For the time being entirely eliminate desire

In the following message to the International Stoic Forum Grant Sterling addressed questions about the desire for virtue, and preferrence.

On 10/22/2013 10:30 AM, Richard wrote:
>
> Does a Stoic let go of Desiring Virtue, Wisdom, etc., too
>
> Regards, Richard

*****
Epictetus recommends that "for the time being"
desire should be entirely eliminated. (Ench., #2)
That is, the person who is just beginning to make
progress will be unable to make the proper distinctions
and change their habits immediately, and so any desire
at all is likely to lead to passions. But, presumably,
after a while it will be acceptable to begin desiring
again, but only those desires that cannot fail and
cannot lead to vice--in other words, desires for
correct choices and judgments.
Anger is a passion. I don't remember any
Stoics speaking of it as the object of a desire.
(I suppose I could imagine someone desiring to
be angry, but such a desire would always be an
inappropriate one.) More commonly, anger _arises
from_ our desires. (I desire to be the exclusive
lover of some woman. Then I find out that she has
had sex with someone else. Hence, I become angry
(with her, or with the other person, or both, or
with myself, or with all women in the world, or
whatever). Since anger is a passion, no degree
of anger is ever appropriate. [This is one of the
few areas where the Stoics profoundly disagree with
Aristotle. Most of their other disagreements are
matters of degree.]

I agree with the distinction that has been
made between preferences and demands, but I do not
agree with the way that it has been presented.
Preferences and demands (to adopt that terminology
for the present) do not differ in _degree_, but
rather in _kind_. {I know that this is a controversial
matter on this List, but my own view hasn't changed.}

I enjoy roast turkey. Suppose that I go
to a restaurant, and I see turkey on the menu.
There is nothing wrong, on the Stoic view, with
the fact that I prefer the taste of turkey to the
taste of (almost anything else in the world), or
with the fact that I consequently choose to order
it. (I chose this example because I do in fact
like turkey, and it's not an unhealthy food that
would make the story more complicated.) Indeed,
it is probably completely beyond my control that
I have this preference.
But if I have not merely a preference for
turkey over the other things on the menu, but an
actual desire for turkey, then this will be demonstrated
if the waitress returns and says "I'm sorry, the
chef says we're out of turkey today". If my taste
for turkey is merely a preference, I will simply
choose from the menu my next-favorite food. If I
have a desire for turkey, then I will be unhappy
about not getting it--I will be disappointed, or
angry, or sad at not getting what I wanted.
There is a student in one of my classes that
I find extremely attractive. This is probably not
in my control. But if I actually desire her, then
I will be disappointed that she's not mine, or I
will invite her to my office to talk about the class
(when it's completely unnecessary), or I will be
upset when I see her flirting with another student,
etc.

Biological urges or preferences are not in
our control, and are not subject to praise or blame.
Even the Sage will have them. Even the Sage will
like some foods better than others, or be sexually
attracted to some people and not others. But
desire are very different things, though they may
often be built upon those same urges or preferences.
The difference shines through only when we don't
get what we prefer--if it was only a preference, we
go on through life completely undisturbed. If it
was a desire, we are unhappy (perhaps only slightly,
perhaps grievously). It is crucial to Stoic doctrine,
and it accords with my own experience, that we _do_
control whether or not we allow our urges to become
desires. I have had times when I dwelt on my thought
of how good the turkey would taste, or when I fantasized
about undressing an attractive woman...and I was
unhappy when I didn't get the turkey (or it wasn't
as good as I imagined) or didn't get the woman. And
I have had times when I ordered something at a
restaurant, or saw an attractive woman, and went on
with my life undisturbed when the object of my
preference could not be obtained.

Regards,
Grant