Should we pursue preferred indifferents?

 There was a problem with a maxim of mine: 'pursue nothing external,' derived from _Discourses_ 4.12.15, which other members of the International Stoic Forum tried to help me correct.

"First, therefore, we ought to have these principles at command, and to do nothing apart from them, but keep the soul intent upon this mark; we must pursue none of the things external, none of the things which are not our own, but as He that is mighty has ordained; pursuing without any hesitation the things that lie within the sphere of the moral purpose, and all other things as they have been given us" (Oldfather).

The main objection was that my wording (and even many translations) made it sound like Epictetus was saying that we shouldn't pursue preferred indifferents.

Grant Sterling provided the best solution:

"All:
    Part of the problem is that English (and probably ancient Greek)
lacks good terminology to express an important distinction.
    Imagine that my _only_ goal was to perform the action that would
increase the number of purple things in the universe by the
greatest amount possible.  The problem is that this goal, stated in those
terms, is insufficient for action.  I have to figure out which concrete plan
_is_ the one that would maximize purple.  Suppose it turns out that the
purple-maximizing option is to use my savings to purchase a factory
that manufactures paint, convert it so that it only makes purple, and offer
the paint at wildly discounted prices.  So I go to the factory owner and offer
him money for the plant...
    Now suppose that someone asks me "what are you trying to do?"  In
English, all of these answers are 'true':
    1) I am trying to increase the amount of purple in the world.
    2) I am trying to buy a paint factory.
    3) I am trying to manufacture inexpensive purple paint.
    4) Etc.
    So in one sense I am aiming at purchasing a factory, and in another
sense I am aiming at maximizing purple.
    The Stoics now run into the same problem.  My goal is to do the
virtuous thing.  Fine.  But what _is_ the virtuous thing?  Maybe at this
moment the virtuous thing is to provide tutoring to a student who is
struggling in my class.  OK, then in one sense of the word I am striving to
help this student learn more about Hume's philosophy, and in another
sense I am striving to be virtuous.  These are two descriptions of the very
same action, and they are both accurate descriptions in some sense.

    So, I think, it is true that for the Stoics the _only_ thing we aim at
should be virtue, and also true that we should constantly aim at external
things other than virtue.  Those ideas seem contradictory, but they aren't--
the are compatible because they represent descriptions at different levels.
    To see this, imagine the following case.  Suppose Abimelech desires
to do the right thing.  And suppose that he calculates (correctly) that
the right thing for him to do at that moment is to campaign to help
Candidate P get elected Mayor.  So he campaigns for Candidate P.
    But he becomes frustrated, because people don't seem receptive to
voting for P.  When P loses the election, Abimelech is miserable.
    This illustrates the difference between:
    a) Pursuing an external thing _only_ insofar as it represents the
concrete path to virtue, (or, to put it another way, aiming at the
correct _action_) and
    b) Pursuing the external thing _pre se_ (or, aiming at the desired
_outcome_).
    Abimelech started out purely aiming at virtue.  At first, campaigning
for P was _only_ the concrete execution of his pursuit of virtue.  But
then it became an end in itself, and the result was that Abimelech was led
away from eudaimonia instead of towards it--he's miserable instead of
happy.
    The next election comes.  This time, Abimelech discovers how to
rig voting machines so that they will convert some votes for the other
candidate into votes for P.  P wins the rigged election, and Abi is
happy.  But, of course, he doesn't have eudaimonia, because he is not
acting as he ought to act.  Again, he is pursuing an external (securing
election of P as Mayor) in itself, not as a distillation of the pursuit of
virtue.  Once you fall into pursuing the external thing itself, you will
fail to be consistently happy, and fail to act consistently in the correct
manner.  You will fail to achieve eudaimonia.

    So, again, in one sense of the word it is perfectly fine to say that
Stoics pursue things other than virtue, indeed the pursuit of virtue
in the abstract cannot lead to any actions at all.  But in another sense
it is very dangerous to start talking as though Stoics pursue the external
thing _itself_.  There is a big difference between "aiming at helping
Candidate P get elected" and "aiming at doing the virtuous thing, which
at this moment happens to involve helping P get elected"."

    "Regards,
        GCS"