Stoic News

By Dave Kelly

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

There May Have Never Been A Stoic Sage

 

There May Have Never Been A Stoic Sage


That probably doesn't matter much. See Grant Sterling's answer to Steve Marquis on the International Stoic Forum sent May 23, 2017:


Steve:

I am ion [sic] general agreement with your position, so I will not re-state the points of agreement (except to emphasize the crucial point that my action IS my choice--these are not two different things). But I do want to clarify one issue:

I don't think the distinction between the virtuous action of the Sage and the appropriate action of the person making progress is ONLY a distinction in regularity, for the ancient Stoics.

Let's start with a case from Kant. I own a store. A child comes into my store and buys some candy. He gives me a $`20 bill, and obviously has no idea how much it's worth. Do I give him the correct change, or cheat him? Now imagine that the only thing that enters my mind is "If I cheat him, his parents might find out, and I'll get the reputation of being someone who cheats children out of their money, and my store will lose business. I'll have better long-term profits if I give him correct change." In this case I have in one sense done the right thing (I gave him fair change), but for the wrong reason (the fact that cheating him would be immoral should have at least entered my mind!).

Now imagine the following case. Suppose that I am assigned by my corporation to purchase the vehicles for the company fleet. I look at the various cars available on the basis of gas mileage, repair costs, purchase costs, etc., etc., etc. Now suppose after all of this consideration it becomes clear that car A is acceptable, but car B is superior.

Suppose that I phone the dealer who sells car A one last time to let him know that unless he can come up with a substantially better offer I am going with car B. The dealer says, "I'll tell you what I'll do. I quoted you a price of $10,000 for that car. I'll write you up an invoice for your corporation that says that you purchased the car for $12,000, and I'll write a sales slip up for my boss that says I sold it for $10,000, and you and I can pocket $1,000 each for ourselves."

Now suppose further that I struggle with this tempting offer of personal gain, but decide in the end that it would be wrong to act in this way--I purchase car B. Did I make the right choice?

In one sense, yes. The right choice was to pick car B, and I picked car B. Did I do it for the right reason? In one sense, yes--I did it because it was the correct action given my role as a purchaser for my company--taking bribes would be wrong.

But in another sense, my reasoning was flawed. I considered the fact that I would receive `$1,000 for myself to be a very strong reason in favor of choosing car A (even though I ultimately decided against doing it). But in truth, the fact that the dealer wanted to bribe me to do it was, if anything, a strong reason to buy from someone else. Because I am not a Sage, I have desires for external things (the money and/or the things the money could buy), and those desires warped my reasoning process. They did not, in this case, warp them irreparably, but they did warp them. The Sage would have chosen car B instantly, without hesitation and without temptation to do anything else. Put it another way--I thought it was a close call whether I should pick A or B, but it wasn't a close call.

This produces the distinction in regularity that you have rightly pointed out--the Sage always gets these actions right. I got this one right, this time, but given my desires I will surely get some action wrong sometime. Maybe the next bribe will be bigger, or will come at a time of weakness, etc.

So, for the traditional Stoics, an appropriate action is not just a correct action done by someone who doesn't always do correct actions. An appropriate action is an action with the correct object (buy car B, give correct change, feed the orphans, tell the truth under oath, whatever), but with imperfect reasoning...and an action with imperfect reasoning is not entirely the correct action at all. The Sage's reasoning is not distorted by desires for external things, and so that's why he gets it right 100% of the time. This ties in with a point that I made recently--the Stoics believe that the only reason anyone ever does the wrong thing is because they have incorrect value beliefs, and hence incorrect desires, and hence they sometimes pursue their desires instead of the rational thing to do.

So what we have, I think is both a dichotomy and a sliding scale. The Sage is not just one pole of a sliding scale--the reasoning of the Sage is different in kind from the reasoning of the person who is almost-but-not-quite a Sage, in much the same way that someone who has never committed adultery is different in kind from someone who only did it once. There are those who are faithful, and adulterers. Among adulterers, there is a sliding scale of severity. There are those who reason correctly (Sages) and those who reason incorrectly, but among the latter there is a sliding scale of severity. The vicious person is the person who habitually not only reasons imperfectly but actually chooses actions with the incorrect object habitually. The coward habitually runs away from danger even when he shouldn't. The Sage isn't even tempted to run away (nor tempted to rashly face dangers he rationally should avoid). The rest of us don't consistently get things right or wrong--we can try to make progress towards Sagedom, though....

I agree, by the way, that virtually no-one is literally incurable. I don't know any liars who aren't at least sometimes swayed towards telling the truth. I don't know any cowards who don't at least occasionally see that it would be right to stay. So for practical purposes both poles are as rare as the phoenix. But this shouldn't blind us into thinking that Sages are irrelevant theoretical entities. If true eudaimonia only comes to those who reason correctly, then according to traditional Stoicism those of us who are not Sages have no eudaimonia at all. On the traditional Stoic view, I have never reasoned correctly in any of my actions. This is a critical distinction.

Regards,
Grant

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