The Heart and Soul of Stoicism

From: Grant Sterling [...] Sent: 03 October 2017 19:54 To: stoics@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [stoics] Structural Soundness

 "I've said this before and no-one showed me where I was wrong. I'll say it again and maybe this time someone will do so. You (Malcolm) say that Stoicism would have to be subjected to an extreme process to winnow the ethics away from the Physics. Without commenting on the 'extremity' involved, that process has already been completed, by a guy named Epictetus. Pick up the Encheiridion. In sections 1-5, Epictetus presents Stoic ethics with no reliance on anything in the Physics. Only internal things are in my control. Unhappiness is caused by (falsely) believing that externals are good or evil, which causes us to desire the world to be one way rather than another, which inevitably causes unhappiness when the world doesn't conform. If I eliminate my belief that externals are ever bad, I can even prevent all grief when my child or wife dies, or when I myself face death. The only thing that isn't here in sections 1-5 is a discussion about preferred and dispreferred indifferents. This is the heart and soul of Stoic ethics (and obviously, on my view, of Stoicism itself). And this is the book from which the majority of contemporary "Stoics" learned Stoicism (in my experience). There are passages later on that mention the gods, but none of them are central to the text. The section that discusses the gods most thoroughly, #31, doesn't place the ethics on the foundation of the Physics, but actually connects our proper religious beliefs to the ethics (i.e., the ethical system that has already been discussed is the foundation of the discussion of theology, not v.v.). And there is absolutely nothing about Logos, pneuma, pantheism, materialism, or any of that. So Epictetus stripped away almost the entirety of Stoic Physics in order to present an entirely coherent and compelling ethical theory--and he could have easily removed the handful of theological references as well if he had wanted to. And my position, repeated many times, is this-- if Epictetus doesn't deserve to be called a "Stoic", then your definition of "Stoicism" is far too narrow. I'll happily be whatever Epictetus is, and you can take your "Stoicism" home with you."

 "Regards, 

   Grant"