Stoicism, Moral Facts, and Ethical Intuitionism
Stoicism, Moral Facts, and Ethical Intuitionism
Three posts by Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum (Google Groups), thread “What is a fact?” First and second: February 24, 2020. Third: March 13, 2020, in reply to Steve Marquis. Preserved by Dave Kelly, 2026. Layer: Theoretical Core — Philosophical Commitments. Attribution: Sterling.
Theoretical foundations: Grant C. Sterling (Eastern Illinois University). Analysis and synthesis: Dave Kelly. Prose rendering: Claude (Anthropic). 2026.
Editorial Note — Dave Kelly
These three messages together constitute Sterling’s most complete epistemological grounding of moral realism in ethical intuitionism. The thread opens as a dispute over the word “fact” itself, provoked by Gich’s objection that defining moral facts in terms of facts is circular. Sterling’s two February 24 messages answer that objection by building the apparatus from the ground up: first the correspondence theory of truth (belief on one side, fact on the other, truth as the relation between them), then a four-part epistemology distinguishing contingent from necessary facts and fallible from infallible means of knowing them. The second message ends by promising to apply the apparatus to moral belief specifically — a promise redeemed three weeks later in the March 13 message, in reply to Steve Marquis’s attempt to derive Stoic value claims from an empirically-grounded starting assumption. Sterling’s reply is the source of the corpus’s clearest statement of the intuitionism-or-nihilism dichotomy and the sensory-exclusion argument: moral terms cannot be heard, smelt, tasted, seen, or felt, so any access to moral facts must be non-empirical. The three messages should be read as one continuous argument, interrupted by three weeks of thread traffic: truth is correspondence → necessary truths are known by direct rational apprehension → moral truths, being necessary and non-empirical, are known the same way, and there is no stable alternative to this position short of nihilism.
Message One: Truth Is Correspondence, Facts Are Not in the Mind
Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum, February 24, 2020, 16:41 UTC. Thread: “What is a fact?” Responding to an extended exchange with Gich and Steve Marquis over whether “moral facts” is a coherent phrase.
OK, I have been busy, and I was hoping that this thread had run its course. But I see now that I should have made time to send this message sooner. (By the way, I am using ‘the universe’ to mean ‘all of reality’, ‘Being’, ‘everything that really is’, etc. If you believe in multiple universes, they are all still part of ‘the universe’ as I am using the phrase.)
Let’s start with a (relatively!) simple case. I believe that it is raining outside. That belief is internal to me. It has content, it is ‘about’ something — namely, rain outside. But some beliefs are false — sometimes I believe that it is raining outside, but it isn’t. So beliefs are about the world, and when they match the way the world really is, they’re true; when they don’t, they’re false. “Truth” is correspondence of a belief with reality — that’s the ‘correspondence theory of truth’, and it’s the theory of truth that would have been embraced by the ancient Stoics if anyone had asked them, which they didn't, because basically 100% of people throughout most of human history have not only embraced it but thought it was so obvious that there wasn't even a name for it.
So we have something on the side of the mind — let’s stick with “belief” for a moment. We have something on the side of the universe. And we have the correspondence between them, which is “truth”. Now we need a name for ‘the way the universe actually is’. And the word that philosophers have pretty much unanimously chosen is “fact”. So “facts”, as philosophers use the word, are not things in our minds — they’re things in the world.
Belief (in the mind) → Fact (how the universe is) = Truth. Belief that fails to match Fact = Falsehood.
You can argue among yourselves about whether or not “fact” was a good choice for the word for the way the universe is. We certainly need some word. It’s not a clear deviation from common usage — for example, we commonly say “in fact” when we’re about to make a claim about how the universe actually is, often in contradiction to how someone has claimed that it was. But I won’t spend time arguing about that. “Fact” is the word philosophers have chosen, and seeing no better word I’ll use the word that way as well.
