My "Action" Is _My _Choice

 

Grant Sterling email to the ISF.

Again, I am pressed for time so I will attempt
a broad response to multiple ideas....

        On the Stoic view, my "action" is _my _choice,
not anything I physically do.
        So, for example, today I agreed to go to lunch
with another professor.  We left the building, walked
to the restaurant, ate our lunch, and returned.  I
made the choice to promise to go, the choice to walk
out the door, the choice to continue walking toward
the restaurant, the choice to converse and say various
things, the choice to order one of the specials, etc.

        Each of those choices was inappropriate or
appropriate.  "Appropriate" means that it was rationally
correct.  My choice to agree to go was based on several
considerations--I needed to eat some food, the walk
would give me exercise, the weather was nice, the
restaurant has good food that is not too expensive,
the other professor is a colleague on my department
so the conversation was likely to be both enjoyable and
productive, etc.  Given these considerations, I think
it was correct...rational...appropriate of me to agree
to accompany him when he asked me to go.

        Having agreed to go with him, I needed to make
more (rational) choices.  I needed to choose a route to
the restaurant that would get us there in a reasonable
time without breaking laws or endangering ourselves
or other people.  I needed to make sure that I had cash
or a credit card to purchase my meal.  Etc.

        So I needed to:
        1) Identify rational goals to pursue.
        2) Select a rational course of action designed
to help realize these goals.

        If I had failed in either case--if going to
the restaurant to eat was immoral or irrational (imagine
that the restaurant was known to use its proceeds to
sponsor terrorist attacks, or that it was prohibitively
expensive, or was known to frequently serve spoiled or
poisoned food), or if my method of getting there was
immoral or irrational (the restaurant is 50 miles away
and I was planning on walking there during my lunch
hour, the sidewalks are covered with ice and are highly
dangerous, etc.) then my choices would be inappropriate.

        {To go beyond making appropriate choices and
achieve virtue, I must make appropriate choices _and_
those choices must be connected together in a settled
disposition to rationally evaluate all information that
comes to me.  Hence, one cannot perform _one_ virtuous
action--virtuous actions come when one has reached the stage
where one's inner rational development has been perfected.
No-one achieves that except the Sage.  I, personally, am
willing to be a bit more generous and call some actions
"virtuous", but most of the ancient Stoics would not.}

        So my action _is_ my choice, and as such it is
appropriate (or inappropriate) at the instant the choice
is made.  So it is utterly irrelevant if I am hit by a
car before I get there, or my colleague changes his mind
and decides not to go, or the restaurant turns out to be
closed when I get there, etc.  I have already made the
choice, and it is already appropriate or inappropriate.
By the same token, a choice to unnecessarily walk along
ice and dangerous sidewalks is inappropriate, even if we
manage to safely negotiate the dangers unharmed.

        If you'll forgive the odd comparison, the Stoic
attitude towards actions is very like Jesus' prayer
in the Garden of Gethsemene, as recorded in Luke.
"Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me;
yet not my will, but yours be done."  That is, Jesus is
saying "It seems that this outcome is best, but if God
wills otherwise then it must not be."  This is very similar
to the Stoic doctrine of choosing "with reservation".
The Stoic, in effect, chooses "the most rational means to
a certain goal _if_ God (the gods) will allow it to
occur".  All outcomes are out of our control and in the
hands of the gods--hence, it would be irrational as well
as productive of misery for us to assume that we can actually
produce any outcome.  So I should choose the means that
are most rational to select aiming at the goal which is
most rational to aim at _with the conscious recognition
that if the gods don't want it to happen, their will takes
precedence.  I choose a rational path to the restaurant,
but when we get there we find it closed.  I am not in the
least upset, because all along I was _not_ aiming to
produce the outcome of eating at that restaurant, but
rather aiming at the outcome of eating at that restaurant
_is possible_.  Now I recognize that it was not possible--
the gods did not will it.  Nevertheless all my choices were
correct at the time, and so I am content.  {Of course, now
I must make new choices about what to do now.}

        So:

1) Choose objectively correct, rational ends.
2) Choose rational means to those ends.
3) Make all those choices with the "reservation" that
these outcomes are never really under my control, and
so if the all-wise gods will otherwise "not my will
but their be done".

