What are the fundamental doctrines of Stoicism?

In a message to the International Stoic Forum, Grant Sterling disputes Chris Fisher's view of the fundamental Stoic doctrines.

On 8/12/17 10:35 AM, [Chris Fisher]  [stoics] wrote:
>
>
> Grant,
>
> I must admit I find it interesting that both of you and Guillaume spend
> so much effort attempting to discredit Stoic theory while simultaneously
> self-identifying as practicing Stoics. I admit if I found as much to

*****
Sorry about that. I meant to send a bunch of posts
over the last several months in which I made it clear that
I don't consider determinism, pantheism, and other metaphysical
doctrines to be part of Stoic theory. I guess I didn't
send them.
***



> disagree with in Stoicism as both of you appear to have discovered, I
> would either walk away from it as untenable or admit to some form of
> eclecticism that allowed me to remain intellectually consistent. You
> appear to like the word "Stoicism" while simultaneously denying the
> validity of fundamental aspects of the concept referred to as "Stoicism."

*****
See above.
***



> The fundamental aspects of Stoicism are well-defined. In fact, there is
> so much historical agreement on what is meant by the word "Stoicism"
> that numerous scholarly books have been written on the topic. Certainly,
> there was disagreement over the details of Stoic theory in ancient
> times, and that is reflected in the scholarly books on Stoicism.
> Nevertheless, there is fundamental agreement about the essential
> doctrines that define Stoicism as a distinct school of thought and
> differentiate it from other philosophies.

*****
I have never denied that scholars discussing the
_history of ancient philosophy_ have pointed out doctrines
that differentiated it from the other ancient doctrines
at the time. If we were discussing dead Stoicism, that
would be relevant.
The closest thing there is to consensus as to
how the term should be used _today_ is that "Stoicism"
is the name of an ethical theory. The fervor with which
you deny this fact in no way undermines it.
***



> On the topic of determinism, Chrysippus believed humans were free to
> choose their assents to impressions and thereby modify their character
> to the extent that their reactions to future impressions would also be
> modified. This is Chrysippus' theory of the cylinder. Therefore, the

*****
This is either manifestly false, or a manipulation of
words to obfuscate the issue.
Chrysippus' view is this:
I am born with a certain character. {I don't know--maybe
he thought this began at conception. I doubt it. Let's use birth,
in any case, which is simpler.} I have absolutely no control over what
character I am born with. Then I receive a stimulus. (Let's say
it's the doctor slapping my butt.) I respond in the only possible
way that I can respond to that stimulus at that time given the
character that I possess. This response will have certain effects
on my environment (including other people, who will react according
to their characters), and it may (or may not) alter my own character
slightly. Now I will receive another stimulus, which I will respond
to in the one and only one possible way which fits my character.
Etc. At no time am I "free to choose" my assent to an impression,
except in the compatibilist sense in which "Free to choose" is
defined (perversely) as "reacting based on my character". If my
character dictates that I assent to this impression, I will assent
to it. If my character dictates that I deny assent, I will deny
assent.
You're right that this isn't fatalism--Chrysippus responded
effectively to that objection. Fatalism would hold that all events
will happen whether I will them or not. Chrysippus holds that this is
not true--yet, he holds that whether I will it or not is dictated by
my character.
The cylinder doesn't get to 'freely choose' how to roll. It
rolls in the one and only one way that it can roll, given its shape.
but of course the cylinder will roll in a different way than, say,
a sphere, cube, or irregular mass. So my actions are shaped (forgive
the pun) by my character. Fatalism is false...but there's nothing in
the theory that I (or virtually anyone other than compatibilist
philosophers) would recognize as "free will".
Again, that's why the next cycle will be exactly like this
one. If I had genuine free will, I could choose differently next
time around.
***