Now the story above works with other mental attitudes as well. For example, I perceive that there is a Pepsi can on the desk in front of me. If, in fact, there is a Pepsi can in front of me, then my perception is accurate. (You can call this match “truth” as well, if you like — it’s certainly a close cousin to ‘truth’ as applied to beliefs.) But the perception is still in the mind, and the facts about what I am perceiving are still in reality, outside the mind. Or, in a different case, we say “her wish came true” when her wish, in her mind, matched up with the facts of the universe. I can desire something, and I will receive positive feelings when the world in fact fits my desire, and negative feelings when it doesn’t (which is why I need to change my desires in the way the Stoics recommend). There are many sorts of mental attitudes that are ‘about’ the universe, and sometimes the universe fits those attitudes, and sometimes it doesn’t.
So cataleptic impressions, if they exist, are not the same thing as ‘facts’. An impression is a way of seeing the world — but some impressions are false, they don’t match up with the way the universe really is. That’s the heart and soul of Stoicism — most of our impressions about good and evil do not match up with the way good and evil really are in the universe. Cataleptic impressions are a special class of impressions, because they always match up with the facts. But CIs are still inside our minds, and if there were no facts outside the mind, our CIs could never be true — that is, they could never be cataleptic! So CIs in my mind need facts outside my mind in order for them to be true.
So Stoicism is incoherent without moral facts. Unless the universe really contains good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, and contains them in definite states that are independent of how we want them to be, the whole view would make no sense. Externals are neither good nor evil — the Stoics think this is a fact about the universe. If there are no facts, then the Stoic view of what is good, evil, or indifferent is no more valid than the ordinary view. The Stoics think that we have role-duties. This is a (putative) fact. If there are no such facts, then we have no duties, and psychopaths are closer to the truth about morality than we are. Courage, the Stoics think, is a Virtue. If there are no moral facts, then there are no virtues. The Stoics consistently believe that there are objective “right answers” about these things, and their view requires this.
As I said before, if you have an irrational fixation against the word “fact” that matches Gich’s irrational fixation against “moral”, by all means use some other word or phrase. But make sure not to pick a word or phrase that ordinarily refers to something on the left side of the truth-correspondence arrow. Don’t use ‘impression’ (cataleptic or otherwise), ‘belief’, ‘opinion’, or even ‘truth’. Some philosophers like ‘state of affairs’. Whatever. But I hope that I am sufficiently clear now: mental attitudes point out towards the universe. Sometimes they match up with the way the universe actually is. (Sometimes, they don’t.) I am using, always have used, and intend to continue to use the word “fact” to refer to the way the universe actually is.
This is quite long enough for now. I’ll have another post about things like “knowledge” and “certainty” and “skepticism” and “pragmatism” at a future time.
Regards, GCS
Message Two: Necessary Facts, Known with Certainty
Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum, February 24, 2020, 21:57 UTC. Same thread, same day, continuing the epistemology.
So, again, however anyone else wishes to use their words, I will always mean by “fact” the objective reality, the state of the universe (essentially, what Steve and Kant call “noumena/-on”).
Let us return to where I started, with a belief. I believe that it is raining outside. If that belief corresponds to the facts, if it actually is raining outside, then the belief is true.
But let’s for a moment stop thinking about whether our beliefs correspond to the facts, and think about the beliefs themselves. Some beliefs are reasonable, rational, or justified, while some are not. My belief that it is raining outside is based on the fact that I heard today’s weather forecast and it predicted continual rain, plus the fact that I was outside a while ago and perceived rain, as well as solid dark clouds in every direction, suggesting that the rain would not be stopping soon. Those two things together give me good reason, I think, to believe that it is raining outside. Of course, I could easily imagine having stronger evidence. Evidence, ‘justification’, comes in degrees. Some of our beliefs are well justified, some poorly justified (and some clearly unjustified).
