Stoic Virtue Internalism vs Aritotle's Virtue Actualism

 

What about a view where virtue requires physical engagement with externals 

Claude:

That's essentially Aristotle's position, and it creates a fundamental tension with Stoic ethics. 

Aristotle argues that virtue necessarily involves engaging with external goods and circumstances. You can't be truly generous without having resources to give away. You can't practice justice without participating in community life. You can't be courageous without facing actual dangers. Virtue (*arete*) for Aristotle is excellence in activity - it requires a stage on which to perform. 

This view sees virtue as inherently relational and contextual. A person stranded alone on a desert island might maintain good intentions, but they couldn't fully express virtues like justice or generosity. Aristotle would say their virtue remains incomplete or merely potential until they can act in the world with others. 

For Aristotelians, this means:

- External goods aren't just "preferred indifferents" - they're necessary instruments for virtuous action

- You can be prevented from virtue by circumstances beyond your control

- Complete virtue requires not just right intention but successful engagement with the world

- The good life depends partly on luck and external conditions 

This sharply contrasts with the Stoic view that virtue is purely internal. Where Stoics say the sage is equally virtuous whether rich or poor, healthy or sick, Aristotelians would argue that poverty or illness can genuinely impede virtuous activity and thus harm your flourishing. 

The Aristotelian view makes virtue more vulnerable but arguably more concrete - it's not just about having the right attitude, but about actually doing virtuous things in the messy, complex world of relationships and material circumstances. 

What would you call the Stoic view that virtue is only internal in contrast to Aristotle's view that virtue must be expressed in physical activity.

Claude:

You could call this the distinction between **virtue internalism** and **virtue externalism** (or **virtue actualism**).

**Virtue internalism** (the Stoic view) holds that virtue is constituted entirely by internal states - your rational judgments, intentions, and attitudes. The virtue is complete regardless of whether you can successfully act on it in the world.

**Virtue externalism** or **virtue actualism** (the Aristotelian view) holds that virtue necessarily requires external expression or actualization. Virtue isn't just about having the right internal states but about successfully manifesting them in action within the world.

Some philosophers also frame this as:

**Virtue as disposition** vs. **virtue as activity** - though this gets more complex since both schools see virtue as involving dispositions, they just disagree about whether those dispositions must be successfully exercised.

**Contemplative virtue** vs. **practical virtue** - emphasizing whether virtue can be complete in thought alone or requires engagement with practical affairs.

The internalism/externalism terminology is particularly apt because it captures the core disagreement: whether the essential nature of virtue lies within the agent's mind and will (internalism) or necessarily extends outward into successful worldly activity (externalism).

This distinction has modern parallels in debates about whether moral responsibility depends only on intention or also requires successful action, and whether we can be fully virtuous agents even when circumstances prevent us from acting on our virtuous commitments.