Logical Reformulation of Epictetus’ Enchiridion 1

Epictetus' Enchiridion 1

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Universal Template for Logical Reformulation of Stoic Texts

Stage One: Systematic Reformulation

Th 1) There is a division between what is in our control and what is not in our control.

1*) In our control (within prohairesis): conception, assent/choice, desire, aversion—“everything that is our own doing.”

2*) Not in our control (externals): body, property, reputation, office—“everything that is not our own doing.”

3*) Ergo, the field of prohairesis is internal acts (cognition/assent/impulse), and the field of externals is all outcomes and conditions beyond our governance.

Th 2) By Reason’s order (physis as rational order), things in our control are free and unhindered; things not in our control are servile and hinderable.

1*) Internals: “free, unhindered, unimpeded.”

2*) Externals: “weak, servile, subject to hindrance, not our own.”

3*) Ergo, modal freedom attaches to prohairesis alone; externals are structurally hinderable and alienable.

Th 3) If one mistakes what is servile for free and what is not-one’s-own for one’s-own, psychic disturbance follows.

1*) Effects named: being hampered, grieving, turmoil, blaming gods and men.

2*) [Suppressed premise made explicit] Emotions (pathē) arise from value judgments about good/evil.

3*) Ergo, disturbance originates in false judgments that treat externals as if they were one’s own good or evil.

Th 4) If one judges only what is one’s own to be one’s own, and judges externals as not-one’s-own, freedom from compulsion and injury follows.

1*) Effects named: no one can compel or hinder; blame no one; do nothing against one’s choice; have no enemies; “no one will harm you.”

2*) [Suppressed premise made explicit] Only harm to prohairesis would be genuine harm; externals cannot harm prohairesis.

3*) Ergo, correct classification (internal vs external) removes compulsion and the possibility of genuine harm.

Th 5) The aim (freedom and happiness) is high and requires disciplined renunciation and postponement.

1*) One must “give up some things entirely, and defer others.”

2*) If one seeks both the higher aim and externals (office, wealth), one risks losing the externals and certainly forfeiting the higher aim.

3*) Ergo, priority must be given to virtue/freedom over pursuits of office/wealth.

Th 6) Method of handling impressions: address each harsh impression as such and then examine by rule.

1*) First response: “You are an external impression and not at all what you appear to be.”

2*) Then test by the primary rule: does it concern what is in our control or not?

3*) If it concerns what is not in our control, answer: “It is nothing to me.”

4*) Ergo, the control-criterion governs assent and preserves prohairesis from deception.

Th 7) From the control-criterion follows the value-criterion.

1*) [Suppressed premise made explicit] What is not in our control has no bearing on good/evil.

2*) What is in our control (assent/choice) alone bears on virtue/vice.

3*) Ergo, externals are indifferent with respect to good/evil; virtue/vice belong to prohairesis.

Th 8) Misclassification guarantees misfortune; correct classification guarantees freedom from misfortune.

1*) If externals are treated as necessary goods/evils, frustration and blame ensue (Th 3).

2*) If only prohairesis is treated as one’s own, compulsion and harm are impossible (Th 4).

3*) Ergo, freedom and happiness arise from aligning assent with the control/value criteria.

Th 9) Practical synthesis.

1*) Study to preface impressions with their status (external) and apply the control test.

2*) Renounce or postpone pursuits that conflict with the higher aim.

3*) Ergo, by practicing classification, examination, and disciplined preference, one secures freedom (from hindrance and harm) and happiness.

Th 10) Summary closure.

1*) Only internal acts (assent/choice/desire/aversion) are ours and free; externals are alien and hinderable.

2*) Treating externals as goods/evils produces pathē; treating only prohairesis as one’s own removes compulsion, blame, and harm.

3*) Ergo, right use of prohairesis—governed by the control-criterion—constitutes the sole path to freedom and happiness (eudaimonia).

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Stage Two: Evaluation Against Sterling’s Principles

Nine excerpts and full texts about Stoicism from Grant C. Sterling

Scope Assessment:

Focused. The passage establishes the control/value framework and a practical method for examining impressions; it is not a comprehensive treatise.

Consistency with Sterling’s Criteria (✓ / ⚠ / ✗ / —):

1. Cognitive theory of emotion — ✓

Grief/turmoil/blame arise from false judgments that treat externals as one’s own (Th 3).

2. Foundational value theory (only virtue good, only vice evil) — ✓ (implicit)

Genuine harm is impossible unless prohairesis is corrupted (Th 4.2); value therefore attaches to internal use of reason (Th 7).

3. Status of externals (indifference) — ✓

Externals are “not our own,” hinderable, and “nothing to me” (Th 2, Th 6–7).

4. Preferred indifferents (material of action) — —

Not addressed; the text does not inventory preferred/dispreferred indifferents or kathēkonta.

5. Logical order (control derived from value, not vice versa) — ⚠

The text leads with control to teach the method; value-status is made explicit in Th 7. Alignment with Sterling is compatible but not fully derived step-by-step from axiomatic value claims.

6. Sufficiency of virtue for eudaimonia — ✓ (implicit)

“No one will harm you… you will do nothing against your will” and the promised freedom/happiness (Th 4, Th 10) entail sufficiency.

7. Psychology of assent (impression → examination → assent/refusal) — ✓

Explicit directive to address and test impressions using the control rule (Th 6).

Translation Assessment (including required vocabulary assessment per §2B):

“Under our control / not under our control” → within prohairesis / externals (warranted by Epictetan eph’ hēmin usage).

“Say to every harsh impression” → address the impression and govern assent (Stoic psychology of phantasia and synkatathesis).

“By nature free” rendered as by Reason’s order free to align with the user’s stipulated interpretive register (Reason = rational moral order). This preserves function and does not alter doctrine.

Vocabulary correction per §2B: Not applicable; the source is an ancient Stoic text, not a modern interpretive overlay using “intention/will” terminology.

Essential Omissions (distortive if absent):

None. The claims presented are coherent and do not mislead within their stated scope.

Scope Limitations (Not Deficiencies):

No treatment of preferred indifferents / kathēkonta (how to select among externals while remaining indifferent to outcomes).

No explicit reserve clause (hypexairesis).

Positive affect taxonomy (eupatheiai) not articulated here.

Contradictions with Sterling:

None.

Classification:

Fully consistent with Sterling’s formalization within a focused scope.

Additional Analysis:

The text’s pedagogy is method-first: students learn to classify and test impressions using control as criterion; value-indifference follows naturally from that practice (our Th 7 makes the implicit value-theoretic link explicit).

The necessary suppressed premises supplied (pathē as judgment; only harm to prohairesis is harm) are canonical Stoic axioms required to make the closure steps explicit and are plainly implied by the promises of invulnerability and freedom.

Conclusion:

Enchiridion 1, reformulated, cleanly grounds the Stoic practice: distinguish internal acts of prohairesis from externals, govern assent by the control-criterion, and thereby eliminate disturbance and compulsion. It aligns with Sterling’s value theory and psychology of assent, and it stands as a foundational entry-point to the larger system.