I am using ‘evidence’ in the widest possible sense. So, for example, suppose that I consider the proposition “modus ponens is deductively valid”. (M.p. is the argument structure: ‘If p, then q; p; therefore, q’. ‘Deductively valid’ means that it is impossible for the premises to both be true while the conclusion is false.) I can “see”, mentally, that m.p. is valid. That is, when I contemplate the propositions involved, it is obvious to my intellect that there is no way those premises could be true and the conclusion false, regardless of what you wish to plug in for ‘p’ and ‘q’. I would say that I have extremely strong evidence for the truth of that proposition, that my belief that it is true is overwhelmingly justified.
In fact, I would say that in this case I have certainty. Not just psychological certainty (“I’m really, really sure that it’s true”), although I do have that, but rational certainty — it is impossible (I assert) for this belief to be false.
When I use the word “knowledge” in the strict sense (that is, the careful, philosophical sense, not like ordinary conversation where people casually say “I know that…” promiscuously for a wide range of their beliefs), I will mean that I have rational certainty that my belief is true — it is impossible for me to be wrong.
This is the traditional sense of the word “knowledge”. It’s what Plato and Aristotle meant by the word, as well as most of their opponents. It’s what the Stoics mean. It’s not a popular view today among philosophers, because of course we know very little according to this definition. But I think that this is one area where ancient philosophers were wiser than contemporary philosophers. Anyway, wise or not, that’s how I’m going to use the word.
In fact, people like Plato were so concerned to mark off the difference between knowledge and belief/opinion that they even refused to call what we know a “belief” at all. That is, where I characterized “knowledge” as a rationally certain belief, Plato insisted on using the word “belief” in such a way that it meant by definition “something that falls short of knowledge”. For him, if I “believe that p”, then by definition I do not “know that p”. Although I am in fundamental agreement with him about what knowledge is, I think it’s easier to use modern language, where ‘knowledge’ is one species of belief — namely, certain belief.
Now keep in mind that I think that beliefs can be rational, justified, without being known. I do not know that it is raining outside. (In fact, the longer I spend typing this message, the weaker my justification gets.) But I think that my belief is justified. (Note that justification comes in degrees, but knowledge does not — you either know, or you don’t.)
OK, what kinds of beliefs could be “known”, and what kinds cannot? Well, on my view, contingent facts are tremendously difficult, if not impossible, to “know”. Because if the fact is not logically necessary, then that almost always raises the possibility that it isn’t a fact at all. There is no logically necessary reason why it must be raining outside right now, and so I can certainly imagine the opposite state of affairs. Since from a logical point of view both states are possible, it becomes very difficult to try to claim that I know either one with certainty. I would have to have some infallible method of grasping these contingent facts, and that leads us to our next problem.
By the same token, it is impossible to have knowledge of something if the means of gathering evidence is fallible. So, for example, my senses work indirectly, through a long causal chain, and every link in the chain introduces the possibility of error. So while I think that I am strongly justified in believing that there is a Pepsi can on my desk right now, because I clearly see it right in front of me, I must admit the possibility (however slight) that my senses are misleading me, or that I am dreaming. So I do not know that there’s a Pepsi can in front of me.
So there are four combinations: 1) contingent facts discovered by fallible means; 2) contingent facts discovered by infallible means; 3) necessary facts discovered by fallible means; 4) necessary facts discovered by infallible means.
1) Some very, very large percentage of our beliefs are beliefs about contingent truths based on fallible evidence, and hence do not constitute knowledge. The majority of our beliefs are based on our senses, or on the testimony of other people. Both of those methods are fallible, and so no knowledge whatsoever can ever come from them. But that’s fine — we seldom have to have knowledge; justified beliefs are fine. And this is also the realm of Science. Science builds strongly justified beliefs by putting together the sensory evidence of different people, coordinating it, testing it, etc. This will never reach certainty; scientifically-based beliefs are always subject to possible error and therefore should always be held in such a way that they can be revised if necessary. But, again, that’s just fine — it would be idiotic to throw out Science just because it doesn’t reach absolute certainty, and it would be idiotic to do the same with my many ordinary sensory beliefs. When I’m done today I will walk to the parking lot where I remember having parked my car, and I will expect it to be there. Yes, maybe I dreamed it. And maybe it has been stolen, or annihilated by an alien ray gun, or whatever. But the small possibility of error does not mean that I should reject the belief.
