Grant Sterling Explains Why He Calls Himself A Stoic

Grant Sterling Explains Why He Calls Himself A Stoic.

"I've already said my piece about the definition
of Stoicism, but I thought I would make one final
comment...


I understand Malcolm's position--for him, "Stoicism"
is the name of a philosophical _school_, a collection of
beliefs and attitudes passed on through a series of personal
relationships between teacher/mentor and students. As such,
it cannot exist in the 21st century, since that line of
teachers has been broken irretrievably. We can read books
about some of the things the Stoics said, but no book can capture
the entire experience of going to a Stoic school. We can extract
ideas from those books, and use them in our own lives, but that's
not nearly the same thing as being a Stoic--in the same way,
we could read about the tradition of courtly love among
medieval knights, but anyone who decided to try to recreate
that life today would be sadly misguided. (I could give
innumerable other examples.) Put more bluntly, "Stoicism"
is the name of a corpse, and modern Stoics would be no more
than zombies--things with an outer semblance of the former
person but without the living force within.
I also understand Donald's position. "Stoicism"
is the name of a set of philosophical ideas. As such, it
is an inherently eternal entity--that is, any set of beliefs
can be adopted by anyone at any time in history. Write down
a list of philosophical ideas, and I can choose whether I
wish to believe the things in that set or not. The list
you give me might be the list of things the Stoics believed,
or the list of things that Immanuel Kant believed, or a list
of things that doesn't match up with what anyone in history
has ever believed. I might know where your list came from, or
not. All that is irrelevant--the ideas themselves can be
accepted or rejected regardless of whether anyone else in
history did, or did not, also believe them.
{The following aside will tell you something about my
view of philosophy, a view certainly not held by all philosophers
but also not a view unique to me:
Obviously, accepting a set of beliefs that was accepted
by any group of people a very long time ago may be possible
but may be grossly irrational. It is possible to adopt the
same scientific beliefs that Aristotle held, but you should be
ashamed to do so, since we have very good reason _today_ to
think that a large number of things that Aristotle reasonably
believed in his day cannot be reasonably believed today. You
would be even stupider to believe historical facts from Aristotle's
day--anyone in 2017 who believes that Egypt is ruled by the
Ptolemaic dynasty is a moron. So I do not, in general, recommend
believing things that people in ancient times believed.
But I don't think this is generally true in philosophy.
That is, I think the ideas of, say, Plato are, by and large, just
as serious contenders for being true as the ideas of Augustine,
of Locke, or William James, or Panayot Butchvarov (one of my
dissertation advisors). Occasionally a theory which was once
popular will confront a set of objections that render it highly
suspect, but this is rare. In general, the fact that a philosophical
theory is very old is not a reason to doubt it--if anything, it's
a reason to take it seriously.}

But even if we take the latter view, that leaves open
the question--_which_ set of philosophical views is denoted by
the term "Stoicism". Chris and Steve (et al) think it is (very
roughly!) 'the set of things the ancient philosophers called
"Stoics" believed'. I think it is (roughly) 'the set of ethical
and psychological things that the ancient Stoics believed'. Who's
right?
This is the issue that I have singularly failed to explain
in a way that other people can grasp it. What a word means is
totally and completely determined by what the people who use it
and hear it used think it means. Period.
So, for example, some years ago there could have been
(there wasn't) a public discussion of whether society should allow
the word 'gay' (which meant 'carefree and happy') to also mean
'homosexual'. There could have been a discussion about whether
this would confuse people (in the Christmas song when people sing
"don we now our gay apparel" does that mean we are to dress in clothes
denoting homosexuality?), whether there was or could be found a
different word that would be effective for the new use, etc. But
although that discussion _could have_ taken place, it _cannot_
(present tense) take place. Because society has accepted this as
the meaning of the word. Indeed, one cannot today use the word in
its former meaning without causing confusion--the word used to
mean 'carefree', then went through a stage where it meant 'carefree'
OR 'homosexual', and today it means only 'homosexual'.
I submit that the same thing has happened to 'Stoic'.
Whatever the term may have meant in ancient Greece, or in the
earliest English uses, today it means:
1) In ordinary conversation, "someone who doesn't show
emotion" (not capitalized).
2) In philosophical discussions, "someone who holds the
ethical views of the ancient Stoics".
3) In historical contexts (including history of philosophy),
"someone from the ancient Stoic school".

As a description of the views of the ancient Stoics, '1'
is grossly misleading. But I see little or no hope of changing
how the word is used, and no reason to expend the energy or
trying.
As a description of the views of the ancient Stoics, '2'
is much less misleading. As I have pointed out, people like
Epictetus spend very little time on any part of Stoic doctrine
except Ethics. But it is still misleading.
Only '3' does justice to the views of the ancient Stoics.
(Notice, though, that '3' is closer to Malcolm's view than to
Chris and Steve's.)
But that's totally irrelevant. Because philosophical
conversations [again, I am NOT talking about conversations in
history of philosophy] are only tangentially related to what
ancient people--what any people in the past--thought.