        Regards,
                Grant

PS:  On rare occasions it will be rational to do
some task in an inferior way.  For example, I
may have good reason to take a shower, but at the
same time recognize that I have a good reason to
spend no more than 5 minutes showering and dressing.
I cannot shower and dress thoroughly and well in
5 minutes...in this case, I'll have to shower and
dress somewhat sloppily.  But such cases are rare.

Who is a Stoic?

 

Grant Sterling message of 6/15/17 to the International Stoic Forum

On 6/14/17 3:05 PM, Steve Marquis [email deleted] [stoics] wrote:
>
>
> Kevin-
>
> Points of agreement:
> 1.Anyone is going to do exactly what they want.Not only is that not in
> our control we have no legitimate authority to think it should be.

> 2.This pursuit of who is a Stoic, the idea of arguing over the _label_
> of Stoicism, seems to me a pursuit of vanity and the ego.IOW a person
> who wants to thump their chest and self-identify with a bunch of labels
> needs to get a grip.What we want everyone to see us as _is not important_.

*****
I agree.
***

> Points of disagreement:
> 3.Despite the above there is good reason for identifying what this
> ‘philosophy is both from a historical perspective and a logical
> perspective (for us who wish to [practice], I didn’t even include the
> scholar’s goal).This has to do with trying to understand the genuine
> knowledge the system has.This is necessary if we are to actually
> maximize benefit from the practice.

*****
I disagree.
_From a scholar's perspective_, it is important to
identify what a philosophy was from an historical perspective.
From the perspective of someone who wants to practice
a view, it is important to understand what a view is from
a logical perspective.
I deny that these two interests necessarily cross-pollinate,
and I think there is an important third group.

If what I want to do is understand the writings of
Chrysippus*, then I need to know as much as possible about
what Chrysippus said. I need all fragments we have from his
work, as well as comments mentioning him by others. It
will be helpful for me to also know about the ideas of Zeno,
although it will be an open question whether Chrysippus agrees
with Zeno about everything, so I must be careful about extrapolating
Zenonian ideas into Chrysippus. I will (to the degree possible)
study all the ideas of Chrysippus--(using modern terms) ethics,
logic, epistemology, metaphysics (including theology and theories
about the material world and other things), political philosophy,
etc. I will be interested in the ways in which Chrysippus
tried to connect his ideas in one field with his ideas in the
others, if he did. I respect and admire the people
on this List who have greater knowledge of such things than I
have, and I seek to learn from them whenever possible.
From this point of view, obviously, there will be no
issue about whether I myself am or am not a Stoic--I'm studying
the views of Chrysippus, not myself. Indeed, the label "Stoic"
will have only two uses--1) to mark off people who regarded
themselves as part of a certain school, historically, and 2)
as a term of simplicity, so that I can say things like "The
Stoics believed [nota bene the past tense] x.y.z" instead of
having to constantly say "Zeno and Chrysippus and....believed
x,y,z".

If what I want to do is achieve eudaimonia, then it
will be sufficient for me to learn that there is a view which
holds that it is achieved by doing a,b,c. I don't need to know
who thought up this view, or when they lived, or what language
they used to express it, or what sports team they rooted for,
or what _other_ philosophical views they may have held. If
Zeno was a pedophile or Chrysippus loved tacos or Marcus Aurelias
wanted to dismantle the entire apparatus of the Roman Imperial
State and convert it into a democracy (see the movie version of
MA in "Gladiator") that's all very interesting historically, but
unless we can show that the road to eudaimonia they proposed
required illicit sex, Mexican food, or political democracy, those
things are irrelevant. The historian (sans phrase) will mention
those things, the historian of philosophy (see above) will mention
only the third, but the person seeking eudaimonia need not care
about any of them.
Now if there is a logical connection between ideas such
that my a certain path to achieving eudaimonia requires that
I have certain beliefs about (whatever), then that's a different
story. Because I think we agree that Stoicism is a cognitive
doctrine--that is, it teaches that one can achieve eudaimonia
only by adopting a certain set of _beliefs_. (There are many
people who think that one can achieve happiness by doing certain
things [meditating, having a lot of sex, following your dreams
wherever they lead you, being in love, etc.] regardless of what
you believe.) So if the beliefs that lead to euadimonia (externals
are neither good not evil, etc.) require pantheism, or at least
some-kind-of-theism, or belief in objective value, or belief in
kataleptic impressions, or belief in democracy, then I need to
study and think about those beliefs--if not, I don't.
For this person, there is no need at all to use the
word "Stoic".