2) Now there is one area, and on my view only one area, where we have infallible knowledge of contingent facts — and that is our introspective knowledge of the contents of our own minds. I cannot be certain that it is raining outside, but I can be certain that I believe that it is raining. (You can’t be certain, because I might be lying to you. But my knowledge is direct and unmediated.) I believe that I hit my knuckle in a door earlier today, but I am certain that I feel mild pain right now. Knowledge is only possible in this case because, as I said, my awareness of my own mental states is direct and unmediated — there are no causal steps that can go wrong in this case.
3) Fallible awareness of necessary facts commonly occurs in the case of believing things on the basis of testimony of others, even though one cannot “see” (directly grasp) the truth oneself. My Mathematician friends often tell me that certain things in higher Math have been proven, where I cannot grasp the proof. When I was a child, I believed that 6×0=0 because my teacher told me that it was true. This is not knowledge — the person speaking to you could be lying, or they could be mistaken, or you might be misunderstanding what they’re saying. Again, your belief-based-on-testimony might be justified, even very strongly justified. I think that I was very strongly justified in believing that 6×0=0 simply because my teacher and the Math textbook both agreed that it was true.
4) Finally, we come to infallible awareness of necessary facts. On my view, this comes when my mind directly and clearly grasps the fact which I claim to know. At some point, I saw that 6×0 had to equal 0. I apprehended its necessity, I grasped the fact directly with my mind. At some point in my life I knew that modus ponens was valid. I didn’t believe it because the book said that it was valid, or because I could plug in a few values for ‘p’ and ‘q’ and end up with conclusions that I was sure were true — at some point I grasped it directly with my Intellect. I cannot be wrong about this — it is rationally certain. I know it.
I’m out of time for today. I will apply all of this to moral beliefs tomorrow.
Regards, GCS
Message Three: Intuitionism or Nihilism — No Third Option
Grant C. Sterling to the International Stoic Forum, March 13, 2020. Same thread. Reply to Steve Marquis, who had proposed deriving Stoic value claims from the unstated assumption that existence is good, then reasoning empirically from there.
Steve: I owed you this response a long time ago. I will be as brief as I possibly can.
Marquis had written: “OK, your turn. Explain to me how I see (or smell, or whatever) the goodness of survival. Recall the teleological vs non-teleological explanations for the start of everything I gave as an example? … Common to all of those will be the unspoken assumption that existence is good and non-existence is not good. That is about as basic as I can possibly get. We can move to survival of species / individuals / eco systems / etc from that. … There is no smell test in particular but we can empirically (to the best of current science) have a well justified opinion about whether a thing is dead or not.”
I totally agree that IF one makes the unspoken ASSUMPTION that existence is good and non-existence is not good, you may then proceed by empirical (or quasi-empirical) steps to conclusions about ethics. But my entire point was that the assumption itself is non-empirical. One can assume that pleasure is better than pain, and reach conclusions about ethics from that. Or the assumption that Courage is better than cowardice, or that truth-telling is better than lying, or any number of other things. Give me a non-empirical assumption to use as a crowbar, and no door will stand against me.
But I deny you that assumption. Some ethicists try to cheat, and engage in a bit of linguistic sleight-of-hand. (I do not accuse you of this.) They say that they will use ‘good’ as an empirical term, meaning something like ‘in accord with evolutionary fitness’ or something like that. Then before you know it they’re telling you that you ought to do this or that. But of course that is deceitful. If you wish to distort the word ‘good’ in this way, I cannot stop you, but I can deny you the right to make the derivations that one can make with the word in its ordinary meaning. (I.e., from ‘this action would cause the most good’ many people accept ‘this action is right — I ought to do it’. But from ‘this action would cause the most evolutionary fitness’ we cannot immediately derive anything about what we ought to do.) Furthermore, they cheat — evolutionary fitness is a notion that applies to a particular entity. I am evolutionarily fit if I am well-suited to have my genes preserved in posterity. From this you might get conclusions about how I should best preserve my own life and health, or that of my close relatives, but you can never get to conclusions about sacrificing myself for people in distant countries, etc.