When I'm having a conversation with someone about their
beliefs, and they say "I'm a Marxist", I do not assume that
they believe everything Karl Marx believed. I assume they
believe a certain core set of beliefs that spells out the modern
usage of the WORD "Marxist". Some Marxists today believe things
that would have horrified Marx himself. That's historically
interesting, but irrelevant. The word has moved on. If someone
says "I am a Kantian". I do not assume that they believe all the
things Kant believed, a "Utilitarian" need not mimic Bentham,
a "Platonist" may diverge in many ways from Plato. They cannot
diverge in _just any_ way--there are some doctrines that mark
out the essence of those theories, and some doctrines that do not.
A Platonist who believes in Democracy is not an absurdity--
Plato's political views are simply not part of the class-2
usage of the term "Platonist". A Platonist who doesn't believe
in unchanging essences is an absurdity.

Just as I see little or no hope of changing how the
word "Stoic" is used on class-2 contexts, I see no reason to
expend the energy to change it. And at the most basic level
THE FIGHT IS OVER--or, more properly, it was never fought.
The decision about how the word "Stoic" will be used in class-2
contexts has _already been made_. It is like the word 'gay'--the
word means what it now means whether anyone likes it or not. I
had a professor who hated that the word 'hopefully' (an adverb
that once meant 'to act in a hopeful fashion') was being used to
mean 'I hope that'. I didn't have the heart to tell him, "I'm
sorry, but you've lost. The word has gotten away from you--it
now means something other than it used to mean. That might be a
linguistic defect--our language may have been better when it meant
what it used to mean. Or maybe not. But what a word means is a
strictly factual matter defined by how the word is used--and the
ship has sailed on 'gay' and 'hopefully'...and the ship has
sailed on both 'stoic' and "Stoic". I see Chris and Steve's efforts
to make "Stoic" include theological and other ideas as futile, in
exactly the same way that my professors efforts to correct my usage
of 'hopefully' was futile. Look at the Stoic Voice Journal, for
example. Read the comments from new subscriber--almost 100% of them
are interested in the _ethical_ ideas of the Stoics, and use the
word with that meaning only.
What _can_ be done is to refine the usage of the word in
philosophical contexts. Someone could write a nice article saying
"the word 'Marxist' is used to cover only a portion of Marx's
thought, but it is used loosely. Let's try to define more precisely
which doctrines of Marx one should have to hold to be a 'Marxist'."
And I (among others) have tried to do that for Stoicism. Philosophers
do this all the time--they take a word which has a meaning that is
somewhat fuzzy around the edges, and they try to refine it. That
a project that has some value. But it works within the confines of
an existing word.

So this has been unnecessarily long. My position is this:
1) I have no interest in zombie Stoicism. I have no interest in
trying to recreate (in myself or anyone else) what Stoicism as
a living social movement was to people in ancient Greece or Rome.
And I understand and respect Malcolm's view that this was 'real'
Stoicism, but I don't share it.
2) I am interested in the history of philosophy, and so I am interested
in conversations about what the ancient Stoics themselves actually
believed. Chrysippus was a determinist. That's historically
interesting. Posidonius held divergent views of ethics. That's
nice. All the Stoics were theists of some sort or other--and we can
argue about whether they were all pantheists of some sort of not.
Fine and dandy. But that's _history_. I have that sort of interest in
the views of Plato, or Confucius, or Heidegger.
3) As for the present tense, I believe that a certain set of ideas about
ethics and psychology are true. Not "interesting", or "historically
influential" or "deeply held by some past people"...I believe they are
_true_. (Just as I believe that certain theological, epistemological,
political, logical, etc. views are true.) Since I believe that they are
true, I wish to be able to articulate them clearly, and communicate them
to other people, and even perhaps to convince some of those people to
believe them, too. Those ethical and psychological views conform very
closely (but not perfectly) with the views that are ordinarily
understood to be the referent of the term "Stoic". So I say "I am a
Stoic". I find that when I say "I am a Stoic" other people who have
some familiarity with philosophy immediately and fairly accurately
understand what I believe. Since that's the whole purpose of language,
I continue to use the word. I am not homosexual, so I say (if the topic
comes up "I am not gay", even if I happen to be happy and carefree at
the time. I say "Hopefully, the Illinois legislature will now begin
to act more responsibly" even though I am not proceeding in a hopeful
manner (and neither are they).

"The number of Stoics (as I and they use the word) is indeed
growing. And I think that's a good thing, since I think Stoicism
(as I and they use the word) is true."

Regards,
Grant


-

The Word 'Stoic' Now Designates an Ethical/Psychological Theory

 

"The word 'Stoic' now designates an ethical/psychological theory."

The following 7/24/2017 message of Grant Sterling to the International Stoic Forum was addressed to Chris Fisher.