Now there is a third group, somewhere in between. These
are philosophers who study different philosophical ideas. They
typically have their own beliefs about which theories are true
(and they typically try to act in ways consistent with those
beliefs), but they are interested in and spend time studying
other possible views as well. I am not talking about historians
of philosophy (they're in group 1) who are discussing what
past thinkers believed. I'm talking about people who are attempting
to understand which philosophical views are true (which requires
understanding the various options). Almost all such people believe
that the truth about philosophy was not achieved by any one historical
figure.
For these philosophers, the word "Stoic" is useful as
a tool of simplicity to mark off a certain set of ideas. You
want to be able to say "Fred's a Utilitarian, Juan's an Aristotelian,
and Niko is a Stoic". {Or, "Fred's an Empiricist, Juan's a
Skeptic, and Niko's a Rationalist", etc., etc., etc.} And the
fact is, as I have pointed out before:
a) like it or not, they have chosen to use the word "Stoic"
to refer exclusively to a set of ethical/psychological doctrines, and
b) if we refuse to use the word "Stoic" for those doctrines,
we'll just have to invent some new word, because those doctrines
form a distinct and interesting set of ethical doctrines, and
c) this usage of the word "Stoic" is the second-most common
usage of the word, behind only the "Stoic means someone who doesn't
show their emotions" usage.
Now the vast majority of these people aren't claiming to be
"Stoics" themselves. They're using the word to label a theory that
they reject. So this isn't a matter of ego.

I, personally, straddle all three groups. My father is
an historian (not of philosophy), and I love history, and I think
it's interesting to learn about Chrysippus purely as an historical
investigation. And I do want to achieve eudaimonia, and to practice
the doctrine that I think will help me get closer to that goal. And
I love to study philosophical ideas, even ones that I disagree with.
Maybe there are few people on this List like me. Certainly more than
one person has explicitly said that they don't care what academic
philosophers think, or do, or how they use words. [Although by no
means all people in the third group are academic philosophers by
profession.] But I see no reason why the way the first group uses
the word "Stoic" must take priority over the way the third group
uses it. Indeed, within the realm of _ideas_ I think that philosophers
should ordinarily have pride of place ahead of mere historians if
one must choose.

Now if someone can indeed show that the beliefs which
form the core of Stoic thought from this third perspective must
include theological beliefs, that would be very interesting. But
I haven't seen it done. I haven't had time to look at all the
articles Chris listed, but so far I have only seen arguments of
the form "this or that ancient Stoic in fact connected their ethical
views to their theology" or "the specific phrasing 'according to
Nature' requires explication in terms of Stoic theology." The latter
doesn't interest me, because Stoic ethics can be explaining entirely
without using that particular phrase. The former doesn't interest me,
because any good philosopher (yes, there are bad ones) will connect
their ideas in one field with their idea in another. I know two people
who are advocates of Democracy as a political doctrine. One is an
atheist, one a monotheist. Both of them try to tie their political
views to their theology. But it is clear to me that their _political_
ideas are essentially identical. By the same token, there are people
on this List with different theologies than mine, but who agree with
me in all the critical ideas that philosophers use to label "Stoics".
I think that Steve is a Stoic, and I'm a Stoic, and probably Chris
is a Stoic and Dave and so on.

Again, anyone on this List who wishes to lay out for me
an argument showing how one cannot consistently believe that
Virtue is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia, that externals
are indifferent, that emotions are caused by false value impressions,
etc., without believing in Providence, or in pantheism, or whatever,
I am quite interested in seeing their argument. I'll encourage you
to write a philosophical paper arguing for a revision of the usual
understanding of Stoicism _as a contemporary theory-type_. But
I haven't seen it yet, and I don't expect to.
***

> 4.As part of a group of people who are interested in a careful reasoning
> approach to life I would think we should naturally oppose those who wish
> to abscond with the pedigree of any system based on reason for their own
> ego labeling purposes with not a care that they just trashed the logical
> coherence of the system in doing so.It seems to me there is an
> obligation on those of us who actually have learned a bit about Stoicism
> to promote the genuine article.The success of that promotion is not up
> to us of course.

