Can we have intuitive knowledge of fundamental moral axioms?

Grant Sterling's 11/19/2014 message to the International Stoic Forum

Again, I think we need to make a key
distinction here, the distinction between
(roughly) axioms and theorems.
Theorems are Provable, by an application
of logic (or the logically-structured rules of
the discipline). However, proofs require premises.
If the premises are themselves provable, they are
provable on the basis of more fundamental premises.
Eventually one must arrive at axioms--principles
that are not provable, but provide the basis for
proof in the subject.
Axioms, of course, could be totally arbitrary,
but then the subject would be of little interest to
most people except as an intellectual puzzle. (Indeed,
logic puzzles work this way. Or Sudokus--you are
given an arbitrary collection of numbers, along with
some arbitrary logical rules, and you have to derive the
location of the other numbers.) But serious subjects
seek axioms which are _true_, and this requires an
act of intuition or perception of self-evidence (I
think those are the same thing) or some equivalent.
If someone asserts a theorem as true, it is
right to demand that they show the proof. If someone
asserts an axiom as true, then demanding a proof is
a sign of misunderstanding.
But that doesn't mean that one cannot provide
evidence for the truth of an axiom. This will have to
be indirect evidence, but it can be evidence nonetheless.
But it will only be necessary for someone who is not
themselves sure of the axiom. If I can "see" that if
A=B and B=C then A=C, I need offer myself no evidence
of its truth. Only someone who doesn't see the necessity
of this truth will have reason to ask for evidence.
{By 'indirect evidence' I mean something like
consulting others to see if they find the axiom
self-evident, considering the logical consequences of
the axiom to see if it yields any wildly implausible
consequences, seeing whether the principle has been
accepted by a wide variety of cultures in different
time periods, etc.}

Now take the moral case. I am asked by the
tyrant to bear false witness against a friend. Should
I do so?
In one sense, 'deliberation' and 'reason' and
'logic' are certainly appropriate. The Stoics always
defend the crucial importance of reasoning in practical
(as well as theoretical) affairs. In that sense they
would not have approved of someone who simply chose
impulsively or relied on 'intuition' about how to act.
But what do we use as premises for such an
argument? Principles about what kinds of things are
and are not good or evil:



> And what did you decide?
> 'That justice and fairness are good, vice and injustice bad.'
> Is life a good?
> 'No.'
> Is dying bad?
> 'No.'
> Or jail?
> 'No.'
> And what about slanderous and dishonest talk, betraying a friend, and
> trying to ingratiate yourself with a tyrant -- how exactly did you
> characterize those?
> [[Discourses, 4.1.]134] 'As bad.'

But where do we get _those_ principles? I
hold, and I think the Stoics hold, that they are
self-evident or intuitive. {That life is not good
and death or jail are not bad may not seem intuitive,
but the Stoics think that when we help people strip off
the fact that they _desire_ these outcomes they can see
these truths. See '2', below.} The Stoics would regard as
absurd a demand for "proof" that one ought not betray
a friend (ceteris paribus, at the very least!)--indeed,
that's part of the point of this passage.

So, as I see it:

1) The Stoics accept that we can have intuitive
knowledge of fundamental moral axioms. Without
such knowledge, the moral project of Stoicism cannot
get off the ground.

2) One's character, especially one's desires, does
indeed obscure our knowledge...more correctly, it
adds pseudo-axioms to our moral system that create
contradictions and consequently immoral choices. So
we need to work on our character, and question some
of our moral assumptions.

3) This does not mean that our 'conscience' is
merely a reflection of our character or our
upbringing. The fact that our desires have piled
fool's gold on top of the true gold of our moral
intuitions doesn't make them any less golden.
{See 'X', below.} If you throw out the baby with the
bathwater, you're left with no moral axioms at
all, and that's nihilism, not Stoicism.

4) Deliberation is needed when we discover a
legitimate reason for acting in one way and a
legitimate reason for acting in another. I
should not need to deliberate in the 'tyrant'
case, because I should have performed the gleaning
of my axiomatic system in advance, and so I
should be able to see immediately that there is
in fact no reason for agreeing to bear false witness,
and very good reasons not to do so.

X: A digression. This is, I think, the
main reason that society today mistakenly assumes
that morality is by definition other-regarding.
No-one ever regards an action beneficial to themselves
as a command of conscience. (No-one ever says
"I was going to use this money to buy a gift for
my mother, but my conscience told me to spend it
on a gift for myself instead.") We can only identify
true acts of conscience when they conflict with
our desires or with social expectations. As a result,
people come to think that 'morality' consists of
rules that demand self-sacrifice, because they
don't see that their ideas of self-interest are
mistaken, and so they only 'see' the moral rules
that constrain them from doing what they want.

So, once again, I'd say that you're both
right.

Regards,
Grant