Chris:

Thanks for your thoughtful letter. Unfortunately,
like Nigel, I think you have misunderstand a key issue.
The scholars you cite are not, generally speaking,
discussing the issue of what is essential to Stoicism,
understood as a general philosophical school. They are
attempting to explain the doctrines of the historical school
of Stoicism which existed among the ancient Greeks and
Romans. No-one that I know of has denied that the ancient
Stoics were theists. No-one that I know of has denied that
they connected their theological principles to their other
principles (Ethics and Logic, as they called them). I
don't doubt that if you had asked them, they would have
said that their theology was "essential" to their ideas.
(Just as they would have said that their doctrine of
kataleptic impressions was essential.) All of this is
true, well-documented (as you have pointed out), and
irrelevant.
The question that some of us have been discussing
on this List is quite different. We are asking "if I
am looking at a philosophical theory of someone writing
at any point in history (today, 200 years ago, 2000 years
ago), what are the doctrines that would be most critical
in deciding whether to call that theory a "Stoic" theory
or not? And that issue has been decided by philosophers
just as decisively as the historical issue. Because if
you were to compile all the references to Stoicism in the last
two millenia of the form "X was heavily influenced by the Stoics", "I
reject the doctrine of the Stoics on this issue. They held....",
"I take from the Stoics the idea that...", "I here develop
a new Stoicism", etc., etc., etc. you will find that virtually
none of those references have anything to do with Physics
(/theology) or Logic (/epistemology). Nearly 100% of those
references are to ethical and/or psychological doctrines--
the cognitive theory of emotions, the denial of value to
externals, the elimination of emotions, etc.
This is not an historical accident. The fact is
that after the debates between the Stoics and the Skeptics
regarding the existence of kataleptic impressions, the
issue disappeared from philosophical discussion. Skepticism
fizzled, and was not seriously revived for centuries, and
when it was, the epistemological ground had shifted and
the notion of "impressions" had been revised so radically
that no-one would talk any more about them being a source
of certainty.
And the fact is that _even during the time of the
ancient Stoics themselves_ the theological ground was
shifting. Epictetus (at least in the surviving written
works) holds on only to a generic Providentialism. That
theological doctrine was still tied to his ethical principles
quite strongly, but it is no longer identifiable as a
distinctive doctrine. Almost everything that Epictetus
says about the gods could be readily and easily affirmed by
a Christian, Jew, Muslim, etc. (apart from the use of the plural
form--and even in that Epictetus is not consistent). So
even by Epictetus' time a distinctively "Stoic" theology
was disappearing--and, as far as mainstream philosophy is
concerned, it never reappeared. The vast majority of philosophers
today are monotheists or atheists--but even among the pantheists,
panentheists and polytheists, the fragmented writings of the
ancient Stoics are not widely discussed.
But the Ethics...that's a different story. Stoic
ethics is distinct--no other philosophical movement in history
advocated the complete severance of value from the external
world while still preserving the idea that ethical truths
existed and were objective facts. And not only was this idea both
revolutionary and unique to the Stoics, it is continually revived
throughout the history of philosophy. While it has never again
attained the popularity that it achieved during the Roman era,
there have been philosophers ever since who have been influenced
by Stoic Ethical ideas.
So, to be blunt, Stoic Logic is effectively dead. The
few philosophers who defend views very similar to those of
the Stoics (I am one) virtually never discovered those views
first in Stoic writings, virtually never present them in
discussion using Stoic terminology or by citing Stoic authors,
and in most cases have no idea that their views are similar to
those of the Stoics. I know of eminent, leading epistemologists
who know [nothing] at all about Stoic "Logic".
Stoic pan(en)theistic theology is effectively dead. The
few philosophers who defend views very similar to those of
the Stoics (I am not one) virtually never discovered those views
first in Stoic writings, virtually never present them in
discussion using Stoic terminology or by citing Stoic authors,
and in most cases have no idea that their views are similar to
those of the Stoics. I know of eminent, leading theologians
who know [nothing] at all about Stoic "Physics". (Providentialism,
on the other hand, is alive and well but has become entirely
divorced from Stoicism--_Stoic_ Providentialism is dead.)
But Stoic Ethics is alive. The philosophers who defend
views very similar to those of the Stoics (I am one) often
discovered those views first in Stoic writings, frequently present
them in discussion using Stoic terminology or by citing Stoic authors,
and in almost all cases are fully aware that their views are similar to
those of the Stoics. I know of not one eminent, leading ethicist
who knows [nothing] at all about Stoic "Ethics"--indeed, I know very
few epistemologists or theologians who know nothing about Stoic
Ethics!

So the fact is, if you go to a philosophy conference and
tell people "I'm a Stoic" or "My views are heavily influenced by
Stoicism", etc., they will immediately assume that you mean
that you hold that externals are neither good nor evil, virtue
is the only good, emotions are caused by false value judgments,
etc. They will not assume that you are a theist, much less
assume that you are a pantheist. They will not assume that you
believe in kataleptic impressions. They may very well not know
that the ancient Stoics believed in such things. They'll assume
that you're talking about Ethics.

To put this another way:
1) Historically speaking, Stoic influence on epistemology
and theology in the last 2,000 years has been almost non-existent.
But Stoic Ethics has been very influential (even though only a
small minority of ethicists are Stoics).
2) Philosophically speaking, Stoic pantheism has not
stood out from other pantheisms as a substantially different
doctrine, nor has Stoic Providentialism stood out from other
providentialisms (or Stoic dogmatist epistemology from other
dogmatisms). But Stoic Ethics remains unique. And (Long's
"broken-backed" comment aside) no-one has shown any reason why
one would have to be a Theist (much less a pantheist) in order
to defend those doctrines.