*****
I agree. If you can show that stoic ethics requires
certain theological or physical beliefs for its logical coherency,
show me why.
***

> I mean don’t you feel the same way?And not just about Stoicism.There is
> this relativistic equal diversity dumbing down of knowledge in today’s
> culture.No one can be wrong about anything.To claim someone is wrong is
> politically incorrect and most insensitive.This entire movement really
> is IMO anti-truth (I have to back Grant’s insistence on objective
> morality because of this even though we disagree on other things).Truth
> hurts sometimes but truth, I would argue, is how we first survive then
> flourish.Correct reason, which I would assume everyone here is somewhat
> interested in, is opposed to incorrect reason.There just isn’t a way I
> can accept truth and falsehood as equally viable.Can you?
> So this debate has at its roots something very fundamental.Here is a
> slippery slope for you:if those who are interested in Stoicism are OK
> with false variations of their own system who then will stand for truth
> at all anywhere?

*****
Obviously, I think my variety of Stoicism is the
true one. :)
I am totally with you in rejecting relativism, and
rejecting the wishy-washy idea that everyone is right (or, at
least, no-one is wrong). I emphatically reject the kind of
ecumenicalism that says that all religions or all philosophies
are really saying the same thing, or that if a philosophical
view feels good to you then that's all that matters. Philosophy
ought to be the pursuit of truth.
The problem is that some people on this list insist
that the historian's usage of the word "Stoic" (or, worse
yet, Chrysippus' use of the word) is somehow to be enshrined
as the true usage of the word, and everyone like me needs to
wear an scarlet A on their clothes whenever we utter the word.
They have pointed out, truly, that some dead Greeks took very seriously
the ways they connected ethics to physics. (I once again point
out that they never mention kataleptic impressions. Do you
believe in those, Steve? Must you therefore qualify the word
"Stoic" every time you use it? Why haven't we been treated to
long discourses demonizing people who deviate from true Stoic
"logic"?) I have not denied it. When you, or I, or Long
investigates the views of the dead Greek Stoics, we should be
all means investigate those connections. But if the question
is "what does one need to believe in order to be reasonably
called a "Stoic" _today_?" then the philosopher's way of
using words is the relevant one.
***

> Live well,
> Steve

Regards,
Grant

* #49 "When someone acts grand because he understand and
can expound the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself "If
Chrysippus had not written unclearly, this man would have
nothing to be proud of".

Making correct use of impressions, training and character development

This is from a message of 06/20/2018 from Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum:

"I receive impressions. For the moment, let [us] take
these as being out of our control. Those impressions are
cognitive, propositional--they are not uninterpreted raw data,
but rather ideas that claim that the world is a certain way.
I do not see a collection of colors and patterns--I "see"
my backpack sitting on the chair in front of my desk. Some
of these impressions are value-neutral (as that one is--there
is nothing good or bad about my backpack being on my chair).
But other impressions have a value component. Suppose that I
remember having left my backpack on the floor when I left--
I might now have the impression "my backpack is on my chair,
which means someone has intruded on my office, which is a very
bad thing!"
As I said, for the time being we are assuming that
these impressions are not in our control. But what _is_ in our
control is how we react to them. We can assent, or not assent.
That is, we can accept that a given impression is _true_, or
reject it as unproven or false. (Rejecting it as false involves
both refusing to assent to the impression AND formulating a
new idea (the opposite of the impression) and assenting to
that.) A few minutes ago, I assented to the impression that
my backpack was on the chair. I didn't have to, but I did.
The process of assenting is cognitive (it's something
that happens in the conscious mind), but is very seldom
explicit. By that I mean that, for example, although I assented
to the impression that my backpack was on the chair, at no time
did I formulate the explicit mental thought "It seems to me that
my backpack is on the chair. Should I assent to that impression?
yes, I think I will." My acceptance of the impression was so
simple and momentary that it seems as though things just passed
directly from impression to belief. But that isn't the way it works.
(Imagine a scenario where my backpack being there would be very
unexpected, and you can see how it would be possible for me to
question what my senses seem to be saying. I _could_ question them
even now (and really committed skeptics about the senses might be
able to do this in ordinary cases), I just don't.)
If I refuse to assent to an impression, nothing happens.
No emotion, no action, nothing.
If I assent to an impression with a value component, then
a desire will result. I will desire that the "good" thing happen,
or desire that the "bad" thing not happen. If the impression says
that this outcome has _already_ occurred, then a emotion will result
(in the example above, the likely emotions are anger or fear):
positive feelings of mental enjoyment if the impression was that
something good had happened, negative feelings if it was "bad".
Further, this may lead to another impression, assenting to
which will lead me to some course of action. For example, I might have
the further thought "It would be good for me to go find out who
has been in my office", and if I assent to this further idea then
I will stalk angrily down the hall to demand an explanation.