If, on the other hand, I grant you one non-empirical assumption, then how can you deny me the right to introduce a second assumption? Or a third? If intuition, or Reason, or whatever you wish to call it justifies your assumption that existence or life is better than non-existence or death, then I can argue that it justifies other things. So my claim that our alternatives are intuitionism on the one hand or nihilism (or total skepticism, which is identical for practical uses) on the other hand has nothing to do with certainty — either we can see into the moral realm (however dimly), or else we are blind. Prefer a fallible intuitionism aiming at contingent truths if you’d like, but I still don’t see any third alternative.
‘Good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘virtuous’, ‘vicious’ — none of these things can be heard, smelt, tasted, seen, or felt. If there are moral facts that we can know (or even have the most faintly justified beliefs about), then we have to have a non-empirical way of knowing them. Since I don’t believe in a moral sense, and since I think the truths are necessary and not contingent, and since I already believe in the power of Reason to give us (certain) knowledge of mathematical and logical truths… my ethical position falls out of that.
And, for what it’s worth, I don’t see any better way of understanding the position of the ancient Stoics, either. I acknowledge that this is a debatable point (maybe they did believe in a sixth, moral, sense).
And none of this has anything to do with the existence of moral facts.
Regards, GCS
Corpus Note — Dave Kelly
These three messages together establish the complete epistemological chain from correspondence truth to moral intuitionism.
First, from the two February 24 messages: truth is the correspondence of a belief (in the mind) with a fact (in the world). Facts are not mental contents; cataleptic impressions, being mental, require external facts to correspond to in order to count as cataleptic at all. This makes Stoicism as a system dependent on moral facts existing outside the mind — without them, the Stoic evaluation of externals as neither good nor evil has no more claim to validity than any competing view.
Second, from the same messages: knowledge in the strict, traditional sense requires rational certainty, which requires both necessity (the fact could not have been otherwise) and infallible means of apprehension. Sterling identifies only two sources that meet this bar: introspective awareness of one’s own mental states, and direct rational grasp of necessary truths such as the validity of modus ponens or that 6×0=0. This second category — direct, unmediated intellectual apprehension of a necessary truth — is the epistemic mechanism that the March 13 message goes on to apply to ethics.
Third, from the March 13 message: any attempt to derive ethical conclusions empirically must smuggle in at least one non-empirical starting assumption (Marquis’s “existence is good”), and once one such assumption is granted, there is no principled way to refuse a second or third. This is the argument from unstable privilege — empiricism cannot license exactly one axiom and no more.
Fourth, from the same message: the sensory-exclusion argument and the resulting dichotomy. Moral terms cannot be heard, smelt, tasted, seen, or felt, so moral knowledge, if it exists at all, must come through a non-empirical faculty. Given that Sterling denies a distinct moral sense and holds that moral truths are necessary rather than contingent, the same rational faculty that yields certain knowledge of mathematical and logical truths is the faculty that yields knowledge of moral truths. The resulting dichotomy is exhaustive on Sterling’s account: intuitionism (fallible or infallible) or nihilism, with no stable third position.
Sources: International Stoic Forum (Google Groups), thread “What is a fact?” Messages of February 24, 2020 (16:41 UTC and 21:57 UTC) and March 13, 2020. Author: Grant C. Sterling. Preserved by Dave Kelly, 2026.
Theoretical foundations: Grant C. Sterling (Eastern Illinois University). Analysis and synthesis: Dave Kelly. Prose rendering: Claude (Anthropic). 2026.
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