Hence--I agree that the ancient Stoics thought that
all three areas of thought were important. If you are a
traditional Stoic in all three areas, that's fine with me.
(I wonder how you resolve some of the tensions that arise
from trying to be a pantheist and a Stoic in ethics at the
same time, but that's a discussion for another day.) I agree
that fully traditional Stoicism is a viable philosophical
theory. I'm certainly not trying to argue that you aren't
a Stoic. (Nigel's not a Stoic--he's an Aristotelian. But
you may be a fully traditional Stoic for all I know.) But
the word "Stoic" now designates an ethical/psychological
theory.

(The Greek Stoics would probably reject Steve
from their camp (he is at the very least heavily skeptical
of the notion of kataleptic impressions). They would
reject me (I'm not a materialist or a pantheist). They
would reject Nigel (he thinks that it is sometimes appropriate
to feel anger, grief, etc.). That's an interesting historical
fact, but irrelevant to the question of what is essential to
Stoicism as a perennial theory.)

Regards,
Grant

PS: It's very much like the term "Marxist". If someone
at a philosophy conference sits next to me at lunch and
tells me that she is a Marxist, I will immediately (and
reasonably) assume that she holds all or most of the
distinctive _economic_ principles that Marx held--the
labor theory of value, the theory that personality is
shaped by the economic system of one's society, etc. I
will not assume that she is an atheist or holds Marx's views
about the Jews, etc.
Marx was an atheist, and he thought that atheism was
critically connected to his economic theories. But
others have shown, since then, that one can easily hold
distinctively Marxist economic views without being atheists.
Marx had distinctive views about the Jews (I will not enter
into the debate about whether those views constitute anti-Semitism),
and connected those views to his economic theories, but people
with different views of the Jews (harsher or milder) have
embraced his economic theories. What stands out about Marx
is his economic theory--and today the word "Marxist" denotes
that, and only that.

The Stoic Doctrine on Desire

 The Stoic Doctrine on Desire

The following is a message sent by Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum on 2/13/2017.

[The Stoic doctrine on desire is not common sense.]

"This thread has produced an interesting
practical example of the issues I was discussing
with Steve about moral and non-moral beliefs (judgments),
and the distinction between those things and the
morality of _choices_.
        To be clear, I will use the terms "believing
that-p", "making a judgment that-p", and "assenting
to the impression that-p" interchangeably.

        As a preliminary, two comments directed
towards Nigel.  The rest of this post is a discussion
of Stoic doctrine.  Nigel's view is too Protean for
me to pin it down and comment on it.

> I personally do not accept such.  All externals are neutral, as Stoicism
> claims.  But they do have qualities whereby in the roles that we play
> out in our lives they may be preferred or dispreferred according to
> their appropriateness to any given situation and the wider view of what
> is the ethical path for us to follow.


*****
        OK, so far, so good.
***

> Personally I try not to think in the Christian terms of ‘good and
> evil’.  I prefer the Stoic idea of what is complete, appropriate and
> harmonious combined with the idea as to what is right and proper.  I
> even follow some experts’ guidance to think in terms of beneficial and
> not beneficial.  It all depends on circumstance – but ‘good’ and ‘evil’
> are definitely not part of my preferred vocabulary just as such words
> were not part of the Greek vocabulary.


*****
        Astounding.  Every translation that I can think of
that deals with the works of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics,
the Epicureans, etc. all use the words "good" and "evil"
repeatedly for some of the most central doctrines of those
thinkers.  I am utterly baffled.  This is like saying "Marx
didn't think in terms of 'capital'".
***

> As to your claim that it is OK to desire/lust after your neighbour
> because you cannot control such feelings, if this is truly you view your
> lack of understanding as to what is ethical and what is not as far as
> Stoicism is concerned would be astounding.
>
> To desire or lust after a person that it is not appropriate to lust
> after, be it because one is in a committed relationship or that they may
> not want to lusted after etcetera, is in Stoicism down to incorrect
> judgements – *judgements that need to be corrected*.

> If you do not think these feelings are under your control I would hope
> that you are not let loose with female students.  However, despite your
> protestations, I am sure that you do in fact bring any such stirrings
> under control by making the correct judgement that to allow the initial
> stirring of the feeling to continue would be inappropriate.
>
> I am sure that if you experience the initial aesthetic attraction of a
> beautiful girl that you ensure that it does not increase in intensity to
> whereby you would be liable to act inappropriately.  You will moderate
> the feelings and not be the slave to it.
>
> You cannot totally eliminate the initial stirring in that this is part
> of your animal nature but you do moderate it – in a similar manner as,
> in courtship, you will allow the same stirring to develop appropriately
> if the feelings are being reciprocated, while always moderating them so
> that they do not become inappropriate and out of the control of your
> ‘ruling faculty’.

*****
        The view that Nigel seems to be affirming here (no
doubt he will deny it) is that there is a thing which we
can call "desire" which begins as a biologically-based
'stirring'.  I am able to control whether or not I choose
to allow this feeling to grow in strength.  If I am a single
person who is courting another single person, then it is
appropriate for me to allow the feeling to grow, as long as
I do not allow it to grow to be so strong that it overpowers
my reason and leads me to do the wrong thing.  If I am am married
to someone else, or the object of my desire is married to
someone else, or if they are not attracted to me, then I
should prevent my desire from growing at all.
        Stoicism, on the other hand, denies this picture
in more than one way:

        1) It denies that the initial stirring and the
full-blown desire are the same thing.  In other words,
they do not differ merely in degree, they differ in
_kind_.
        2) It denies that I should ever allow the
initial stirring to grow into a desire.  Ever, for
anyone.  Not for the person I'm courting, not for my
wife, not for anyone.
        3) It denies that the relationship between
desire and reason is a relationship of power.  In
other words, on the Stoic view I don't have to worry
that my desires may become so strong that they will
overcome reason, because reason can and should
_eliminate_ desires entirely.