All of this sounds complicated, but it boils down to this:
_everything_ on the Stoic view comes down to assent to impressions.
Choosing whether or not to assent to impressions is the only thing
in our control...and yet, everything critical to leading the best
possible life is contained in that one act. All our desires, all
our emotions, all our actions are tied to assenting to impressions.
If I get my assents right, then I have guaranteed eudaimonia. If
I get one wrong, I cannot have eudaimonia.

One final thing. I said above that we would assume that
the original impressions are not in our control. Directly, that's
true. But indirectly, it isn't, for two reasons:

a) Our impressions are closely connected to our character.
If you reject an impression, then it makes that same type of
impression less common and weaker. If you assent to it, it becomes
more common and stronger. If it seems to me that it would be good to
punch someone in the nose for insulting me, and I assent, then it
becomes more likely that the next time something annoys me it will
seem to me that I should lash out at someone, and that 'seeming' will
be more compelling. If I refuse to assent, if I tell myself "hitting
them won't solve my problems", then I will have fewer "I should punch
someone" impressions, and they will be weaker (more easily resisted).
So, in this way, by being careful with our acts of assent (which are
in our control), the impressions that we receive will be altered over
time. This is a long process, but is critical for the Stoics--this
is building a virtuous character. The Sage is simply someone who has
controlled their assents so carefully for such a long period of time
that they no longer receive the false value impressions (that externals
are good or bad) in the first place.

b) While our impressions are not in our control, we do have
the ability (suggested in above examples) to formulate new ideas.
I receive the impression "Someone has been in my office--that's a
very bad thing." If I manage to refuse assent to this impression,
I can choose to formulate an alternative impression--"it seems
that someone has been in my office, but that is neither good nor
bad." This proposition I can correctly assent to. I receive the
impression "I should punch this guy in the nose". If I reject
it, I can formulate some alternative idea. One of my favorite passages
in Epictetus is where he says that if you hear that someone has been
criticizing you, don't try to defend yourself, but instead say
"Obviously he doesn't know my other faults, or he wouldn't have
mentioned these." I wonder how much gossip and how many feuds would
have been prevented if people reacted like that.

So what we should be striving for is:
a) Don't assent to impressions that depict externals as
either good or evil.
b) If we fail 'a', don't assent to subsequent impressions
that depict immoral responses to the good or bad thing as being
appropriate.
c) Consciously formulate true propositions regarding the
lack of value of external things. As far as possible, do this in
advance. Remind yourself that your own life and health are neither
good nor evil, as are the lives and health of those around you.
The same for your job, etc. Whether or not you have done so in advance,
try to do so at the time. "I have pictures here of your wife having
sex with another man." Remind yourself: 'my wife's actions are not
in my control. They are neither good nor evil. My happiness is in
my control, not enslaved to the actions of others.'
d) Consciously formulate true action propositions. "I
should report truthfully to my boss regarding the sales numbers
from the last quarter: truth telling is virtuous, and I have a
duty to act faithfully at work. If my boss fires me, I should
remember that my job is an external, neither good not evil."
By paying attention to preferred and dispreferred indifferents,
and to the duties connected with my various roles in life, I can
recognize what it would actually be correct for me to do in
each situation. Bring this consciously to mind, and assent to
it.
e) When you do act correctly, assent to the proposition
that you have done a good thing--then you will experience Joy
(or at least proto-Joy.)
f) Over time, my character will change such that I
no longer have the false value impressions in 'a' and 'b',
and 'c' and 'd' and 'e' become routine. This is eudaimonia--
good feelings combined with virtuous actions.

