DETAILED SUMMARY: "Phantasia, Phainomenon and Dogma in Epictetus" by Aldo Dinucci

Overview and Structure

Dinucci's paper investigates how three core concepts—phantasia (φαντασία), phainomenon (φαινόμενον), and dogma (δόγμα)—interconnect in Epictetus' Stoic philosophy. The article demonstrates that understanding this relationship is essential for grasping Epictetus' therapeutic method.

PART 1: Fundamentals of Stoic Phantasia

Definition and Translation Issues

No consensus on translating φαντασία: "appearance" (Lesses, Annas, Sorabji), "impression" (Frede, Long & Sedley), "presentation" (Inwood & Gerson), "representation" (Long, Hadot, Gourinat)
Dinucci chooses to transliterate: phantasia

Chrysippus' Dual Nature Theory

Phantasia has two aspects:

Corporeal: A modification of the rational capacity (physical alteration)
Incorporeal: An axioma (proposition) that describes and evaluates what affects the rational capacity

The Light Analogy: Just as light shows both itself and what it illuminates, phantasia shows both itself and what produced it.

Logical Structure

Lekton: The "sayable" content—what can be expressed linguistically (incorporeal)
Axioma: A complete lekton that can be asserted; the Stoic equivalent of a proposition
Only axiomata are strictly speaking true or false
Phantasiai are called true/false derivatively—based on the axioma they contain

Assent (Synkatathesis)

In rational beings, assent is voluntary
Assent is given to an axioma (not directly to the phantasia)
Accepting an axioma creates a dogma (belief/opinion) or hypolepsis (assumption)
These are synonymous in Epictetus

PART 2: Encheiridion 1.5 and the Interpretation Problem

The Critical Passage

Greek: εὐθὺς οὖν πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ τραχείᾳ μελέτα ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι "φαντασία εἶ καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον"

Two Translation Traditions

Option 1: "You are a phantasia, and absolutely not what you represent"

Simplicius, Gourinat, White
Focus: The object as represented in the phantasia

Option 2: "You are a phantasia, and absolutely not what you seem to be"

Perotto, Poliziano, Schweighäuser, Oldfather, Boter
Focus: The appearance itself

Hadot's Two Interpretations

Earlier view (La citadelle intérieure, 1992):

Phainomenon = "what seems to be the case" in the harsh phantasia
The activity is keeping objective phantasiai pure without adding moral judgments

Later view (Manuel d'Épictète, 2000):

Following Bonhöffer
Phainomenon = "the object as it really is in the comprehensive (kataleptic) phantasia"
Translation: "You are just a pure phantasia and you are not in any way what you represent"

Textual Evidence for "What Seems"

Dinucci shows that throughout Epictetus:

Phainomai (φαίνομαι) = "to appear/seem"
Dokeo (δοκέω) = "to seem to be the case" (synonymous with phainomai)
Oiomai (οἴομαι) = "to think/suppose/believe"
Hypolambano (ὑπολαμβάνω) = "to suppose"

Key passage (E 42): All four verbs interconnect—what "seems to be the case" (phainomenon) is a belief/judgment, not the objective reality.

PART 3: Phantasia in Epictetus

Central Role of Rational Capacity (Dynamis Logike)

D 1.1.5: The rational capacity:

Makes use of phantasiai
Is the only self-evaluative capacity

D 1.20.16: "The nature (ousia) of human good is proper use of phantasiai"

D 3.1.25: Human being = "mortal animal with power to use phantasiai rationally"

What's "Up to Us" (Eph' Hemin)

The rational capacity is totally up to us (D 1.1.7)
Therefore, proper use of phantasiai is totally up to us
This is our "authentic part of Zeus"—leads to imperturbability

The Water and Light Analogy (D 3.3.21)

Critical insight:

Water = soul
Ray of light = phantasiai
When water moves, the ray seems to move, but doesn't actually move
Application: Phantasia itself doesn't disturb the mind
What disturbs: The dogma held about the external object represented in the phantasia

Testing Phantasiai

D 1.20.7: "The chief and first work of a philosopher: examine phantasiai, distinguish them, admit none without examination"

The test consists of:

Recognizing it as appearance (phantasia), not reality
Checking if it concerns what's "up to us" or "not up to us"
If not up to us → "It's nothing to me" (E 1.5)

Four Types of Phantasiai (D 1.27)