        It works like this:
        There is indeed a biological stirring which
slightly resembles "desire" (and, hence, becomes
confused with it in ordinary English).  Allow me
the leeway to stipulatively use the word "urge"
for this stirring.  This is the thing which I
acknowledged is not in our control, and hence
cannot ever be right or wrong.  I ate lunch today
at a restaurant.  There was a customer there who
I found very attractive in this way.  I did not
find her boyfriend attractive, nor the waitress
who took my order.  This was in no way voluntary
on my part--I did not in any way choose which
people (if any!) I would find attractive.  If
I had my choice, I would have found none of them
attractive, because I was not looking for someone
to have sex with, and so there was no advantage in
seeing anyone as being sexually attractive.  But
this wasn't voluntary.
        There are similar biologically-based
stirrings in other areas.  If I go to the zoo and the
lion suddenly roars unexpectedly, I may experience a
feeling of startlement that resembles fear.  If I see a
dog get hit by a car and it whines in pain I may experience
something like sadness.  Etc.  None of these are under our
control.
        Note also that none of these biologically-based
feelings _have cognitive content_.  When the lion's
roar startles me I am not considering any proposition
at all.  I am not thinking "I am in danger of being
harmed"...I am not thinking of anything.  I am reacting
to a sound, or an image, or whatever.  There is no
false judgment here, because there is no judgment.  The
only thing I control is assenting to impressions, but
impressions have cognitive content, and no assent has
taken place in these cases.  So these things, again, are
not in my control.

        But what is under our control is what happens
next.  I can choose to stare at the woman in the
restaurant, or to look away.  I can sit there and
mentally undress her, or I can turn my mind back to
other subjects.  I can imagine how happy I would be if
only I had her for my wife (or mistress), or I can
reject this thought on the grounds that she might very
well be stupid or selfish or obnoxious in some way and
so being with her would not be pleasant, or on the better and
more general grounds that my eudaimonia does not depend on
any external at all, include the nature of my wives or
mistresses, and that it would be wrong for me to have a
relationship with her.
        If I choose to think that having sex with this
woman will make my life better, then I have accepted a
value judgment.  Things that (I believe)contribute to my
eudaimonia are things that I judge to be good.  If (as in
Epictetus' example) I say to myself "she is beautiful, and
_happy is her husband_ then I have passed beyond the stage
of seeing someone who I find biologically attractive, and into
the stage of assenting to a proposition.  NOW what I experience
is no longer the biological feeling or urge, it is a desire.
Desires are feelings that arise from having assented to the
impression that something is good or bad.  So what has happened
here is _not_ that an initial stirring has become stronger...
what has happened is that a non-propositional biological
urge has become transformed into a propositionally-based
desire.  What we have now is a new thing, not a stronger
version of the old thing.
        This belief, that having this woman as a sexual
partner will contribute to my true happiness, is false.
Always.  In any case, assenting to any proposition is a
choice, and irrational choices are always wrong.  {The belief
"the moon is made of green cheese" is not a moral belief, not a
value belief of any kind.  But since it would be irrational for
me to assent to this impression, it would be morally wrong for
me to have that belief.}

        How can reason control a desire?  It can't.  This
is where the Aristotelian model breaks down.  If Reason
tells me that the impression "having her as a sexual
partner will increase my happiness (eudaimonia)" is false,
and so I refuse to assent to it, then the desire is not
moderated or controlled, it is eliminated.  The desire is
caused by my assent to the impression--no assent, no desire.
On the other hand, if my reason has assented to the impression,
then it is no longer in position to control the desire that
results.  It's like the legislature who turns power over to a
tyrant and expects to control his actions--once you have ceded
your authority, you cannot get it back without rescinding the
assent.  As long as I assent to the proposition "having this
woman increases my eudaimonia" then I no longer have logical
grounds for refusing to assent to "it would be good for me to
have sex with her even though I'm married (or she's married,
or both)", or "I should conceal some of my income to buy her gifts
so that she will begin (or continue) having sex with me", etc.
Nowhere in Stoicism does it teach you how to maintain your desires
but moderate them and control them with reason.  That's a common
sense idea, but you will not find it in Stoic thought.  What you
find in Stoic thought are passages that tell you to refuse to
assent to the impressions of value and the desire, emotion or
pathos will _go away_.

        So we have:
1) A non-propositional urge...not voluntary, neither true
nor false, neither right nor wrong.

2) The non-moral, non-value impression "this person is
physically beautiful".  (This may not be connected to
a desire at all.  For example, I would agree that George
Clooney is physically beautiful, even though I am not in
the least bit sexually attracted to him myself.)  Assent
to this impression (like all assent to impressions) is
voluntary, but not in itself dangerous.