> straw-man of fatalistic determinism does not apply. How can these
> apparently conflicting concepts be compatible? Therein is the mystery we
> have yet to resolve. Nevertheless, using the arguments of the opponents
> of the ancient Stoics to discredit Stoicism seems a little odd for
> someone who claims to be practicing Stoics. Like Guillaume, you are
> forcing your interpretation of determinism on us so you can argue it is
> invalid. The Stoic scholars do not interpret Chrysippus that way. Here
> is what Dorothy Frede wrote in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics:
>
> "When Chrysippus is concerned with the general picture, he
> emphasizes that nothing happens outside the all-encompassing
> ordinance of the causal order of fate so that nothing can turn out
> other than in accordance with that ineluctable order (Fat. 19). He
> then uses ‘antecedent cause’ as a term to cover all that happens in
> the natural order of things, so that there are no fortuitous events
> in nature. When it comes to the explanation of individual events,
> the perspective changes, and it turns out that ‘fate’ is not a
> uniform concatenation of necessitating antecedent causes, but rather
> a web that contains quite different elements with different
> functions and powers." (p. 199)
>
>
> Here is a lengthy excerpt from her conclusion:
>
> "If the Stoics, nevertheless, believe in divine providence, then it
> is the consequence of their cosmic optimism in the overall causal
> order, where everything is rational and therefore works for the
> best. For them the causal network is rational in the sense that
> there can be no better overall order. For this reason, they believe
> in the eternal identical recurrence of all things and events in
> every world cycle. The complicated causal network will always follow
> the same pattern, not because there is a divine plan laid out in
> heaven, but because it is the only rational development that things
> can take. Within this general order, many events may occur that
> thwart an individual’s purposes. Many human beings may lead lives
> that seem short, sad, and brutish. Although the Stoics were quite
> aware of that fact, it did not alter their faith that the overall
> cosmic economy works to the best for all inhabitants. If humans knew
> more than they do about the causal network of which they are a part,
> they would understand the rationale for seemingly senseless personal
> tragedies. Such cosmic optimism may not be to everyone’s taste. But
> this is what made the Stoic doctrine attractive to generations of
> adherents who regarded the faith in an overall divine order as the
> most plausible explanation of how the world works. They clearly saw
> it as a more plausible theory than the purely mechanistic view
> offered by the atomists or than the ‘partial teleology’ of the
> Peripatetics – not to speak of the quietism recommended by the
> sceptics who desisted from any attempt to make sense of the world.
> To what degree, then, is the contemporary stereotype justified
> that sees Stoic moral rigor and suppression of all emotions as the
> consequence of a ‘fateful’ resignation? It was the aim of this
> chapter to show that the Stoics were not only far from such
> resignation, but that they also had good reasons for recommending an
> active involvement in the world’s concerns. If they treated human
> passions as an impediment, it is not because they advocated
> acquiescence to fate’s ordinance. Rather, they believed that
> passions interfere with our ability to deal as reasonably as
> possible with the existing conditions and to follow our view of what
> is the best, most rational course to take – even if there is no
> guarantee of success. Stoic determinism, therefore, does not lead to
> resignation, but to a careful study of our capabilities and
> limitations." (p. 205)
>
>
> That is one example from a recognized scholar on the topic, and it
> demonstrates that mechanistic determinism is not the Stoic position. You
> have created a straw-man representation of Stoic determinism to argue

*****
I don't see anything in that picture which is
anti-mechanistic...the Stoics (on this reading, which is
not universally accepted) merely have a different sort of
mechanism. On this version, the Stoics simply believe that
"what is rational" happens of necessity. But even this is
exploiting an ambiguity in the word "rational". Consider
Himmler's decision to advocate the "Final Solution". Given
Himmler's character, it is in some sense "rational" for him
to make that decision. Yet in another sense it is manifestly
_not_ "rational", not the decision that someone who made only
true value judgments would make. Some of the Stoics may have
believed that somehow this act of Himmler's, when placed in
the context of everything else, produces optimal results
(or maybe, as Nigel believes, produces "the best results we
can get given the initial conditions of the universe over
which the gods have no control"). Nevertheless:
a) At that moment, it was impossible for Himmler to
have done anything other than what he did, (that's determinism)
and,
b) What he did was grossly immoral.
***


> against it. Additionally, you wrongfully attribute a couple of positions
> to me. First, you wrote:
>
> "First of all because it is apparent to me (if not apparent to Steve
> and Nigel and Chris and many others) that the Stoics were not
> themselves in agreement about the metaphysics."
>
>
> It is quite apparent to me the ancient Stoics disagreed on some details
> of metaphysics. However, there is ZERO evidence they disagreed about the
> providential nature of the cosmos. That is a defining doctrine of the
> Stoa. Using disagreement within the Stoa over metaphysical details to
> justify abandoning the Stoic conception of a providential cosmos is a
> fallacious argument. Second, you wrote:
>
> "Hence, Steve and Chris are not allowed to modify anything, not in
> the least tiny bit, or else the theory they are discussing is no
> longer Stoicism. "Stoicism" is absolutely fixed at the moment of
> Chrysippus' death, and cannot be altered."
>
>
> You are trying to force a false dichotomy on us. We are not forced to
> accept every dot and tittle of Stoicism to remain committed the holistic
> nature of the Stoic system. The fundamental doctrines, not the esoteric
> details, define the system. I would never agree to the assertion that

