From "The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus" by Phillip de Lacy:
[6] "The sixth discourse shows how the logical relation of consequence is used in ethics. Epictetus picks up from the second discourse the statement that man is endowed with reason. By the work of providence, this endowment, like every other, has its proper function and object. The objects of reason are appearances. Its function is not only to receive them but to select, abstract, add together, combine them, and pass from one to the other" (117).
"We attain our end only if we use appearances according to the consequences of our endowment (_akolouthos_te_kataskene). Thus the ethical principle of the second discourse, that we should preserve our character, and the formulation of ethics as the rational use of appearances have now been combined by the means of the logical relation of consequence" (117).
"Epictetus says also that action in accord with consequences must be in accord with method (_kata_tropon) and order (_tetagmenos_)" (117).
"For man is endowed with the powers necessary to endure any hardship. Hence the enduring of any hardship is merely a form of acting according to the consequence of our endowment. Hardship is a specific matter (_hule_) for ethical training (_gumnasia_)" (117).
""To conclude the sixth discourse, Epictetus relates other ethical notions to this new formulation of using appearances according to consequences. This use is in our power, unhindered and unconstrained. It gives us freedom and puts an end to our complaints and sorrows. It may be noted here, that the relation of consequence, though necessary, is not in any sense fatalistic or deterministic. It is at best a hypothetical necessity. As Epictetus says, if man is to attain his proper end, he must act according to the consequences of appearances. This is in no way a denial of man's freedom" (118).
"Thus the rational use of appearances has now become the use of appearances according to consequence. Now the relation of consequence in Stoic logic is a necessary relation and can be tested by a formal test. If Epictetus proclaims that this relation is basic in ethics, we should expect him to maintain that the correct use of appearances in ethics is based on necessary truth and is subject to a formal logical criterion. This is precisely the view he sets forth in the seventh discourse" (118).
"Logic teaches us how one thing is a consequence of another and when one thing follows on one thing or on many. One must master these things if he is to establish proofs and determine consequences properly and not be misled by fallacies. That is why students have been required to study and practice logic. The obedience to the laws of logic is itself a duty. Once we have granted the premises, it is a duty and a necessity to abide by the consequences from them. But if the premises are changed, then the consequence is no longer binding. The student must know when to grant a hypothesis and accept its consequences and reject what conflicts with it. He cannot acquire this ability without careful training in logic" (118).
"The failure to learn logic means the inability to use appearances according to consequence, and that means that the basic error in ethics, as well as in logic, has been committed. In this way Epictetus establishes the rules of logic as the criteria of value judgments and justifies the opening statement of the seventh discourse, that the study of logical fallacies and hypothetical propositions is relevant to moral conduct" (118).
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