3) A value impression--"having sex with this person would
make me happy/be good for me/etc."  This impression is
false--no external things are good.  If I assent to it I
will experience a desire.  I should never assent to such
impressions.

        So what about my "desire" for my wife?  I should
not have such a desire.  Most people don't choose to marry
people for whom they don't even have a sexual urge.  That's
fine--pleasure is a preferred indifferent for the Stoics, so
marrying someone who will give you sexual pleasure makes
rational sense.  But there is no need for me to ever assent
to the proposition "my wife will bring me eudaimonia".  Not
only is that false, but if I assent to it I will have a much
tougher time not also assenting to "it would be bad for my
wife to leave me", "it would be good for me to steal jewelry
that will make my wife want to stay with me", etc., etc., etc.

        So...urges are neutral.  All desires are bad.
***

> Let us get some common sense into understanding the Stoic approach.
>

*****
        No, you want to change the Stoic approach to
conform to common sense.
***


> Nigel
>

        Regards,
                Grant

Judgments and Character in Stoic Philosophy

 

I prompted Claude to expand upon the idea of "Judgments and Character":

Certainly. Let's delve deeper into the relationship between judgments and character in Stoic philosophy:

11. **Judgments and Character**:
   

1. **Character as a System of Judgments** 

- In Stoic thought, one's character is essentially a set of habitual judgments and responses to impressions.

- These judgments, repeated over time, form the core of who we are.

2. **Reciprocal Relationship**:
   - Our judgments shape our character, and our character influences our judgments.
   - This creates a feedback loop where each reinforces the other.

3. **Habituation of Judgments**:
   - Repeated judgments become habitual and automatic over time.
   - These habitual judgments form the basis of our instinctive reactions to situations.

4. **Character Development through Judgment Modification**:
   - Stoic practice involves consciously examining and modifying our judgments.
   - By changing our judgments, we gradually reshape our character.

5. **Virtue as Correct Judgment**:
   - For Stoics, virtuous character is fundamentally about making correct value judgments.
   - Wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance all involve judging situations correctly.

6. **Consistency in Judgments**:
   - A strong, virtuous character is marked by consistency in judgments across various situations.
   - Inconsistent judgments often indicate a character still in development.

7. **Judgments as Expressions of Character**:
   - Our spontaneous judgments in challenging situations reveal our true character.
   - Epictetus often emphasized that our character is shown in how we handle difficulties.

8. **The Role of Proairesis (Moral Character)**:
   - Stoics believed in proairesis, our capacity to make moral choices.
   - This capacity is exercised through our judgments and is central to our character.

9. **Character as the Only True Good**:
   - Since Stoics view virtue as the only true good, and character as the seat of virtue, developing good character through correct judgments becomes paramount.

10. **Judgments and Emotional Patterns**:
    - Our habitual emotional responses are rooted in our characteristic judgments.
    - Changing these judgments can alter our emotional patterns and overall character.

11. **Self-Reflection and Character**:
    - The practice of examining our judgments fosters self-awareness.
    - This self-awareness is crucial for intentional character development.

12. **Character as Internal vs. External**:
    - Stoics emphasize that our true character lies in our judgments, not in external actions or circumstances.
    - This focus on internals aligns with the Stoic emphasis on what is within our control.

13. **Judgments and Moral Progress**:
    - Stoic moral progress (prokope) is essentially about refining our judgments over time.
    - This refinement leads to a more virtuous character.

14. **The Sage's Character**:
    - The Stoic sage, the ideal of perfect virtue, is characterized by unfailingly correct judgments.
    - While this ideal may be unattainable, it serves as a guide for character development.

15. **Judgments in Social Contexts**:
    - Our judgments about others and social situations reflect and shape our character.
    - Practicing correct judgments in social interactions is key to developing a virtuous character.

16. **Responsibility for Character**:
    - Stoics emphasize that we are responsible for our judgments and, therefore, for our character.
    - This responsibility empowers us to actively shape who we are.

17. **Character Resilience**:
    - A well-developed character, built on sound judgments, provides resilience in facing life's challenges.
    - This resilience is a key aspect of Stoic eudaimonia (flourishing).

By understanding the profound connection between our judgments and our character, we can approach Stoic practice with greater intentionality. Every judgment we make is an opportunity to shape our character, moving us either closer to or further from the Stoic ideal of virtue.

This understanding encourages us to be mindful of our judgments in daily life, recognizing that each one contributes to who we are becoming. It also provides hope and motivation for personal growth, as we realize that by working on our judgments, we have the power to transform our character and, ultimately, our life experience.

What do you have to believe, in order to count as a Stoic?

From a message sent by Grant Sterling to the International Stoic Forum on May 24, 2021:

Subject: Do you need God to be a Stoic?


"All:


  "Of course, you've heard this before.  Steve was brief...I'll be brief as well.  Of

course, I'm incapable of being as anywhere close to _as_ brief as Steve.

  "Being a Stoic" is not an objective factual matter, like being over 6' tall.

It requires people to develop criteria.

