Core Stoicism: Section Four: Virtue

Section Four: Virtue -- Grant C. Sterling

Th 24) In order to perform an act of will, the act of will 

must have some content.  The content is composed

of the result at which one aims.

Th 25) Some things are appropriate objects at which to

aim, although they are not genuinely good.

Th 26) Some such objects are things like life [our own,

or others'], health, pleasure, knowledge, justice, truth-

telling, etc.

Th 27) Virtue consists of rational acts of will, vice of

irrational acts of will.

28) Ergo, any act that aims at an [external] object of desire is

not virtuous, since all desires [for externals] are irrational.

29) Ergo, virtue consists of the pursuit of appropriate

objects of aim, not the pursuit of the [external] objects of our

desires . Such virtuous acts will give us good feelings

[by 17] , and since we have no desires regarding

the actual outcome, they will never produce unhappiness

for us. 

Core Stoicism