Stoicism, Correspondence Theory of Truth, and Objective Moral Facts
Two posts by Grant C. Sterling. First: Stoics Yahoo Group, August 20, 2015, thread “Re: Regarding Criterion of Truth / Cognitive Impressions.” Second: International Stoic Forum, January 10, 2022, thread “Re: What is Truth?” Preserved by Dave Kelly, 2026. Layer: Theoretical Core — Philosophical Commitments. Attribution: Sterling.
Editorial Note — Dave Kelly
These two messages together constitute Sterling’s most direct statement of the correspondence theory of truth as the only defensible criterion and his argument that Stoicism cannot stand without it. The August 2015 message establishes the core claim: correspondence with reality is the only criterion of truth; the Stoics were pure realists in this regard; and the entire revisionary project of Stoicism — the claim that value impressions are false — depends on there being objective facts for impressions to correspond to or fail to correspond to. Remove the correspondence criterion and there is no basis for calling value impressions false rather than merely culturally contingent or personally inconvenient. The January 2022 message adds the epistemological clarification that Scruton’s objection to correspondence theory fails because it demands a definition of “fact” when “fact” is already the fundamental ontological category — at some point something must be accepted as foundational. This is where correspondence theory and foundationalism meet: both require that some categories be accepted as primitive rather than defined in terms of something more fundamental.
Message One: Correspondence Is the Only Criterion of Truth
Grant C. Sterling to the Stoics Yahoo Group, August 20, 2015. Thread: “Re: Regarding Criterion of Truth / Cognitive Impressions.” Responding to a challenge to the objectivity of the criterion of truth and the concept of cognitive impressions.
A) I am, in this thing like almost all others, a philosophical dinosaur.
The only “criterion of truth” that I recognize is correspondence with the facts — correspondence with reality. I reject utterly any notion of “truth” wherein something can be “true” and yet not match reality. And I am an authentic Stoic in this regard — the Stoics were pure realists in this regard.
You say that you are not prepared to accept the idea of an objective “what is”. But this threatens the very basis of Stoicism. Because the foundation of Stoicism is the notion that things that are not in our control are neither good nor evil — that Virtue is the only good and Vice the only evil. These are taken to be objective facts.
Pain and death and defeat and unemployment and rejection (etc.) all seem to be bad things. “Common sense” says they are bad things. Our pre-existing notions say that they are bad things. Stoicism says that nevertheless they are not — all these impressions are false, and we must radically revise the way we see the world to embrace the truth. If we undermine the claim that there are objective facts, it is hard to see what justifies us in radically revising our beliefs.
B) The Stoics do not hold that the Cognitive Impression is the criterion of truth — they hold that it is the basis of knowledge. Those are utterly different, although related, ideas.
Consider: “The number of molecules of O(2) in this Pepsi can is even” and “The number of molecules is odd.” Either the first or the second is true, and the other is false. It is absolutely impossible for any human being to know which is which. Having a cataleptic impression guarantees truth, because a cataleptic impression by definition always corresponds to the facts. But billions of sentences are true for which no one has a cataleptic impression.
C) For a sentence to be known to be true, one must have a clear understanding of the terms in the sentence. So in order to know the truth of “I see a chair,” you must have a clear understanding of chairs. An impression held by someone who lacks that clear understanding cannot be cataleptic with respect to that category — but this does not undermine the existence of cataleptic impressions as such. Many things we believe are things that we cannot or do not know, because we do not have a cataleptic impression of them. I believe that Barack Obama is President of the U.S., but I do not have a cataleptic impression that this is true, so I do not “know” it. I nevertheless believe that it is objectively true — I assent to the (non-cataleptic) impression that it is the case.
Regards, Grant
Message Two: Correspondence Theory and the Fundamental Ontological Category
Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum, January 10, 2022. Thread: “Re: What is Truth?” Responding to the claim, based on Scruton, that trying to decide what is true is futile because the concept of fact cannot itself be defined.
In order to define some term informatively, there need to be other, more fundamental notions that you can appeal to.
Scruton’s fallacy is his failure to see that at some point this process must stop. He has answered the question “What is Truth?” completely — truth is correspondence of a statement with the facts. Then he demands a definition of “fact”, and is frustrated that none is forthcoming. But that is because he demands too much — he has made “facts” into the fundamental ontological notion, and is then frustrated when he finds that he cannot define it in terms of more fundamental notions. But that is not because “truth” cannot be defined — it is because he cannot see that at some point something must be accepted as fundamental.
(The Stoics never used the cataleptic impression as a criterion of truth — they used it as a criterion of knowledge. That is very different. And interpretations of Stoicism exist that are immune to the standard objections, although some of the Stoics may not have seen the problems. But, again, this only connects to knowledge, not truth.)
Regards, GCS
Corpus Note — Dave Kelly
These two messages together establish the three most important claims Sterling makes about correspondence theory as a philosophical commitment.
First, from the 2015 message: correspondence with reality is the only criterion of truth, and this is the authentic Stoic position. The Stoics were pure realists. Any theory of truth that permits something to be true without matching reality is rejected without qualification. This is Sterling’s foundational epistemological stance, and it is not tentative or hedged.
Second, from the 2015 message: the entire revisionary project of Stoicism depends on correspondence theory. The claim that value impressions are false — that pain, death, defeat, and rejection are not genuine evils despite appearing to be so — requires that there be objective facts for impressions to correspond to or fail to correspond to. If there are no objective facts, Stoicism cannot call these impressions false. It can only say they are inconvenient, or culturally contingent, or personally unhelpful. The normative force of the Stoic revision is entirely carried by the claim that the impressions are factually wrong, not merely psychologically uncomfortable. Remove correspondence theory and that claim has no ground.
Third, from the 2022 message: the demand that “fact” itself be defined is a regress demand that misunderstands foundational categories. Correspondence theory defines truth in terms of facts. Facts are the fundamental ontological category. At some point something must be accepted as fundamental and not further defined. This is the junction between correspondence theory and foundationalism: both commitments require accepting certain categories as primitive rather than derived. The objector who demands a definition of “fact” is making the same error as the objector who demands a justification for Theorem 10 from something more fundamental — both fail to see that foundational categories terminate the regress rather than extending it.
Sources: Stoics Yahoo Group, “Re: Regarding Criterion of Truth / Cognitive Impressions,” August 20, 2015; International Stoic Forum, “Re: What is Truth?”, January 10, 2022. Author: Grant C. Sterling. Preserved by Dave Kelly, 2026.
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