*****
How are the 'fundamental doctrines' defined? Is pantheism
a fundamental doctrine? Suppose I'm a Greek polytheist who
believes the gods are good, and therefore that the universe is
providential--can I be a Stoic? How about if my polytheism is
combined with free will libertarianism, but I think that the
gods dictate that all externals are providentially optimal (although
many internals, like Himmler's choice, are not.) Can I come and
play? Suppose that I'm a substance dualist--I think that minds
and matter are two separate kinds of reality. Can I be a Stoic?
Suppose I deny the existence of kataleptic impressions, but
I still that that one can have reasonable (though fallible) beliefs?
Suppose I think that externals are good and evil (health, let's say,
is good, while being immersed in poison gas is evil). Do I count?
Suppose I think that many emotional reactions are caused by biological
facts about our brains, and so cannot be eradicated by changing our
beliefs? Do I still count as a Stoic?
It seems to me that in your passionate attempt to push
back against militant atheistic "Stoics" on social media you have
brought to this List a doctrine in which _providential theism_
becomes the central defining tenet of Stoicism. And that seems
to me to be linguistically silly. And, more profoundly, it seems
to me that, like Singapore, your guns are pointed in the wrong
direction. Because this List is not a haven for militant atheistic
"Stoics" with an agenda to push. For years I have been on this List
and we have had good discussions of Stoic thought which rarely
centered on theism. There have been a handful of regular contributors
who were atheists (I miss Daniel, who was intelligent and fair-minded),
others who were monotheists and polytheists and pantheists and so
on...and many posters who never mentioned their views on god and
_never needed to_. It never came up. Now that List, sadly, seems
dead.
When I posted, years ago, my list of the defining doctrines
of Stoic thought, no-one objected that I had left off theology.
No-one noticed the omission. I'm not saying that everyone agreed
to every detail of my list, but everyone seemed to understand that
_something like that_ was what Stoicism was all about. Because
that's how people use the word "Stoicism" today, when they're
speaking in the context of a theory that living people might
adopt.
***


> nothing in Stoicism can be modified. In fact, I will argue the opposite:
> Stoicism is a holistic philosophical system that encourages the
> integration of new knowledge. Nevertheless, the system relies on
> fundamental doctrines that define it. If those doctrines are proven
> unsound, then Stoicism falls apart. That is what the ancient Stoics
> argued, and it is a fact many moderns appear quite willing to
> intentionally ignore. So far, science has not disproven any of those
> fundamental doctrines. Some of them may not be in vogue within the
> current scientific community, but that is another topic. The holistic
> Stoic system is adaptable; it is not infinitely malleable. If the Stoic
> conceptions of the cosmos as providential (physics) and epistemology
> (logic) are ever proven scientifically wrong, then Stoicism is dead as a
> holistic philosophy. Our understanding of these doctrines may change
> slightly based on new knowledge without throwing the baby out with the
> bathwater. However, if the science ever proves the universe is random or
> that our ability to understand the universe is an illusion or wishful
> thinking, then Stoicism will have been proven false and it should be
> abandoned as a reasonable philosophical way of life. To date, those
> Stoic doctrines are still open possibilities based on what we know.
> Therefore, the traditional conception of Stoicism, with minimal changes
> in the details, none of which affect the fundamental doctrines, remains
> viable in the twenty-first century.

*****
I totally agree. I just think you're totally wrong about
what those fundamental doctrines are.

Let me try one more time. Imagine someone says, "I
believe the following doctrines:

1) The goal of life it to obtain eudaimonia, which
means both to act morally and to enjoy life.
2) Emotions are caused by our beliefs about what is good
and what is bad--when I get something bad I experience anger,
grief, sadness, fear, etc.
3) My identity is defined as the rational part of
me, the part that chooses.
4) Therefore, only things that this part of me does
can really be good or bad for me. Anything external to my
will cannot be good or evil.
5) Therefore, the feelings that cut my joy in life
and which lead me astray in my actions (anger, fear, etc.)
are caused by _false_ beliefs about what has value.
6) I control my beliefs, and so by disciplining
myself to stop thinking of externals as being good or evil,
I will be able to become morally better and have more joy
in life."

Now this person says "What should I call my view of
the world"? I think the answer is easy, "You've discovered
Stoicism". Further, I think that if you asked 90% of all
people with some knowledge of philosophy, they'd say the
same. You and Steve and a tiny handful of other people would
have to say "I have no idea--do you believe in a providential
deity?" (And maybe you'd have to ask about other things, too--
I'm not clear.) This List hasn't needed that further question
in all its years of existence...and I don't see why it should
need it now.
***



>
> I wish you well,
>
> Chris

Regards,
Grant