   Suppose someone agrees with everything Karl Marx said (for simplicity,

let's pretend that he was completely consistent in his beliefs).  There would

be no rational doubt, then, whether or not he was a "Marxist".  But suppose

he didn't agree with Marx's view of religion--suppose, in fact, that he was a

Christian.  Is he still a "Marxist"?  It depends on how important you think

Marx's view of religion is to his philosophical system.  I, personally, think

that the answer is "of course he is".  I think the heart and soul of Marx's

philosophy is his view on economics, specifically things like the labor

theory of value, the ultimate superiority of communism, etc.  If this man believes those

things (even if they have to be fitted into the rest of his system differently than Marx fit

them into his, since Marx's system included different religious ideas), then he's a Marxist. 

{You may have different standards.  But this is not _entirely_ an arbitrary, subjective

matter--I would say that someone who calls someone a "Marxist" entirely on the

basis of whether or not the person shares Marx's views on, say, Judaism was being irrational.

But there is certainly a subjective element.}

  (I just had this exact discussion about Christianity.  What do you have to believe, in

order to count as a "Christian"?  Do non-Trinitarians qualify?  Those who deny the

existence of Hell?  Etc.)

   So unless someone believes 100% of the things that the Stoics believed, we'll have to

decide what is so central and distinctive of Stoicism that it should count as a defining

feature, and what shouldn't count.  And since the "Stoics" didn't agree with each other

about 100% of things, then we either say there never were any Stoics, or we'll have to define

what is required to be "in".  (This doesn't have to be a list of necessary and sufficient conditions.

It can be a list of distinctive ideas, and someone counts as a Stoic if they agree with 80%

of them or something.)

  I think that what is truly central, important, and distinctive of Stoicism is the moral

psychology.  The theory of what things are good, of the origin of emotions, or

eudaimonia, etc.  So I think someone who believes those things is a Stoic.  I do not

pretend that this is 100% of the things that the ancient Stoics believed.  But I think it

was what set the Stoics apart from other philosophers throughout history.  And my view is

not idiosyncratic--I'll bet that if you look at the cases where someone has been described

as being a "Stoic", after you sort out the cases where the term is being used in it's

colloquial sense (someone who doesn't display much emotion), you'll find that 99%

of the time it's based on those characteristics.  Stand up at a philosophy convention and

say "what philosophical system do I follow?", and then start reciting those characteristics.

People will say "Stoicism", without waiting to hear whether you believe in cataleptic

impressions or pantheism.

  You can have a different set of criteria if you want to.  I don't object.  But be careful--

I don't think Epictetus was a pantheist, for example.  If you make pantheism essential to

Stoicism, then Epictetus wasn't a Stoic.  Chrysippus was a strict determinist.  I'm not sure

which other Stoics were strict determinists, but I'll bet not all of them were.  (Again, I

have doubts about Epictetus, for one.). Is determinism central?  Cataleptic impressions?

Belief in fiery pneuma?  You can end up defining "Stoicism" in such a way that no

living person would ever want to be one.  I think that's unhelpful--your mileage may vary."


   Regards,

           GCS

V.2 Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions

 

V.2 Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions

Claude:
"I understand. I'll combine the information from your previous prompt with the new text [Grant Sterling; see link below] to modify the steps for making proper use of impressions, focusing on the mechanism of assent. Here's an updated and expanded version of the steps:

**Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions**

1. **Pause and Observe the Impression**
   • When an impression arises, consciously interrupt your automatic response.
   • Recognize that the initial impression is not under your direct control.
   • Identify the nature of the impression: Is it purely cognitive or does it have a value component?
   • Label the impression objectively, e.g., "This is an impression that my backpack has been moved."

2. **Examine the Impression**
   • Analyze the content of the impression: Is it claiming something about the world?
   • Determine if the impression has a value component (e.g., "This is bad").
   • Consider the context and potential origins of the impression.
   • Assess whether the impression relates to externals (things not in your control) or internals (your judgments and actions).

3. **Apply Rational Judgment (Assent or Withhold Assent)**
   • Decide whether to assent to the impression as true, reject it as false, or withhold judgment.
   • If the impression involves externals as good or bad, be cautious about assenting.
   • Remember that assenting to value-laden impressions can lead to desires or emotions.
   • Consider formulating alternative impressions that align with Stoic principles.

4. **Respond, Don't React**
   • If you withhold assent, recognize that no action or emotion need follow.
   • If you assent, choose a response based on virtue and reason, not impulse.
   • For impressions about externals, formulate responses that recognize their indifferent nature.
   • Practice formulating and assenting to true action propositions based on your roles and duties.

5. **Reflect and Learn**
   • After responding, reflect on your process of assent and its consequences.
   • Assess whether your assents aligned with Stoic principles of virtue and indifference to externals.
   • Consider how your pattern of assent is shaping your character over time.

6. **Practice Visualization**
   • Mentally rehearse receiving impressions and practicing careful assent.
   • Visualize formulating alternative, Stoic-aligned impressions to common challenging situations.

7. **Seek Feedback and Guidance**
   • Study Stoic texts to deepen your understanding of proper assent to impressions.
   • Discuss your practice with fellow Stoics, focusing on the process of assent.


8. **Cultivate Consistency**
   • Strive to apply careful assent consistently, even with seemingly minor impressions.
   • Recognize that mastery comes through repetition, gradually changing your default impressions.

9. **Adapt and Refine**
   • As you progress, work towards automatically receiving impressions that align with Stoic values.
   • Aim for the ideal of the Sage, who no longer receives false value impressions about externals.
   • Continually refine your ability to formulate and assent to true propositions about virtue and indifferents.