Regards,
Grant

Core Stoicism

 

Core Stoicism

by Grant Sterling

[A post to the International Stoic Forum, September 19, 2005.]


I won't have much time to post for a
while, as I am starting to get swamped at work.
But here's something for everyone to chew on....
[I have to go to class now, so I don't have time to
edit this. Please forgive any howling errors.]

The question came up as to how to explain
the basics of Stoicism without technical
terminology. Daniel has given us his version,
which I find to be an admirable beginning. Here
is my own version--or, at any rate, the skeleton
of my version. Obviously all the points below
would need to be spelled out. I offer as the only
virtue of my version the fact that I have tried to
show how the ideas of Stoicism are connected--
how they flow. More on this below.

Th = theorem The basic principles of
Stoicism, for which I give no argument here.
Some of these may be true theorems [unprovable
fundamental postulates defensible only by
appeal to intuition of their truth], some are
empirical propositions the Stoics thought
were obvious, some are propositions for which
a proof might be offered but it's too complicated
for me to bother with today.
I have not tried to make this strictly
deductive. I leave this as an exercise for the
Spinozists and logicians on the List.

Section One: Preliminaries
Th 1) Everyone wants happiness.
Th 2) If you want happiness, it would be irrational
to accept incomplete or imperfect happiness
if you could get complete [continual, uninterrupted]
happiness.
2*) Complete happiness is possible. [To be proven
below.]

Section Two: Negative Happiness
Th 3) All human unhappiness is caused by having
a desire or emotional commitment [I will henceforth
say "desire" for simplicity] to some outcome,
and then that outcome does not result.

4) Ergo, if you desire something which is out
of your control, you will be subject to possible
unhappiness. If you desire many things out
of your control, the possibility of complete happiness
approaches zero.
5) By 4, 2*, and Th2, desiring things out of your
control is irrational [if it is possible to control your
desires].

Th 6) The only things in our control are our
beliefs and will, and anything entailed by our
beliefs and will.
Th 7) Desires are caused by beliefs (judgments)
about good and evil. [You desire what you judge
to be good, and desire to avoid what you judge to
be evil.]
8) Ergo, Desires are in our control.
9) By 5 and 8, desiring things out of our control
is irrational.

Th 10) The only thing actually good is virtue, the
only thing actually evil is vice.
11) Ergo, since virtue and vice are types of acts
of will, they are in our control.
12) Ergo, things that are not in our control [externals] are
never good or evil.
13) [cf 9, above] Desiring things out of our control is
irrational, since it involves false judgment.

14) Ergo, if we value only virtue, we will both judge truly
and be immune to all unhappiness.

Section Three: Positive Happiness or Appropriate
Positive Feelings
15) Ergo, if we truly judge that virtue is good, we will
desire it.
Th 16) If you desire something, and achieve it, you
will get a positive feeling.
17) Ergo, if we correctly judge and correctly will, we
will have appropriate positive feelings as a result.
Th 18) Some positive feelings do not result from desires,
and hence do not result from judgments about value.
[E.g., the taste of a good meal, the sight of a beautiful
sunset, etc.]
19) Ergo, such positive feelings are not irrational or
inappropriate. [Though if we desire to achieve them
or desire for them to continue beyond the present,
then that would involve the judgment that they are
good, and hence that would be irrational.]
Th 20) The universe is, or is governed by, Nature,
Providence, God or the gods. [Different Stoics
approach this idea differently.]
Th 21) That which is Natural, or is governed by
Providence, God, or the gods is exactly as it
should be. [Zeus is just, or however you wish
to express this.] {Nota bene that this produces
a problem for those stoics who are strict
determinists, since it would mean that even
acts of vice were somehow correct, and are not
actually in our control in any important sense.
But I don't think strict determinism about internal
states is a core belief of Stoicism.}
Th 22) If you regard any aspect [or, better, all
aspects] of the world as being exactly as it
should be, you will receive appropriate positive feelings.
23) Ergo, the Stoic will be positively happy, will
have positive feelings, in at least three ways: appreciation
of his own virtue, physical and sensory pleasures, and
the appreciation of the world as it is. The last of those
three is something that the Stoic could experience
continually, every waking second, since at every waking
second one can perceive something as being what it
is, and hence what it should be.

