The Modernist Marginalization of the Six Classical Philosophical Commitments

 

The Modernist Marginalization of the Six Classical Philosophical Commitments

Theoretical framework: Grant C. Sterling (Eastern Illinois University). Analysis and synthesis: Dave Kelly. Prose rendering: ChatGPT (OpenAI). 2026.

The historical development at issue is the modernist marginalization of the six classical philosophical commitments, with their functions displaced by alternative assumptions and procedures.

In Sterling’s framework, the substitutions can be summarized as follows.

1. Substance Dualism → Physicalism or Materialism

Mind and agency are explained in physical terms rather than as involving a distinct nonphysical substance.

This displacement changes the philosophical account of the rational agent, potentially reducing mental activity and agency to physical processes.

2. Metaphysical Libertarianism → Determinism or Compatibilism

Libertarian freedom is displaced by accounts that explain agency without requiring the power to choose otherwise under the same conditions.

This changes the account of human responsibility by altering or rejecting the conception of freedom as a genuine metaphysical power of choice.

3. Ethical Intuitionism → Procedural or Constructivist Ethics

Direct rational apprehension of moral truths gives way to moral conclusions derived through procedures, deliberation, consensus, or construction.

The central shift concerns the source of moral knowledge: whether reason apprehends moral truths or whether moral conclusions are established through specified processes.

4. Foundationalism → Coherentism or Pragmatic Justification

Justification through basic, independently warranted principles is displaced by mutually supporting beliefs, practical success, or other nonfoundational approaches.

This changes the account of how beliefs and ethical propositions are ultimately justified.

5. Correspondence Theory of Truth → Pragmatic, Coherence, or Consensus Accounts

Truth as correspondence with reality is displaced by accounts emphasizing coherence, practical consequences, or agreement.

This changes the criterion by which claims are understood to be true, potentially shifting emphasis from correspondence with reality to the relations among beliefs, their consequences, or their acceptance.

6. Moral Realism → Moral Anti-Realism

Objective moral facts are displaced by accounts that ground moral judgments in attitudes, conventions, social practices, preferences, or institutional procedures.

This is a particularly consequential displacement because it concerns whether moral propositions are objectively true or whether moral judgment ultimately depends on human attitudes or practices.

The Central Historical Thesis

These changes are not merely revisions to ancient Stoic physics. They concern the philosophical foundations of ethical thought itself.

The most consequential displacement is arguably Moral Realism by Moral Anti-Realism: objective moral truth gives way to procedures or preferences that determine what counts as acceptable. The other substitutions alter the accounts of mind, freedom, moral knowledge, justification, and truth that would support an objective ethical system.

Considered together, the six substitutions describe a shift in philosophical orientation. Questions about the nature of the agent, the reality of freedom, the apprehension of moral truth, the foundations of justification, the correspondence of propositions with reality, and the objectivity of moral value are increasingly addressed through alternative explanatory or procedural frameworks.

The significance for Stoicism is that a modern reconstruction may preserve traditional terminology, ethical exercises, and practical recommendations while adopting philosophical commitments that differ substantially from those Sterling defends.

Scope and Qualification

This is a reconstruction of the historical tendency through Sterling’s six-commitment framework, not a claim that modern philosophy followed one uniform sequence or that every modern Stoic accepts all six substitutions.

The categories identify broad philosophical contrasts rather than universally accepted historical replacements. Each contrast requires separate examination, and particular thinkers may combine positions that do not fit neatly into a single category.

The central issue is therefore not simply whether modern Stoicism preserves ancient practices. It is whether the philosophical commitments used to justify its ethical claims preserve, revise, or displace the classical commitments Sterling considers essential.