
│   │   ├─ Aristotle — no-infinite-regress-of-justification
│   │   └─ Euclid — axiomatic-structure-as-model-for-knowledge
│   ├─ Early-Modern-Foundationalists
│   │   ├─ Descartes — cogito-as-indubitable-foundation (Meditations)
│   │   ├─ Descartes — clear-and-distinct-perception-as-epistemic-base
│   │   └─ Locke — simple-ideas-as-foundational-atomic-units
│   ├─ Contemporary-Foundationalists
│   │   ├─ Chisholm — epistemic-priority-of-directly-evident-beliefs
│   │   ├─ Plantinga — properly-basic-beliefs-in-reformed-epistemology
│   │   └─ BonJour — strong-foundationalism-defended
│   └─ Sterling-Specific-Formulation
│       ├─ Th-10-as-foundational-all-others-derived
│       ├─ Theorem-dependence — Th-12-derives-from-Th-10
│       └─ Smorgasbord-warning — denying-one-collapses-others
│
├─ 5. CORRESPONDENCE-THEORY (C5)
│   ├─ Classical-Sources
│   │   ├─ Aristotle — Metaphysics-1011b — to-say-of-what-is-that-it-is
│   │   ├─ Plato — Sophist — false-belief-as-saying-the-non-existent
│   │   └─ Aquinas — adequatio-intellectus-et-rei
│   ├─ Modern-Defenders
│   │   ├─ Russell — logical-atomism-and-truth-as-fact-correspondence
│   │   ├─ Wittgenstein — Tractatus-picture-theory-of-meaning
│   │   └─ Tarski — semantic-theory-of-truth (snow-is-white-iff-snow-is-white)
│   ├─ Contemporary-Defenders
│   │   ├─ Armstrong — truthmakers-as-facts-in-the-world
│   │   └─ David — correspondence-as-structural-isomorphism
│   └─ Sterling-Specific-Application
│       ├─ moral-impressions-as-claims-about-moral-reality
│       ├─ false-dogma-fails-correspondence-test
│       └─ examination-as-test-of-correspondence-not-utility
│
└─ 6. MORAL-REALISM (C6)
    ├─ Ancient-Realists
    │   ├─ Plato — Forms-as-objective-moral-standards (Republic, Phaedo)
    │   ├─ Plato — Good-as-highest-Form, mind-independent
    │   └─ Aristotle — eudaimonia-as-objective-end-for-human-nature
    ├─ 17th-18th-Century-Realists
    │   ├─ Cudworth — eternal-immutable-morality-independent-of-will
    │   ├─ Clarke — moral-relations-as-necessary-objective-truths
    │   └─ Price — moral-properties-as-real-and-mind-independent
    ├─ Modern-Realists
    │   ├─ G.E.-Moore — good-as-non-natural-indefinable-objective-property
    │   ├─ Sidgwick — rational-intuitionism-presupposes-objective-moral-facts
    │   └─ W.D.-Ross — prima-facie-duties-as-objective-moral-facts
    └─ Contemporary-Realists
        ├─ Russ-Shafer-Landau — Moral Realism: A Defence
        ├─ Derek-Parfit — On What Matters, Part Three (convergence-of-theories)
        └─ Sterling — moral-facts-like-2+2=4, fundamental-and-unalterable

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Theoretical framework: Grant C. Sterling. Mind map architecture and thinker selection: Dave Kelly, 2026. Prose rendering: Claude.