The Logical Dependencies in Core Stoicism Grant C. Sterling, ISF
The Logical Dependencies in Core Stoicism
Grant C. Sterling, ISF September 19, 2005. Dependency map: Dave Kelly, 2026. Prose rendering: Claude.
Sterling’s own labels distinguish three types of propositions: theorems (Th) — foundational postulates not argued for within this document; derived propositions (numbered without Th) — conclusions derived from prior propositions; and one special proposition (2*) — a claim to be proven later in the document. The dependency structure follows his own “Ergo” and “By X” citations.
Foundational Theorems
Not derived from anything within this document; jointly required by the derived propositions that follow.
- Th 1 — Everyone wants happiness.
- Th 2 — If you want happiness it would be irrational to accept incomplete happiness if complete happiness is available.
- Th 3 — All unhappiness is caused by desire for an outcome that does not result.
- Th 6 — The only things in our control are beliefs and will.
- Th 7 — Desires are caused by beliefs about good and evil.
- Th 10 — The only thing actually good is virtue; the only thing actually evil is vice.
- Th 16 — If you desire something and achieve it you get a positive feeling.
- Th 18 — Some positive feelings do not result from desires.
- Th 20 — The universe is governed by Nature, Providence, or God.
- Th 21 — That which is Natural or governed by Providence is exactly as it should be.
- Th 24 — An act of will must have content — the result at which one aims.
- Th 25 — Some things are appropriate objects to aim at, though not genuinely good.
- Th 26 — Such objects include life, health, pleasure, knowledge, justice, truth-telling.
- Th 27 — Virtue consists of rational acts of will; vice of irrational acts of will.
Derived Propositions
Each derived proposition states what it depends on.
2* — Complete happiness is possible. [To be proven — resolved at the document’s conclusion when the threads are tied together.]
4 — Desiring things out of your control makes you subject to possible unhappiness. [From Th 3]
5 — Desiring things out of your control is irrational, if it is possible to control your desires. [From 4, 2*, Th 2]
8 — Desires are in our control. [From Th 6, Th 7]
9 — Desiring things out of our control is irrational. [From 5, 8]
11 — Virtue and vice are in our control. [From Th 10 — virtue and vice are acts of will; from Th 6 — will is in our control]
12 — Externals are never good or evil. [From Th 10, 11]
13 — Desiring things out of our control involves false judgment. [From 9, 12]
14 — If we value only virtue we will judge truly and be immune to all unhappiness. [From 12, 13]
15 — If we truly judge that virtue is good, we will desire it. [From Th 10, Th 7]
17 — If we correctly judge and correctly will, we will have appropriate positive feelings. [From 15, Th 16]
19 — Positive feelings not resulting from desire are not irrational or inappropriate. [From Th 18 — they do not involve false value judgment]
22 — If you regard all aspects of the world as exactly as they should be, you receive appropriate positive feelings. [From Th 21]
23 — The Stoic will have positive feelings in at least three ways: appreciation of his own virtue, physical and sensory pleasures, and appreciation of the world as it is. [From 17, 19, 22]
28 — Any act that aims at an external object of desire is not virtuous, since all desires for externals are irrational. [From 9, Th 27]
29 — Virtue consists of pursuit of appropriate objects of aim, not pursuit of external objects of desire. Such virtuous acts give good feelings and never produce unhappiness. [From Th 25, Th 26, 28, 17]
The Critical Dependency Chain
The spine of the document. Three chains converge at 13 and 14.
Th 3 → 4 → 5 (with 2*, Th 2) → [requires 8] → 9 → 13 → 14
Th 6 + Th 7 → 8
Th 10 → 11 → 12 → 13
Everything in Sections Three and Four is downstream of 14.
The Most Load-Bearing Theorem
Sterling identifies it himself in the closing note: Theorem 7. Denying it collapses 8, 9, 13, 14, 28, and 29 simultaneously — destroying both the unhappiness argument and the virtue argument. Theorem 7 is the structural keystone. Everything that makes the system action-guiding rather than merely metaphysical runs through it.
The Isolable Section
Sterling also notes that Theorems 20 and 21 can be denied without serious damage to the virtue and unhappiness arguments. Section Three’s Providence strand — 20, 21, 22, 23 — is structurally separable. It adds a third route to positive feelings but is not load-bearing for the core ethical conclusions at 14 and 29.
Dependency map: Dave Kelly, 2026. Source: Core Stoicism, Grant C. Sterling, ISF September 19, 2005. Prose rendering: Claude.
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