"Roman Stoic Mindfulness: An Ancient Technology of the Self" by John Sellars
"The sort of attention [Epictetus] is concerned with is not on the task at hand, even if he claims that greater attention will improve whatever one happens to be doing at the present moment, but in fact on something else. The things to which we ought to pay attention are, he says,
'First, these general principles, and you ought to have them at your command (procheiros), and without them neither go to sleep, nor rise up, nor drink, nor eat, nor mingle with men; I mean the following: [1] No man is master of another’s moral purpose (proairesis); and [2] In its sphere alone are to be found one’s good and evil. It follows, therefore, [3] that no one has power either to procure me good, or to involve me in evil, but I myself alone have authority over myself in these matters. (Diss. 4.12.7-8)'
"Epictetus is suggesting that in whatever task a person undertakes they ought to keep these three philosophical principles ready to hand (procheiros). The continual attitude of attention that Epictetus insists is vital is not to the task itself but to these principles that ought to inform everything a person does. The goal underlying and uniting these principles is autonomy or freedom (eleutheria), which for Epictetus is an essential component of a good life. If someone is able to live a life informed by these principles then no external agent or event will have the power to upset their equanimity. If anyone suffers from mental disturbance (tarachê), this is simply due to a lack of training in developing the appropriate attention to these fundamental philosophical principles (Diss. 4.12.13). This is a skill that can be learned, like any other art or craft, echoing Epictetus’s wider conception of philosophy as an art of living (Diss. 4.12.14; cf. Diss. 1.15.2 with Sellars 2003).
"In this spirit of training, Epictetus repeats the point he has just made and his three principles. We ought to keep these principles ready to hand (procheiros) and do nothing without them (Diss. 4.12.15). These principles should always come first. However he adds some further guidance that also ought to be continually kept in mind:'And next we must remember [4] who we are, and [5] what is our designation, and [6] must endeavour to direct our actions, in the performance of our duties, to meet the possibilities of our social relations. (Diss. 4.12.16)'
"This second set of principles is concerned with our social roles and relations. Throughout the Discourses Epictetus says that one ought to conform to such roles. It is worth noting, though, that here he puts them in second place. He also insists on the primacy of the first set of principles by describing them as God-given (Diss. 4.12.11-12), which for a Stoic could equally be rephrased as given by Nature. The fundamental principles that ought to inform all our actions refer to our natural constitution, but we ought to pay attention to our social obligations as well" (John Sellars, pp. 11--12).
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