Section Four: Virtue
Th 24) In order to perform an act of will, the act of will
must have some content. The content is composed
of the result at which one aims.
Th 25) Some things are appropriate objects at which to
aim, although they are not genuinely good.
Th 26) Some such objects are things like life [our own,
or others'], health, pleasure, knowledge, justice, truth-
telling, etc.
Th 27) Virtue consists of rational acts of will, vice of
irrational acts of will.
28) Ergo, any act that aims at an [external] object of desire is
not virtuous, since all desires [for externals] are irrational.
29) Ergo, virtue consists of the pursuit of appropriate
objects of aim, not the pursuit of the [external] objects of our
desires. Such virtuous acts will give us good feelings
[by 17], and since we have no desires regarding
the actual outcome, they will never produce unhappiness
for us.

So now the threads of the sections can be tied
together. Someone who judges truly will never be unhappy,
will in fact experience continual uninterrupted appropriate
positive feelings, and will always act virtuously. Anyone
would agree that someone who led a life like that was
happy. Judgment is in our control. Hence, not only is
prefect continual happiness possible, it is actually in our
control--we can actually guarantee it by simply judging
correctly, and acting on those judgments.

One final comment. Several people on the List
have suggested, at one time or another, that they
regarded Stoicism as a body of doctrines from which
they would extract only those that they wished to use
in combination with some other set of ideas. Of course this
is perfectly appropriate--one should never accept everything
a theory says if one has reason to believe some elements
of that theory are false, nor should one reject all of a theory
if one has reason to believe some parts of it are correct. But
there is a danger to Smorgasbord Stoicism. I have tried to
indicate above that the core ideas of Stoicism interconnect
in important ways. Denying one principle may undermine
support for others, and the very things in Stoicism one
sought to preserve may fall apart. For example, one could
deny theorem 20, or 21, and this would undermine a
great deal of the Stoic view of positive happiness, but would
not obvious damage the views on virtue or avoiding unhappiness
too seriously. But if one denies that emotions or desires are
the result of false judgments [Th 7], then 8, 9, 13, 14, 28, and 29
all collapse. You lose the idea that it is irrational to desire [external]
things, which means you cannot control your happiness,
and that means you lose the argument that all desiring 
acts [of externals] are not virtuous. So denying that one theorem makes the whole house of cards, regarding both virtue and happiness, crumble into dust. So if you wish to pick and choose among the Theorems, be very careful to look at what supports what.

Regards,
Grant [who probably will be limited to short
posts for a few weeks--much to everyone's relief]

Definition of a (modern) Stoic

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stoics/message/23882

Re: [stoics] Definition of a (modern) Stoic

At 01:16 PM 3/3/2009, Steve Simmonds wrote:

>A question for those on this list who consider themselves stoics

>...what definition do you use to determine yourself to be a stoic?

>

>Are there a set of essential requirements? if so, what are they?

>

>All answers welcome.

>

>Steve S.

[Grant C. Sterling:]

"This is off the top of my head, so I may have missed something:

I think a Stoic is someone who holds (most or) all of the

following beliefs:

1) Happiness (eudaimonia) is to be found exclusively in Virtue.

2) Things not in our control are neither good nor evil.

3) The only things we control are inner events such as our

beliefs, desires, and act of will.

4) Emotions (or passions, if you prefer) arise from (false) beliefs that

external things have value.

5) Virtue (or virtue and certain things that can be attained only by

those with virtue) is the only genuine good, and vice the only

genuine evil.

I think anyone who held all 5 of those beliefs could

reasonably be called a Stoic, and maybe someone who

held almost all of them. I don't think anyone who rejects

most of these 5 could be reasonably called a Stoic. You

might add a sixth, along the lines of "No-one should be

distressed by any external occurrance", but I think that

is derivable from the 5 above.

Certainly classical Stoicism could add many other

principles (pantheism/panentheism, materialism, determinism,

divine Providence, assent to appearances, etc.), but none of

them seem to me to be as critical to whether someone

counts as a Stoic as these. I don't think, for example, that

Epictetus was a pantheist, and I'm not sure he was a

materialist or determinist {he might have been, but I can't

tell}, but he was surely a Stoic.

I'm not a pantheist, materialist, or determinist, FWIW.

Some people on this List are" [Grant C. Sterling].

Regards,

Grant