"By focusing on the mechanism of assent and incorporating the Stoic understanding of impressions, this revised approach offers a more nuanced and philosophically grounded method for making proper use of impressions in daily life."

Making correct use of impressions, training and character development

Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions

 

Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions

Focus on the things in our control.

"The key to transforming oneself into the Stoic sophos (wise person) is to learn what is ‘in one’s power’, and this is ‘the correct use of impressions’ (phantasiai), which in outline involves not judging as good or bad anything that appears to one. For the only thing that is good is acting virtuously (that is, motivated by virtue), and the only thing that is bad is the opposite, acting viciously (that is, motivated by vice)" (Seddon, pg. 3).

Keith Seddon (2005). Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes.


Claude (expanding on ChatGPT):
"Certainly. Let's expand on the "Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions" section:

**Steps to Practice Making Proper Use of Impressions**

1. **Pause and Observe**
   • When an impression arises, consciously interrupt your automatic response.
   • Take a deep breath to create mental space between the impression and your reaction.
   • Notice the physical sensations in your body associated with the impression.
   • Identify the specific nature of the impression: Is it a thought, emotion, or sensory input?
   • Label the impression objectively, e.g., "This is a thought about potential failure" or "This is a feeling of anger."

2. **Examine the Impression**
   • Analyze the origin of the impression: Is it based on direct experience or assumption?
   • Consider the context: What factors might be influencing this impression?
   • Assess the validity: Is there concrete evidence supporting this impression?
   • Determine if the impression relates to something within your control or not.
   • Reflect on past experiences: Have you encountered similar impressions before? How did they turn out?
   • Identify any cognitive biases that might be affecting your perception.

3. **Apply Rational Judgment**
   • Evaluate the impression against your core Stoic principles and values.
   • Ask yourself: "Is this impression aligned with virtue (wisdom, justice, courage, temperance)?"
   • Consider alternative perspectives: How might someone else view this situation?
   • Analyze potential consequences of acting on this impression.
   • Separate facts from opinions or emotional reactions.
   • Apply the "view from above" technique: How significant is this in the grand scheme of things?

4. **Respond, Don't React**
   • Take a moment to formulate a deliberate response based on your rational analysis.
   • Consider multiple possible responses and their potential outcomes.
   • Choose a response that aligns with Stoic virtues and your personal values.
   • Implement your chosen response mindfully, being fully aware of your actions.
   • Monitor your internal state as you respond, maintaining emotional equilibrium.

5. **Reflect and Learn**
   • After responding, take time to reflect on the entire process.⁰
   • Assess the effectiveness of your response: Did it align with Stoic principles?
   • Identify areas for improvement in your practice of using impressions.
   • Consider how you might handle similar impressions in the future.
   • Acknowledge and appreciate your progress in applying Stoic principles.

6. **Practice Visualization**
   • Regularly visualize challenging scenarios and mentally rehearse applying these steps.
   • Imagine potential impressions you might encounter and practice your responses.
   • Visualize Stoic role models and how they might handle various impressions.

7. **Seek Feedback and Guidance**
   • Discuss your practice with fellow Stoic practitioners or a mentor.
   • Be open to constructive criticism about your use of impressions.
   • Study Stoic texts regularly to deepen your understanding of proper impression management.

8. **Cultivate Consistency**
   • Strive to apply these steps consistently, even with seemingly minor impressions.
   • Recognize that mastery comes through repetition and patience.
   • Celebrate small victories in your practice to maintain motivation.

9. **Adapt and Refine**
   • As you gain experience, refine your approach to suit your individual needs and circumstances.
   • Be willing to adjust your techniques based on what works best for you.
   • Continuously educate yourself on new interpretations and applications of Stoic principles.

"By expanding on these steps, practitioners can develop a more nuanced and effective approach to making proper use of impressions, fostering greater alignment with Stoic philosophy in their daily lives."

Basic Stoic Principles

 

Basic Stoic Principles

Claude: 

"Based on the text (see link below) the most basic Stoic propositions can be summarized as follows: 

1. Emotions are bad.

2. Emotions are caused by false value judgments.

3. Changing false value judgments will eliminate  the (bad) emotions. 

"These core ideas are explicitly stated in the first excerpt: 

"Pared to their most basic level, the Stoics say:

1) Emotions are bad.

2) Emotions are caused by false value judgments.

3) Ergo, if we change those false value judgments, the (bad) emotions will go away." 

"Additionally, some other fundamental Stoic ideas that are consistently mentioned throughout the text include: 

4. Only internal things (beliefs, desires, will) are under our control.

5. Only virtue is good and only vice is evil.

6. External things are neither good nor evil.

7. Happiness (eudaimonia) is found exclusively in virtue.

8. Desires and emotions arise from beliefs about what is good or bad.

9. The goal of life is to achieve eudaimonia, which involves both acting morally and enjoying life. 

"These propositions form the foundation of Stoic philosophy as presented in the given text. They emphasize the importance of focusing on what is within one's control, cultivating virtue, and adjusting one's judgments about external events to achieve happiness and tranquility." 

Nine excerpts and full texts regarding Stoicism by Grant C. Sterling