Is X and appears X → Comprehensive (kataleptic)
Not X and doesn't appear X → Comprehensive
Is X but doesn't appear X → Not comprehensive
Not X but appears X → Not comprehensive

Harsh (tracheia) phantasia = Types 3 or 4—appearance doesn't match reality

PART 4: Dogma and Hypolepsis

Dogma as General Concept

Any opinion/belief held by reason (good or bad, philosophical or not)
Can refer to any school's teachings (e.g., Epicurus' dogmata)

Good vs. Bad Dogmata

Good (right) dogmata:

Add value to internal things (what's up to us—prohairesis)
Recognize externals as indifferent
Lead to good actions, security, imperturbability
"If you have right dogmata, you will fare well" (D 3.9.2)

Bad (wrong) dogmata:

Add value to external things (what's not up to us)
Undervalue internal things
Cause restlessness, disturbance, turbulence
Lead to bad actions, insecurity, suffering

The Core Teaching (E 5)

"Human beings are disturbed not by things (ta pragmata), but by dogmata about things"

Examples:

Death isn't terrible—the dogma "death is terrible" is what's terrible
A child's departure doesn't cause grief—the dogma "this is bad" causes grief (E 16)
Insults don't harm—the dogma "this is insulting" harms (E 20)

Dogma = Hypolepsis

E 20: "When a human being irritates you, it is your own hypolepsis which has irritated you"

The terms are synonymous in Epictetus
Both are "up to us" (E 1)

Relationship to Prohairesis

D 1.29.3: "Dogmata about materials, if right, make choice good; if perverse, make choice bad"

D 1.17.27: Prohairesis can only be constrained by itself—i.e., by the dogma it holds

Since prohairesis is what we really are:

Good prohairesis = holds good dogmata
Bad prohairesis = holds bad dogmata
Destruction of person = destruction of correct dogmata (D 1.28.25)
Dogmata are our only true possessions (D 4.7.14)

CONCLUSION: The Systematic Integration

The Complete Picture

Phantasiai arise containing both perceptual content and propositional content (axioma)
Testing phantasiai = testing the dogma (propositional content), NOT the perception itself
Harsh phantasiai are "harsh" because we've added false dogmata to them:
- We evaluate externals as good/bad (they're actually indifferent)
- This addition is what we control—it's "up to us"
The therapeutic method:
- Recognize: "You are a phantasia"
- Distinguish perception from evaluation
- Apply the dichotomy: "Is this up to me?"
- If external: "It's indifferent—nothing to me"
- Remove false dogma
- Keep phantasia comprehensive (matching reality)

Resolution of the Translation Debate

Dinucci's verdict on E 1.5: "You are a phantasia and absolutely not what you seem to be"

Why Hadot's earlier (1992) interpretation was correct:

Phainomenon = "what seems to be the case" = the false dogma added to the phantasia
NOT "the object as it really is in comprehensive phantasia" (Hadot 2000)
The tracheia phantasia is harsh because it seems to be about something good/bad
What "seems" (phainomenon) is the wrong evaluative judgment
This must be denied and replaced with correct judgment

Practical Application (E 45)

The bathing example:

Perception: "Man bathing quickly"
False dogma to avoid: "He's bathing badly"
Correct approach: "He's bathing quickly" (pure description, no evaluation)

The wine example:

Perception: "Man drinking much wine"
False dogma to avoid: "He's drinking badly"
Correct approach: "He's drinking much" (description only)

The principle: Keep phantasiai comprehensive by not adding value judgments to externals

Significance for Stoic Practice

Dinucci demonstrates that Epictetus' therapeutic system operates on a precise philosophical architecture:

Ontology: Phantasiai have dual nature (corporeal/incorporeal)
Psychology: Mind disturbed by dogmata, not externals
Ethics: Value resides only in prohairesis (what's up to us)
Practice: Constant vigilance testing dogmata in phantasiai

The three concepts form an integrated system:

Phantasia = the appearance containing propositional content
Phainomenon = what seems to be the case (the dogma)
Dogma = the belief/judgment that can be true or false

Mastery = keeping dogmata aligned with reality (externals are indifferent; only virtue/vice in prohairesis matters)

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Sunday, December 21, 2025

SUMMARY: "Phantasia, Phainomenon and Dogma in Epictetus" by Aldo Dinucci